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1. Introduction
Efﬁcient functioning of institutions and organizations often relies on co-
operation among their members. For example, when decision-making in
ﬁrms requires the sharing of information between an expert and a de-
cision maker, it is necessary that the expert offer correct information to
back up decisions, and that the decision maker use the expert’s informa-
tion appropriately. Similarly, the institution of start-up ﬁnancing does not
function smoothly unless investors and entrepreneurs mutually agree to
the generally established rules of ﬁnancing. The expert chooses to not
share information, and the investor to not lend her money unless they
have sufﬁcient trust in the decision maker and the entrepreneur, respec-
tively, to comply to the implicit rules of the transaction. The importance of
trust in the economy is recognized also by Kenneth Arrow when he writes,
“Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth telling... have real, practical, eco-
nomic value; they increase the efﬁciency of the system, enable you to produce
more goods.” Arrow (1974: 23)
The objective of this thesis is to deepen our knowledge about the impact of
asymmetric information on trust and thereby on the efﬁciency of economic
interactions. In the three essays that constitute the thesis, the focus is on
interactions between two individuals, a principal and an agent. The over-
arching theme of the essays is incomplete information about the intrinsic
motivation of the agent which is a commonplace dilemma in many orga-
nizations. The ﬁrst essay considers a one-time interaction whereas the
other two deal with a framework in which the principal and the agent
interact repeatedly which makes the evolution of trust a central issue.
The main contribution of this dissertation research is to establish novel
results regarding the interplay of asymmetric information and efﬁciency
9
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in principal-agent relationships. The general conclusion from the essays
is that incomplete information may be beneﬁcial for efﬁciency, where ef-
ﬁciency is measured in terms of ex-ante expected welfare of the principal
and the agent.
Cooperation between an agent and a principal is often ensured by formal
contracts which are enforced by courts. For instance, if a ﬁrm refuses to
pay its employees or investors, these can always seek for compensation
through courts by suing the ﬁrm. Given that the ﬁrm cannot escape its
liabilities, following the contract is always cheaper for it, provided that
the contract is designed optimally. Thus, formal contracts greatly enhance
trust in the economy.
It is, however, not always possible to write formal contracts. In these
settings, the efﬁcient functioning of organizations or other economic inter-
actions can still be ensured if contracts are implicit or relational in that
they rely on mutual cooperation over a period of time under the threat
that punishments, such as a termination of the relationship, are imposed
if the informal contract is violated. If punishments are carefully designed
they persuade all parties to comply to the implicit contract.
A myriad of collegial and hierarchical relationships in organizations in-
volve implicit contracts, such as the trading of favors between coworkers
and unwritten understandings between bosses and subordinates about
task assignment, promotion, and termination decisions. Even compensa-
tion, transfer pricing, and internal auditing, which seem highly formal
processes at ﬁrst sight, often cannot be understood without consideration
of their associated informal agreements. Moreover, relational contracts
are not limited to intra-ﬁrm interactions, but are present also in relation-
ships between ﬁrms.
The essays of this thesis all focus on these relational settings in which
formal contracts do not guide the behavior of agents. In such settings,
trust is essential to reach cooperative outcomes. To study trust and reci-
procity, the essays of this thesis apply game theoretical models that cap-
ture the strategic elements embedded in decisions to trust or reciprocate
between two individuals.
The ﬁrst two essays of the thesis consider the extraction of decision-
relevant information from an expert. The second essay combines this with
reputation building by the decision maker. Because the expert is privately
informed about the value of a decision-relevant variable, and because the
transaction is not contractible, the decision maker only obtains imper-
10
Introduction
fectly accurate information from the expert as long as their preferences
are not completely aligned. The essays formalize communication using
the game-theoretic framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Both essays
amend the seminal cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel by assuming
that the expert is uncertain about the preferences of the decision maker.
In the ﬁrst essay, the focus is on a one-shot interaction. The essay seeks
to formally determine whether and in which situations an expert should
communicate with one decision maker as opposed to an audience of deci-
sion makers who act jointly. Or, to emphasize the concern of the decision
maker, when, if ever, should she consult an expert on behalf of a larger
pool of decision makers, and when, if ever, should she consult the expert
individually.
To analyze this tradeoff, I formalize a static cheap-talk game in which
a sender is uncertain about the conﬂict of interest between him and a
receiver. A decision is taken either centrally by a committee of ex-ante
identical receivers, or decentralized to a single receiver. The centralized
decision is determined by the median voter, whereas the decentralized
decision is stochastic from the sender’s point of view. The sender’s prefer-
ences are non-symmetric in that downward deviations from his bliss point
are more costly than upward deviations. The two decision-making proto-
cols are compared in terms of the highest variance that they support in
the receiver’s preferences before communication breaks down.
For the model speciﬁcation under study, I ﬁnd that if the receiver’s deci-
sion leans to the direction preferred by the sender, decentralized decision-
making sustains a higher variance in the bias, but if the decision leans
to the sender’s least preferred direction, centralized decision-making sus-
tains a higher variance in the bias. This result speaks for concealing the
preferences of the decision maker in certain environments as it may en-
hance the efﬁciency of communication. The amount of uncertainty that
the sender has regarding the receiver’s preferences can be interpreted as
the level of trust that the sender has in the receiver sharing the same
preferences with him. The result says, effectively, that there are environ-
ments in which less trust is needed to sustain informative communication
if a decision is decentralized to a single decision maker.
The second essay focuses on a repeated interaction between an expert
and one decision maker, and it seeks to determine whether and under
which conditions the social value of additional information about the de-
cision maker is positive. The repeated nature of interaction allows for
11
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the gradual building of trust, or a sudden elimination of it if cooperation
breaks out. The concern of the sender to be able to participate in decision
making in the future motivates him to take costly actions by transmitting
truthful information at the risk of being deceived. Repeated play thus fa-
cilitates information sharing. At the same time, this concern for future
engagements works to the other direction. The concern of the receiver
to obtain truthful or accurate information in the future motivates her to
take costly actions in the short term by following the supposedly truthful
advice of the sender.
In the model, the sender learns about the possible bias of the receiver by
observing her chosen actions in consecutive decisions. The decisions differ
in their importance for the two players across periods. If the receiver’s
stakes in the ﬁrst period are low, the biased type invests in reputation
by mimicking the action of the unbiased type. I characterize the most
informative communication equilibrium under two alternative scenarios;
one in which the stakes are players’ private information, and another in
which they are commonly known. Although knowledge of the stakes is
beneﬁcial for sorting the receiver in the ﬁrst period, it is shown to reduce
all players’ in a range of parameters speciﬁcations of the model. Hence,
the essay points out that more trust can sometimes be sustained ex-ante
if the sender knows less about the decision maker. This result questions
the pursuit of complete transparency in organizations.
The third essay considers repeated transactions between a principal and
an agent in a setting without communication. Instead, the principal must
simply decide whether or not to trust an agent of unknown type at the
risk that the agent exploits her trust by behaving against the beneﬁts of
the principal. Naturally, if the principal knew that the agent abuses her
trust, she would not engage in a transaction with the agent in the ﬁrst
place. The model can be applied to analyze a variety of situations that
arise for instance between an investor and an entrepreneur, between a
ﬁrm and its employees or suppliers, or between a buyer and a seller.
In the essay, I analyze a twice-repeated trust game where an Investor
chooses in each period whether to invest or not in a project carried out
by an Entrepreneur. The Investor learns about the reliability of the En-
trepreneur by observing whether he repays investments or not. If the
project is valuable, an unreliable Entrepreneur has a reputational incen-
tive to repay the ﬁrst investment so as to be perceived as reliable and
thereby obtain ﬁnancing also in the second round. The paper analyzes
12
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two versions of the model, which differ in their informational assumptions
concerning the value of the Entrepreneur’s project. There is shown to al-
ways exist parameter speciﬁcations of the model under which all players’
ex-ante welfare is maximized if the Entrepreneur is privately informed
about the value of his project.
References
Arrow, K. (1974) The Limits of Organization. New York: W.W. Norton.
Crawford, V., and J. Sobel (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission”.
Econometrica 50 (6), 1431-1451.
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2. Bias Uncertainty and the Limits to
Information Transmission
2.1 Introduction
Decisions in organizations frequently rely on information provided by ex-
perts. These decisions are either made by individuals acting alone, or by
a group of individuals who act based on a joint decision. In ﬁrms, for in-
stance, ﬁnancial decisions are either the responsibility of individual man-
agers, or they are addressed in the board of directors. Suppose that the
decision is about the ﬁnancing of a project, and it is done based on a report
from a project manager (PM) who knows the project’s quality. When there
is any misalignment between the interests of the project manager and the
decision maker, whether an individual executive, or the board of directors,
information transmission is strategic, leading the project manager to use
only messages that favor his interests. At the extreme, the interests of
the players are so far apart that informative communication breaks down
altogether. Given that informed decisions are a prerequisite for success-
ful business, if the ﬁrm was to optimize its decision-making protocol in a
way that it maximizes the ﬂow of information from the project manager,
when should decisions be taken by individuals and when should they be
brought to the board room? This is the question that this paper tries to
address theoretically.
Another context in which this question seems relevant relates to pur-
chasing decisions of consumers. More speciﬁcally, consumers in a given
market need information about the quality of a new product to back up
their purchasing decisions. Should they listen to local sales representa-
tives who care about single purchases, or should they base their decision
on a national advertizing campaign which is designed for the average con-
sumer in the market?
15
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To return to the ﬁrst example, suppose that the conﬂict of interest be-
tween the PM and the decision maker is common knowledge among the
players. Communication-wise, the decision should be taken by the per-
son having her preferences closest to those of the PM. This is the seminal
message of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In any case, as long as preferences
of the PM and any given decision maker are not perfectly congruent, the
equilibrium structure of communication, as shown by Crawford and So-
bel, consists of noisy messages that reveal the PM’s private information
only partially.
Suppose instead that the PM is uncertain about the conﬂict of interest
between himself and the decision maker. This is not at all uncommon.
Many issues within ﬁrms, let alone in politics, are so complex that that
there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in views even within intra-ﬁrm groups
or political parties. The PM in a ﬁrm may be uncertain whether and to
which extent senior employees have more optimistic views about the fu-
ture of business, which would lead them to be either generous or conser-
vative in their ﬁnancing decision in comparison to what the PM prefers.
This provides a more interesting setting in which to explore the differ-
ences in the decision making protocols. When the PM is uncertain about
the decision maker’s bias, which can take any value from a ﬁnite interval,
the equilibrium communication strategy of the PM with an individual ex-
ecutive is a result from the PM maximizing his expected utility, that is,
maximizing the weighted sum of his payoffs for all possible levels of the
decision maker’s bias. The equilibrium communication strategy with a
board of directors, on the other hand, results from the PM maximizing his
utility given the expected decision of the board. On the face of it, these
two optimization problems of the PM seem different. However, if the PM’s
preferences feature certainty equivalence, these two problems are strate-
gically identical at least as long as the board implements the mean of
its members’ preferences. Whenever the bias of the individual decision-
maker is drawn from the same distribution than the biases of individual
board members, it does not matter for communication whether a decision
is taken by one executive or a group of them.
Hence the second departure from the analysis of Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Namely, assume that the sender’s preferences are non-symmetric
around his bliss point. For every quality level of the project, the bliss point
of the PM is the ﬁnancing decision that would maximize his payoff. When
choosing what to report to the decision maker, the PM tries to minimize
16
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the distance between the receiver’s decision and his bliss point. If his
preferences are non-symmetric, it matters whether deviations from the
bliss point are to the left or to the right. This assumption is not difﬁcult
to motivate: economic actors are often not indifferent whether they fall
short of their targets or exceed them, as for example in wage negotiations.
Or, if a new technology turns out to be bad, it is better to have under-
invested in it than over-invested. And when launching a new product, a
higher-than-expected demand may be preferred to a lower-than-expected,
ignoring capacity constraints.
Under the presence of non-symmetric preferences and the sender’s un-
certainty about the conﬂict of interests, it matters for communication who
makes decisions − a single receiver or a pool of receivers. This paper stud-
ies these two decision-making protocols which are henceforth referred to
as a decentralized and a centralized protocol, respectively.1 The proto-
cols are compared in terms of how much variance they sustain in the re-
ceiver’s preferences which are assumed to differ from those of the sender
by a constant which can take any value from a commonly known interval.
The non-symmetry assumption imposes costs in terms of analytical rigor,
which is why I concentrate in studying the limits of communication. That
is, for each decision-making protocol, I solve for the highest level of conﬂict
in interests that still allows for the existence of an informative communi-
cation equilibrium. As an example, if the variance in the receiver’s bias is
so high that meaningful communication fails under the centralized proto-
col, the results of this paper help to determine whether the decentralized
protocol could be more useful for the purposes of extracting information
from the sender.
The analysis shows that at least under certain assumptions on the form
of the sender’s preferences and on the distribution of the receiver’s pref-
erences, the spread in the receiver’s bias that the sender tolerates un-
der the decentralized protocol is more than a mean-preserving spread of
the centralized protocol. In fact, when the sender prefers an over-sized
budget to an under-sized one, and receivers have an upward bias, decen-
tralized communication supports more uncertainty in a single receiver’s
action than centralized communication. This suggests that information
transmission may improve if the board of directors could decentralize its
decision to a randomly picked board member before the game begins. By
1This terminology should not, however, be mixed with that of Dessein (2002) and
related papers.
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contrast, when receivers are downward biased, decentralized communica-
tion is more prone to babbling than centralized communication. In that
case, decentralizing the decision would not improve communication.
More generally, the results show that the sender’s uncertainty beneﬁts
those receivers who under perfect public information about the receiver’s
preferences would not obtain information. At the same time, it yields
welfare losses to those receiver types who would obtain more precise in-
formation if the sender knew their preferences. Results obtained in the
existing literature on the disclosure of biases2 in cheap-talk games would
suggest that non-disclosure of biases would often be ex-ante welfare en-
hancing if the receiver has an upward bias. A more formalized analysis of
welfare is however left for future research.
Related literature
The model of this paper is closest to the seminal model of cheap talk by
Crawford and Sobel (1982), hereafter referred to as CS. In their model,
an informed sender transmits information about a state of the world to
an uninformed receiver after which the receiver takes an action that af-
fects the payoffs of both players. However, given a state of the world, the
sender and the receiver have divergent preferences over the appropriate
action. The authors show that for modest misalignment in the players’
preferences, meaningful, albeit incomplete, communication can occur. An
equilibrium consists of partitioning the state space into a ﬁnite number of
intervals such that the sender only reports the element of a partition in
which the true state lies. The receiver then chooses the action that maxi-
mizes her expected utility over the reported interval of states. CS further
show that the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For a small degree of
conﬂict in interests, there exist several alternative equilibrium partitions
of the state space, and at the interim stage the sender chooses the one
that maximizes his utility given the receiver’s action rule. The number of
equilibria decreases in the degree of conﬂict, and when the players’ pref-
erences are sufﬁciently divergent only one equilibrium remains. At that
point, communication loses all information value and becomes practically
useless. This babbling equilibrium is always part of the set of equilibria
of the game.
This paper departs from CS in that it assumes that the sender is uncer-
tain about the divergence in preferences between him and the receiver. In
2see in particular Li & Madarász (2008)
18
Bias Uncertainty and the Limits to Information Transmission
addition, where applications of the CS predominantly involve the use of
the uniform-quadratic framework for the state space and the players’ pref-
erences, this paper applies the model of CS to non-symmetric preferences.
Seidmann (1990) has considered cheap talk under uncertainty about the
receiver’s action, and constructed simple examples in which communica-
tion may be fully revealing despite conﬂicting interests. His examples,
however, deal either with cases in which the receiver’s actions are non-
scalar, or consider a limiting case of CS in which all sender types share
a common preference ordering over each of the receiver’s actions. More-
over, his focus is not in comparing the equilibrium that he constructs to an
equilibrium in which the receiver’s action would be common knowledge.
In the subsequent literature, models with uncertainty about the sender’s
type are abundant. Morgan & Stocken (2003) study stock recommenda-
tions issued by a ﬁnancial analyst whose incentives are uncertain to in-
vestors. With some probability, the analyst is solely concerned about in-
ducing a stock price that is equal to the ﬁrm’s true value. With a comple-
mentary probability, the analyst is additionally motivated by the beneﬁt
associated with inﬂating the stock price above its true value. Wolinsky
(2003) analyzes a static communication game in which a decision maker
is uncertain as to whether the sender is of a type that wants to minimize
the magnitude of her action, or maximize it. Sobel (1985), Bénabou &
Laroque (1992), and Morris (2001) analyze dynamic cheap talk where the
focus is on the reputation building of the sender. All of the aforementioned
papers are, however, substantially different from the current analysis in
that they deal with one-sided asymmetric information or a dynamic set-
ting.
The main question of this paper, whether more information is disclosed
with one decision maker than with an audience whose decision rule is
known, is essentially a question whether to disclose or not the bias of the
receiver. This relates the paper to models of Li & Madarász (2008) and
Rantakari (2014) who study the welfare effects of disclosing the sender’s
bias. Since the sender’s and the receiver’s biases are simply mirror images
of each other, it is not surprising that the ﬁndings of Li & Madarász and
Rantakari are in line with the ﬁnding of this paper in that uncertainty
about biases is sometimes beneﬁcial for communication.
Two-sided asymmetric information in cheap talk games has been stud-
ied at least by Chen (2009, 2012), Watson (1999), Lai (2013), Moreno de
Barreda (2010), and Ishida & Shimizu (2012). Their papers study how
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communication is affected if the receiver is partially informed about the
state of the world but her preferences are common knowledge. Therefore,
their focus differs from mine.
The seminal contribution to cheap talk between one sender and many
receivers is Farrell and Gibbons (1989) who consider two receivers with
known, distinct preferences. They analyze how welfare of players is af-
fected by whether the sender reports his information privately or publicly.
In their model, however, receivers always act as individuals. Hence, they
essentially compare communication between a sender and one audience
and a sender and two audiences, whereas in my paper there is always es-
sentially just one audience. In their paper, differences between private
and public communication arise because in public communication, the
presence of another audience may either discipline or subvert the sender’s
relationship with the other audience. Hence, while communication may
be credible with one receiver alone, it may unravel in the presence of an-
other receiver, and vice versa. More recently, Goltsman and Pavlov (2011)
have generalized the ﬁndings of Farrell and Gibbons in an environment
with a continuum of states and actions.
When analyzing communication between a sender and a group of re-
ceivers, I abstract away from the group’s internal dynamics. The aggrega-
tion of preferences in a group is not given particular attention as such. For
literature on committee decision making, including communication and
voting, see for example Gerardi & Yariv (2004), Krehbiel (2004), Austen-
Smith & Feddersen (2009, 2006), Austen-Smith & Banks (1996), Fedder-
sen & Pesendorfer (1997), and Li et al. (2001) among others.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 intro-
duces the model and points out the relevant departures from Crawford
& Sobel (1982). Section 2.3 analyzes the model and establishes results
under two decision-making protocols. Section 2.4 discusses some compar-
ative statics. Discussion and conclusions are taken up in sections 2.5 and
2.6, respectively.
2.2 The Model
There are two players, a sender (S, he), and a receiver (R, she), and both
have some private information. The sender, for example a project man-
ager, needs ﬁnancing for a project, say, launching a new product. He re-
quests a budget by making a claim of the project’s quality to the receiver,
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such as the CEO or the board of directors, who allocates the budget. At the
beginning of the game, Nature determines the quality of the project (i.e.
sender’s type) by drawing θ from Θ := [0, 1]. The quality θ is distributed
according to a uniform distribution F with density f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
The sender observes θ privately without noise, and this information is
neither contractible nor veriﬁable.
In addition, Nature draws the receiver’s type, b, which measures the
divergence in the preferences of the sender and the receiver, and is hence-
forth referred to as the receiver’s bias3. Only the receiver observes b.
The parameter b is drawn from a uniform distribution G with a support
on B ⊂ R. In the analysis later on, we consider either B+ := [0, b¯], or
B− := [−b¯, 0]. Hence, the receiver’s bias is either positive or negative, and
the direction is common knowledge.
After the move of Nature, the sender communicates some or all of his
information about θ by sending a costless message to the receiver. Denote
the message by m and let m ∈ M := [0, 1]. The message should thus be
interpreted as a report about the quality which directly translates into an
appropriate budget size. After observing m, the receiver takes an action
by allocating a budget to the project. Assume that there is some commonly
known linear mapping from the quality of the project to an appropriate
budget. The action of the receiver is then essentially the choice of a quality
level.4 Denote the receiver’s action by y ∈ R+.After the receiver’s decision,
payoffs are realized. These are discussed in the next subsection. Finally,
all aspects of the game other than b and θ are common knowledge.
2.2.1 Preferences
Both players’ payoff depends on the difference between y and θ. Denote
the utility of the sender by US(y, θ) and that of the receiver by UR(y, θ, b).
Both functions fulﬁll the sorting condition U i12(y, θ) > 0. This condition
ensures that the preferred budget for both players is strictly increasing in
the quality of the project.
The sender would like to obtain a budget which accurately reﬂects the
true quality of the project. Were the receiver’s decision to differ from the
3This vocabulary is due to our focus on the sender’s uncertainty. Clearly, from
the receiver’s point of view, the sender is biased. For later use, notice that a
positive bias of the receiver is equivalent to a negative bias of the sender, and
vice versa.
4So, if the bias of the receiver is to always allocate a thousand euros more to the
project than what the sender ﬁnds optimal, if the budget function is linear in θ,
and yS(θ) is the sender’s bliss point, then the receiver’s action is essentially to
choose a θ + b such that y(θ + b) = yS(θ) + 1000.
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true quality, then a too large budget is preferred to a too small budget.
Suppose, for instance, that the costs involved with compromising on the
project’s goals, which may have repercussions on the project manager’s
reputation in the ﬁrm, are larger than the psychological costs associated
with running an overly ﬁnanced project. To reﬂect this non-symmetry in
the sender’s preferences, let
US(y, θ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−k(y − θ)2 , y ≤ θ
−(y − θ)2 , y > θ,
(2.1)
where k > 1 measures the degree of non-symmetry.5 The piecewise-
deﬁned utility function reﬂects the twofold objectives of the sender: pri-
marily to induce the receiver to take the action y = θ, and secondarily to
avoid the case where y < θ.
The receiver, for her part, only cares about allocating the appropriate
budget to the project; whether deviations from her bliss point yR(θ) = θ+b
are to the right or left is of no importance. Therefore, let
UR(y, θ, b) = − [y − (θ + b)]2 ,
where b ∈ B.
A positive bias of the receiver could be explained for instance by opti-
mism about the prospects of the ﬁrm6 or by additional, private informa-
tion about the future plans of the ﬁrm which bears on her evaluations of
project importance today. Similar arguments can be constructed to moti-
vate a negative bias.
2.2.2 Strategies and the equilibrium concept
A pure strategy for the sender is given by a signaling rule μ : Θ → M,
such that, for any realized state θ, μ(θ) speciﬁes an element m from M. A
pure strategy for the receiver is given by an action rule y : M × B → R+
such that, given any message m, y(m, b) speciﬁes the budget, through the
choice of a quality level.
The sender’s report induces the receiver to update her prior belief about
the project’s quality. Let F (θ | m) be the distribution of the receiver’s
5Reversed preferences, favoring a too small budget over a too large one, would
be captured by setting 0 < k < 1 or by setting k′ = 1/k. This would simply change
the direction of results.
6There is an abundant literature that has shown that management optimism is
prevalent in the corporate world (see f.ex. Heaton, 2002 for references to other
studies).
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posterior beliefs about the project’s quality upon observing message m.
The equilibrium concept we adopt is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) which consists of a strategy proﬁle (μ, y) and a system of beliefs
F (θ | m) such that
1. For all m ∈ M, and b ∈ B, the receiver’s action
y(m, b) ∈ argmax
y
ˆ
θ∈Θ
UR(y, θ, b)F (θ | m)dθ,
2. Given the receiver’s beliefs, for all θ ∈ Θ, μ(θ) maximizes the
sender’s expected payoff: if m∗ is assigned by μ, then
m∗ ∈ argmax
m
b¯ˆ
0
US(y(m, b), θ)dG(b),
whereG(b) is degenerate under the centralized decision-making
protocol.
3. The receiver’s posterior belief F (θ | m) is formed using Bayes’
rule whenever possible;
The deﬁnition of an equilibrium is otherwise as in CS except for the fact
that the sender now maximizes his expected utility. A more detailed dis-
cussion of the equilibrium can be found in CS (p.1435).
2.2.3 Partition structure
As shown by CS, cheap-talk games have multiple equilibria, the number
of which depends on the degree of conﬂict in players’ preferences. In this
paper, the parameter of interest is b¯, which deﬁnes the support of the dis-
tribution for the receiver’s bias. As long as b¯ = 0, it follows from the analy-
sis of CS that all equilibria of the game are semi-separating, characterized
by a partition structure whereby close-by sender types pool together and
send the same message. The density of the largest partition equilibrium is
decreasing in b¯, and the least informative equilibrium, in which all sender
types pool together and send the same message regardless of the state, is
the only one that remains as soon as b¯ exceeds an endogenously deter-
mined threshold. In this babbling equilibrium, the sender’s message is
uncorrelated with the true state of the world, and therefore the receiver
chooses her action based on her prior belief about θ.
Let a(N) := {ai(N)}Ni=0 be the set of N + 1 boundary points that char-
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acterize a partition equilibrium of size N, where 0 = a0(N) < a1(N) <
. . . < aN (N) = 1. Let mi be the message that sender types in the interval
[ai−1(N), ai(N), ) i ∈ {1, ..., N} , send in this equilibrium.7 Furthermore,
let N(b¯, k) denote the size of the largest equilibrium of the game, that is,
the number of intervals in the ﬁnest partition equilibrium. Thus, N(b¯, k)
takes only integer values. As discussed in CS (Lemma 6), N(b¯, k) is a non-
increasing step function of b¯.8 For any pair
(
b¯, k
)
, the set of equilibria of
the game consists thus of partitions
{
a(1), a(2), ..., a(N(b¯, k))
}
.
The rest of the paper focuses on sets of equilibria which consist of two
elements, that is, N(b¯, k) = 2. As long as N(b¯, k) ≥ 2, the game has an
informative equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium is informative if the sender’s message m
in equilibrium induces the receiver to revise her prior beliefs. That is, if
F (θ | m) = F (θ).
If N(b¯, k) = 1, the unique equilibrium consists of babbling. Given some
k > 1, denote by | Bk1 | the set of b¯’s, either all positive or all negative,
for which N(b¯, k) = 1, and let | b¯k1 | denote the smallest element in the
set, that is, | b¯k1 |= inf(| Bk1 |).9 Hence, | b¯k1 | constitutes a threshold such
that for all biases equal or larger than this, the unique PBE of the game
consists of babbling. For all | b |<| b¯k1 |, the game possesses in addition at
least one informative equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. | b¯k1 | is called a ’limiting bias’ if
N(b¯, k) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if | b¯ |≥| b¯k1|
≥ 2 if | b¯ |<| b¯k1 | .
In addition, b¯k1+ is the limiting bias for a positive support, B+, and | b¯k1− |
is the limiting bias for a negative support, B−.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the notion of a limiting bias for two arbitrary decision-
making protocols. For some k > 1, N(b¯, k) deﬁnes the maximum number
7Since the boundary types are indifferent between consecutive actions, and since
their probability of occurrence is zero, it does not matter which interval they
belong to. Note, however, that the last interval, for i = N, should be closed.
8In light of the results of the paper, N(b¯, k) is nondecreasing in k if b > 0 and
nonincreasing in k if b < 0.
9Absolute value is introduced to account for negative biases.
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Figure 2.1. Limiting biases under protocols A and A’
of equilibria as a function of b¯ for protocols A and A′. The notation used
should be read bearing in mind that the sender is uncertain about the ac-
tual bias, b. Thus, what is meant by saying that protocol A′ has a higher
limiting bias than protocol A is that the largest support of G(b) that still
allows for an informative equilibrium is larger under protocol A′ than A.
The protocol A′ sustains informative communication for all distributions
G with a support on [0, b¯] with b¯ < b¯k1A′ whereas protocol A sustains in-
formative communication only when b¯ < b¯k1A < b¯
k
1A′ . Clearly then, for all
b¯k1A ≤ b < b¯k1A′ , protocol A′ is strictly superior in terms of ex-ante welfare
because it allows for more precise communication which, as shown by CS,
beneﬁts all players ex ante.
2.3 Solving for an equilibrium
In any partition equilibrium of the game, the receiver’s posterior belief
upon observing a message mi sent by sender types θ ∈ [ai−1, ai) is given
by
F (θ | mi) = μ(mi | θ) · f(θ)
F (mi)
=
1
F (ai)− F (ai−1) =
1
ai − ai−1 .
Hence, in equilibrium, upon receiving a message mi, a receiver of type b
chooses her action according to
y(mi, b) ∈ argmax
y
aiˆ
ai−1
− [y − (θ + b)]2 dF (θ | mi),
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which yields an optimal action of
y(mi, b) =
ai−1 + ai
2
+ b.
Following Theorem 1 of CS, in any equilibrium of size N, with 1 ≤ N ≤
N(b¯, k), the equilibrium partition is determined by an arbitrage condition
which requires that a sender of boundary type ai(N), i = 1, . . . , N − 1,
is indifferent between inducing actions Eby(mi, b) and Eby(mi+1, b).10 The
expected action of the receiver depends on the decision-making protocol.
As discussed in the introduction, two decision-making protocols are con-
sidered. The budgeting decision is made either centrally by a committee
of receivers, such as the ﬁrm’s board of directors, or the decision is decen-
tralized and made by a single receiver, such as the CEO or some board
member. The decision-making protocol is known to all players before the
game begins, and the receiver is committed to it. There is hence no pos-
sibility to change the protocol at the decision-making stage. The two pro-
tocols and their limiting biases are analyzed separately in the next two
sections.
Without further knowledge of the functional form ofN(b¯, k),11 we are un-
able to tell how the number of equilibria compare for biases smaller than
b¯k1. Given some k, N(b¯, k) being higher under one protocol than in another
for all b¯ would imply that the protocol ex-ante dominates the other. This
is because it allows for more precise communication, which is considered
jointly beneﬁcial ex ante, that is, before the sender observes the state12.
Information about the limiting biases of different decision-making proto-
cols is valuable, however, in determining whether another protocol could
be more useful in extracting information if the support of G(b) is too wide
to sustain informative communication under one of them.
2.3.1 Special case: k = 1
To see why the assumption of the non-symmetry in the sender’s prefer-
ences is necessary for the purposes of the paper, assume for a moment that
k = 1 and the sender’s preferences are given by the standard quadratic
loss function used widely in applications of cheap talk. Because of cer-
10Sender types a0(N) and aN (N) only consider sending one message, m1 and
mN , respectively.
11Given the non-symmetry in the sender’s preferences, an analytical expression
of N(b¯, k) as a function of b¯ and k turns out to be too demanding for the purposes
of the paper.
12See p. 1441 in CS.
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tainty equivalence,
max
m
Eb
[
US (y(m, b), θ)
]
= max
m
US [Eb (y(m, b), θ)] ,
as the ﬁrst-order conditions of the two maximization problems are equiv-
alent. Certainty equivalence is in many ways a convenient property but it
suits poorly the current context since it makes the comparison of decision-
making protocols redundant. With quadratic utility, the sender’s problem
when faced with a single decision maker,
max
m
ˆ
b∈B
US (y(m, b), θ) dG(b)
is strategically equivalent to her optimization problem when facing a com-
mittee of receivers,
max
m
US (Eby(m, b), θ) ,
where
Eby(m, b) =
ˆ
b∈B
y(m, b)dG(b) =
ˆ
b∈B
y(m) + b dG(b) = y(m) +
ˆ
b∈B
bdG(b),
and dG(b) = 1
b¯
. For k > 1, the certainty equivalence does not hold and
centralized and decentralized decision making lead to distinct equilibria.
2.3.2 Centralized decision making
Assume that the decision is made centrally by a large pool of receivers
that we henceforth refer to as a committee. For large ﬁrms, this could
for example be the board of directors. In other applications, the commit-
tee can be thought of as the consumers or voters in a market, and the
sender’s payoff depends on the average reaction of the market. The com-
mittee thus consists of a large number of receivers whose types are i.i.d.
Let the decision of the committee be governed by the preferences of the
median voter. This is mainly to focus attention on the communication be-
tween the committee and the sender, and not on the deliberation within
the committee. Moreover, all committee members are assumed to have an
equal weight in the decision.13
Since receivers’ types are drawn from a uniform distribution, the Law
13If some members have more weight than others the mere distribution of pref-
erences is not enough to predict the committee’s decision.
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of Large Numbers (LLN) predicts that the decision rule of the committee
upon observing message mi is given as
y(mi, b¯) =
ai−1 + ai
2
+
b¯ˆ
0
b · 1
b¯
db =
1
2
[
(ai−1 + ai) + b¯
]
.
Because the action rule of the committee is deterministic, the game corre-
sponds to a standard CS game with a commonly known bias equal to 12 b¯.
For any b > 0, an equilibrium of size two, a(2), in which message m1 is
sent whenever θ ∈ [0, a), and m2 is sent whenever θ ∈ [a, 1], is then char-
acterized by the following arbitrage condition faced by a sender of type
a ∈ (0, 1).
− k
(
a
2
+
b¯
2
− a
)2
= −
(
1 + a
2
+
b¯
2
− a
)2
. (2.2)
Notice that for a positive bias the existence of an equilibrium requires that
a
2 +
b¯
2 ≤ a, (i.e. b¯ ≤ a), because otherwise the arbitrage condition in (2.2)
would never hold. By Lemma 4 of CS, the limiting bias is obtained when
a = 1.14 Thus, it must be that b¯k1+ ≤ 1. Analogously, if the receiver’s bias
is negative, the equilibrium requires that 1+a2 − b¯2 ≥ a, and at the limit,
a = 0. Hence, also the negative bias must be less than one in absolute
value.
To obtain the positive limiting bias, set a = 1 in (2.2) and solve for b¯. The
resulting polynomial has two roots. Since both are strictly positive for all
k > 1, the limiting bias is given by the smaller of them.
Lemma 1. If the decision is made centrally by a committee of receivers
such that the LLN applies, and G(b) is uniform, the positive limiting bias
is given by
b¯k1+ =
k −√k
k − 1 , ∀k > 1.
The limiting bias is increasing in k, but since b¯k1+ ≤ 1, the committee’s bias
14In a game with a negative bias of the receiver (i.e. positive bias of the sender),
their lemma 4 establishes that for two partition equilibria of the same size,
a(N, b) and a(N, b′), with b′ > b, since the last threshold in both is necessarily
at 1 (i.e. aN (N, b) = aN (N, b′) = 1), and since partition intervals are longer in the
equilibrium with a higher bias (as 4b′ > 4b), it must be that ai(N, b′) < ai(N, b)
for all i = 1, ..., N − 1. Thus, for the negative limiting bias of the current paper,
a1(2, b¯
k
1−) = 0. Analogously, for a positive bias of the receiver (i.e. negative bias of
the sender), the limiting bias must satisfy a1
(
2, b¯k1+
)
= 1.
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b¯
2 must never exceed
1
2 . Given our assumptions about the sender’s prefer-
ences, a positive bias of the receiver is henceforth called a “supporting”
bias, and a negative bias is called “conﬂicting”.
Deﬁnition 3. For any θ ∈ Θ, let yS(θ) be the action that maximizes the
sender’s utility, and let yR(θ) := yS(θ) + b be the action that maximizes the
receiver’s utility for some constant bias b ∈ R. The bias is “supporting” if
b > 0 and “conﬂicting” if b < 0 since
US
(
yS(θ) + b
)
> US
(
yS(θ)− b) .
The results would be reversely identical if the sender preferred under-
budgeting to over-budgeting. This could be easily captured by redeﬁning
k as k′ = 1/k. In that case, a negative bias is supporting and a positive bias
conﬂicting. If the receiver’s bias is negative, the limiting bias is easily
found by setting a = 0 in eq. (2.2).
Lemma 2. If the decision is made centrally by a committee of receivers
such that the LLN applies, and G(b) is uniform, the negative limiting bias
is given by
| b¯k1− |=
√
k − 1
k − 1 , ∀k > 1.
The absolute value of the limiting bias is decreasing in k. The results so
far give rise to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the sender is uncertain about the receiver’s bias, the
stronger the asymmetry in the sender’s preferences, the higher (lower) can
the supporting (conﬂicting) bias be.
Naturally, the sender tolerates greater uncertainty in the receiver’s pref-
erences when her bias is to the same direction as the sender’s preferred
deviation from his bliss point. Hence, for the preferences of the sender
that we consider, b¯k1+ >| b¯k1− | for all k > 1. If k = 1 and the sender’s prefer-
ences are symmetric, b¯k1+ =| b¯k1− |, and the direction of the receiver’s bias
plays no role.
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2.3.3 Decentralized decision making
Consider now that the project’s budget is decided by a single executive,
for instance a ﬁrm’s CEO.
Positive bias
Due to the piecewise-deﬁned utility function, a sender of type ai must take
into account that, if b > ai−ai−12 , the equilibrium action of the receiver
upon observing message mi, is higher than ai and thus to the right of the
sender’s bliss point. Hence, in an equilibrium of size two, the arbitrage
condition faced by the sender of type a, who considers whether to send
message m1 or m2, is given by
−k
min{b¯,a2}ˆ
0
(a
2
+ b− a
)2 1
b¯
db−
max{b¯,a2}ˆ
a
2
(a
2
+ b− a
)2 1
b¯
db
= −
b¯ˆ
0
(
1 + a
2
+ b− a
)2 1
b¯
db.
By setting a = 1 and rearranging, the positive limiting bias is solved from
1
3(k − 1)b¯3 − 12kb¯2 + 14kb¯ = 0, (2.3)
if b¯ ≤ 12 , and from
1
2
b¯2 − 1
4
b¯ − 124(k − 1) = 0, (2.4)
if b¯ > 12 .
The roots of the polynomial in (2.3) are given by
1
2
±
√
1
3
k(1− 14k)
2
3
(k−1) . They ex-
ist if k ≤ 4. Moreover, for k ≤ 4, the smaller positive root is strictly greater
than 12 , a contradiction. This means that the limiting bias is larger than
1
2 and determined as the smaller positive root of the polynomial in (2.4).
Lemma 3. If the decision is decentralized and made by a single receiver
whose positive bias is unknown to the sender and drawn from a uniform
distribution, the limiting bias is given by
b¯k1+ =
1
4
(
1 +
√
1 +
4
3
(k − 1)
)
, ∀k > 1.
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As before, b¯k1+ is increasing in k. In contrast to the centralized protocol,
however, the limiting bias under the decentralized protocol is larger than
1 for all k ≥ 7.
Negative bias
If the receiver is inclined to allocate a smaller budget than the sender
prefers, the limiting bias is solved in an analogous manner. The difference
is, though, that we now need to take into account that if 1+a2 − b < a, the
sender’s utility is determined by the steeper part of the utility function.
To obtain the partition equilibrium of size two, the arbitrage condition
faced by a sender of type a ∈ (0, 1) is given as
−k
b¯ˆ
0
(a
2
− b− a
)2 1
b¯
db =
−
min{b¯, 1−a2 }ˆ
0
(
1 + a
2
− b− a
)2
1
b¯
db− k
max{b¯, 1−a2 }ˆ
1−a
2
(
1 + a
2
− b− a
)2
1
b¯
db.
The negative limiting bias is obtained by setting a = 0 and solving for b¯.
Lemma 4. If the decision is decentralized and made by a single receiver
whose negative bias is unknown to the sender and drawn from a uniform
distribution, the limiting bias is given by
| b¯k1− |=
√
1
4 +
1
3(k − 1)− 12
2
3(k − 1)
, ∀k > 1.
Proof: In the appendix. 
Similarly to the centralized protocol, the absolute value of the negative
limiting bias is decreasing in k. The lemmas obtained in this section give
rise to the following result.
Theorem 1. Let the sender’s preferences be given as in (2.1) and the re-
ceiver’s by a quadratic loss function. When the sender is uncertain about
any single receiver’s bias, and the bias is drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion,
31
Bias Uncertainty and the Limits to Information Transmission
• if the receiver’s bias is “supporting”, the decentralized protocol sustains
a higher variance in b,
• if the receiver’s bias is “conﬂicting”, the centralized protocol sustains a
higher variance in b .
Figure 2.2 visualizes the result of Theorem 1. As it shows, the variance
in the supporting bias under the decentralized protocol can grow very
large without destroying communication. There exists a large set of b’s
for which informative communication is no longer feasible if the decision
is made centrally, but remains feasible under the decentralized protocol.
At least for these values of b, decentralizing the decision to a single re-
ceiver increases the ex-ante accuracy of communication. Moreover, the
relative advantage of the decentralized protocol increases as k increases.
Exactly how this decentralization should be implemented, though, is
a question of its own. The trick is that the decision should be random.
Clearly, if the sender anticipates that the decision is delegated to the me-
dian voter, communication does not improve. If the decision is decentral-
ized to a member of the committee, the decision right could be allocated
only after hearing the sender, or the committee could implement rotat-
ing decision rights in such a way that the median voter’s preferences are
implemented on average over time.
On the other hand, centralized decision-making has an ex-ante infor-
mational advantage over decentralization when the receiver’s bias is con-
ﬂicting. This advantage is, however, modest. Nevertheless, when the com-
mittee members have a conﬂicting bias, decentralizing decisions to single
committee members is useless in inducing more communication, unless
N(b¯, k) assigns higher values under decentralization for some b <| b¯k1− | .
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Figure 2.2. Limiting biases under different protocols
The result in Theorem 1 is rather intuitive. When the bias is support-
ing, the decentralized protocol can make use of the fact that the sender’s
expected payoff is a weighted average of payoffs for different values of b.
The payoff function can thus take on values from the less steep part of the
sender’s utility function. That is, the supporting bias can take on values
higher than 12a which is not possible under the centralized protocol. The
expected utility from message m1 is thus a weighted average of very low
payoffs that arise when b < 12a, and very high payoffs that arise when
b > 12a. The larger the non-symmetry in the sender’s preferences the
larger values above 12a the receiver’s bias b can take to balance the aver-
age payoffs. At the same time, the relative weight of low biases decreases
since probability mass is placed predominantly on biases higher than 12a
(given that G is uniform). Naturally, this balancing of payoffs does not
work to the other direction for conﬂicting biases.
2.4 Comparative statics
It is natural to ask to what extent the results obtained in the previous
section can be generalized beyond the speciﬁcations used there. In par-
ticular, it would be useful to know if the results of section 2.3 are not
just artifacts of the choice of the sender’s utility function and distribution
G(b). This section tests whether the results of Theorem 1 continue to hold
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under two changes in the model speciﬁcations. Firstly, by considering al-
ternative distributions for the receiver’s bias, and secondly, by considering
logarithmic utility. The last subsection also discusses non-symmetries in
the receiver’s preferences.
2.4.1 Alternative distributions
Let G assign values for two points, 0 and b¯ > 0, such that Pr
[
b = b¯
]
= p,
and p ∈ (0, 1) is common knowledge. This section seeks to answer the
following question: given p, what is the largest b¯ under the two protocols
such that informative communication is still possible? Let us concentrate
on positive biases only. By changing p we can roughly mimic alterna-
tive continuous distributions with different means. In particular, p = 12
roughly corresponds to the uniform distribution considered in section 2.3.
The decision of the committee upon receiving messagemi is now y(mi, b) =
ai−1+ai
2 +pb¯. If p =
1
2 the decision is identical to the centralized protocol an-
alyzed earlier. On the other hand, if p = 1, the positive limiting bias must
be half of what was found in the previous section. The positive limiting
bias for the discrete setting can thus be solved to equal
b¯k1+(p) =
k −√k
2p(k − 1) .
Under the decentralized protocol, for an equilibrium of size two, the arbi-
trage condition faced by a sender of type a ∈ (0, 1) is now given by
−pk (a2 + b¯− a)2 − (1− p)k (a2 − a)2
= −p (1+a2 + b¯− a)2 − (1− p) (1+a2 − a)2
if b¯ ≤ a2 , and by
−p (a2 + b¯− a)2 − (1− p)k (a2 − a)2
= −p (1+a2 + b¯− a)2 − (1− p) (1+a2 − a)2
if b¯ > a2 . After rearranging and substituting for a = 1, the positive limiting
bias can be solved to equal
b¯k1+(p) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pk−
√
p2k2−pk(k−1)
2p(k−1) if p ≥ 34 and k ∈
[
1−√4p−3
2(1−p) ,
1+
√
4p−3
2(1−p)
]
1
4
(
1 + 1−pp k
)
otherwise.
The results in section 2.3 would suggest the hypothesis that the decentral-
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ized protocol always guarantees higher supporting biases. To test whether
this hypothesis can be maintained under other than the uniform distribu-
tion, I have analyzed numerically the difference in the limiting biases un-
der the two protocols for different levels of p. The result of Theorem 1 (at
least for the part of supporting biases) is maintained under all p ∈ (0, 1)
and for all k > 1. Figure 2.3 illustrates the difference when p = 15 .
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
25
k
b¯k1 centralized
decentralized
Figure 2.3. Difference between the limiting bias between the decentralized and the cen-
tralized protocol
2.4.2 Logarithmic utility
To get an idea how the results of section 2.3 depend on the form of the
sender’s preferences, this section considers an alternative speciﬁcation.
Let the preferences of the players be captured by the following logarithmic
functions.
US(y, θ) = θ ln y − y
UR(y, θ, b) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(θ + b) ln y − y w.p. p
θ ln y − y w.p. (1− p),
where b ∈ R and is common knowledge. This change in the receiver’s
preferences does not change her action rule since the expected utility is
still maximized when her action is equal to her conditional expectation of
the state θ given message m. In what follows, only the case of a positive
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bias is covered.15
Under the decentralized protocol, the arbitrage condition characterizing
the equilibrium partition of size 2 is given as
(1− p)
[
a ln
(a
2
)
−
(a
2
)]
+ p ·
[
a ln
(a
2
+ b¯
)
−
(a
2
+ b¯
)]
= (1− p) ·
[
a ln
(
1 + a
2
)
−
(
1 + a
2
)]
+ p ·
[
a ln
(
1 + a
2
+ b¯
)
−
(
1 + a
2
+ b¯
)]
,
and when a = 1, the limiting bias must satisfy
−(1− p) ln 1
2
+ p ln
2 + 2b¯
1 + 2b¯
− 1
2
= 0,
from where we obtain
b¯d(p) =
1−
[
1
2e
1
2
] 1
p
[(
1
2
)(1−p)
e
1
2
] 1
p − 1
,
which is positive if and only if p ≥ ln
1
2
+ 1
2
ln 1
2
 0.278.
Under the centralized protocol, the arbitrage condition for an equilib-
rium partition of size 2 is given by
a ln
(a
2
+ pb¯
)
−
(a
2
+ pb¯
)
= a ln
(
1 + a
2
+ pb¯
)
−
(
1 + a
2
+ pb¯
)
.
When a = 1, the limiting bias can be solved to equal
b¯c(p) =
1− 12e
1
2
p
(
e
1
2 − 1
) ,
which is strictly positive for all p ∈ (0, 1). Further, it can be checked nu-
merically that b¯d(p) > b¯c(p) for all p >
ln 1
2
+ 1
2
ln 1
2
. Similarly to increases in k
in the piecewise-deﬁned utility of section 2.3, the effects of changes in the
concavity of the sender’s preferences could be studied by taking a concave
transformation of the logarithmic utility.
2.4.3 Non-symmetry in the receiver’s preferences
Suppose that the receiver of any type b prefers over- to under-budgeting,
that is, shares the same type of non-symmetry in preferences with the
sender. This would shift her action rule to the right, towards the less
15Negative bias of the receiver is problematic since ln(y) is deﬁned only for y > 0.
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costly direction, but would not change the results qualitatively. The action
rule of a receiver with non-symmetric preferences and no bias would be
given by
y(mi) ∈ argmin
y
yˆ
ai−1
(y − θ)2 dθ + k
aiˆ
y
(y − θ)2 dθ
Taking the derivative with respect to y and integrating over θ results in
k (y − ai)2 = (y − ai−1)2 .
Since k > 1, the identity requires that | y − ai |<| y − ai−1 |, and hence
y must be closer to ai than to ai−1. If the receiver in addition has an up-
ward bias, her decision is leaning heavily to the right. For example, in
an equilibrium partition of size 2, upon receiving message m1 ∈ [0, a),
the receiver’s action is y(m1) = a
(
k −√k
)
/(k − 1), where the multiplier(
k −√k
)
/(k − 1) > 12 for all k > 1. This means that the non-symmetry in
the receiver’s preferences works as a form of supporting bias, and leaves
less room for the actual bias.
In fact, although both decision protocols are not affected by the same
magnitude, the relative ’ranking’ of the results would not change. That
is, the decentralized protocol would still support a larger variance in the
positive bias, but a smaller variance in the negative bias. However, as
k increases, the non-symmetry in the receivers’ preferences induces such
a sizable shift to the right in the centralized decision that it turns the
previously increasing series for b¯k1+ into a decreasing one. This is due to
the fact that the theoretical maximum for the committee’s limiting bias is
one, as discussed in section 2.3.2.
On the other hand, the right shift in the action rule mitigates the effect
of a conﬂicting bias and gives more room for it, resulting in an increase
in | b¯k1− | for both protocols. Analogous reasoning, with reversely identi-
cal results, applies to the situation in which both players prefer under-
budgeting.
If the non-symmetry in players’ preferences is not of the same kind, as
for instance when the sender prefers overbudgeting while the receiver
prefers underbudgeting, the receiver’s action rule would assign lower val-
ues than under symmetric preferences, giving all the more room for a
supporting bias and even less room for a conﬂicting bias as compared to
the results in section 2.3.
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Note, however, that non-symmetries in committee members’ preferences
might hand more decision weight to those members who suffer more from
a compromise. The members who end up on the steeper part of their
utility function may induce, via negotiation power, a drift away from the
median voter’s decision. Therefore, a more careful formulation of the com-
mittee’s inner dynamics may be in order. This problem would be absent
if the committee is the pool of consumers in a market, all of whom make
their individual decision but the producer only cares about the market’s
median reaction.
2.5 Discussion
Mainly for tractability, the decision of the committee is modeled by the
median voter. To obtain more structure, the decision making in the com-
mittee could be formalized in more detail. Theoretical literature on voting
in committees would offer a natural starting point. Another digression
from the median voter preferences may arise in a dynamic setting. In a
parliamentary committee, for instance, with conﬂicting interests, a joint
decision hurts all but the median representative. This is likely to result in
a trade of political favors whereby party A agrees to vote for the proposal
of party B in return for B’s support in some other decision important to
party A.
The willingness of a committee member i to make compromises can be
captured by adding a multiplier, ki, to her utility function: −ki (y − (θ + b))2 .
When all members have the same stakes in the decision, that is ki = k ∀i,
a compromise solution, in the form of a median voter outcome, can be
reasonable. If the stakes are not equal across members, then those with
high stakes may be able to use their bargaining power to shift the central-
ized decision to their preferred direction. Adding k would not change the
analysis presented in this paper since the receiver’s optimal action after
a message from the sender remains the same as long as the symmetry in
the utility function is retained.
The literature on committee decision making often assumes that each
committee member gets a private or public signal, possibly with a noise.
In most studies, however, the source of the signal is abstracted away. This
paper points out that the signal that decision makers receive is in fact
determined by the decision rule used and the composition of the commit-
tee (whether it consists of one or more receivers). Hence, this paper point
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out the fact that the quality of the signal that a committee obtains about
the state of nature (sent by the expert) may in some cases be signiﬁcantly
lower than the quality of the signal that a single decision maker would ob-
tain to support her decision. This fact may be useful to keep in mind when
designing the composition of committees or the decision-making protocol.
The results of the paper depend on the assumption that b is drawn from
a uniform distribution. A distribution that is skewed to the right, having
a low mean, would give rise to even higher limiting biases than what is
reported now. On the other hand, the decentralized protocol may not be
that attractive if the receiver’s bias is drawn from a distribution skewed to
the left, having a high mean. Alternative distributions combined with al-
ternative utility functions therefore remain a necessary next step towards
more general results.
Who should hide her type and who should reveal it? Naturally, receivers
of low type prefer to reveal their type while high types, who beneﬁt from
the sender’s uncertainty, prefer to keep their true type hidden. Hence,
there is no credible way for low types to communicate their bias via cheap
talk because all types have an incentive to claim that they are of the low-
est type. By the same logic, the committee’s attempts to encourage more
information transmission by claiming to commit to a decision rule lower
than the median voter would not be credible unless there was additional
uncertainty about the distribution of decision weights among committee
members. In such a situation, the best way to make one’s low type known
would be to act accordingly and use costly signaling to separate from the
high types. This, however, renders the problem dynamic, whereby both
low and high types optimize their paths of action over time. This seems
like a prominent way forward in analyzing the effects of the sender’s un-
certainty about the type of his audience.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper aims to answer a question of the following type: if an expert is
uncertain about the reaction of a decision maker to the information that
he transmits, which protocol gives rise to more accurate communication
on expectation - when the sender talks to one receiver of unknown type or
when he talks to a group of receivers who act as one?
In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, this paper ana-
lyzes an otherwise standard one-shot cheap talk game but amends it in
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two ways. First, the divergence of preferences between the players is only
known by the receiver. Secondly, the model assumes that the preferences
of the sender are non-symmetric around his bliss point. If this assumption
is relaxed, the two communication environments are strategically equiv-
alent and their comparison therefore trivial.
The paper ﬁnds that communication has the potential16 to remain in-
formative under a higher variance of b if the receiver’s bias is supporting
and decision making is decentralized. If the receiver’s bias is conﬂicting,
communication has the potential to remain informative under a higher
variance of b if decision making is centralized. A more general investiga-
tion would be needed to obtain results that span the whole step function
N(b¯, k) for both decision-making protocols.
2.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.
The analysis is done in two parts, depending on the value of min
{
b¯, 1−a2
}
.
Suppose that min
{
b¯, 1−a2
}
= b¯. The arbitrage condition reduces to
−k
[
1
4
a2b¯+
1
2
ab¯2 +
1
3
b¯3
]
= −1
2
(1− a)2b¯+ 1
2
(1− a)b¯2 − 1
3
b¯3.
When a = 0, the limiting bias (in absolute value) is given by
| b¯k1− |=
−12 ±
√
1
4 +
1
3(k − 1)
2
3(k − 1)
(> 0).
The determinant is positive for all k ≥ 14 , and since the absolute value
must be positive, we have
| b¯k1− |=
−12 +
√
1
4 +
1
3(k − 1)
2
3(k − 1)
.
Moreover, it can be checked that | b¯k1− |≤ 12 , so assumption min
{
b¯, 1−a2
}
= b¯
holds when a = 0. Since the limiting bias is determined already, checking
the other case is not necessary. Let us, however, check still that the as-
sumption min
{
b¯, 1−a2
}
= 1−a2 cannot hold in the limiting case. The arbi-
16as babbling is always among the equilibria of the game
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trage condition would be reduced to
−k
[
1
4
a2b¯+
1
2
ab¯2 +
1
3
b¯3
]
=
− 1
24
(1− a)3 − k
[
1
4
(1− a)2
(
b¯− 1− a
2
)
− 1
2
(1− a)
(
b¯− 1− a
2
)2
+
1
3
(
b¯− 1− a
2
)3]
.
Setting a = 0 and rearranging yields
kb¯2 − kb¯+ 1
24
(7k − 1) = 0, (2.5)
such that
| b¯k1− |=
k ±
√
k2 − 16k(7k − 1)
2k
.
Since the determinant is negative for all k > 1, we conclude that there are
no values of b¯ that would satisfy condition (2.5) for any k > 1. 
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3. Can You Keep a Secret? - Building
Reciprocal Trust in Communication
3.1 Introduction
In economic theory, models of strategic communication between an expert
and a decision maker have mostly been applied to settings in which com-
munication partners either know each other’s preferences, or the expert
has an informational advantage both regarding the underlying state of
the world and his own payoff-type. This paper is motivated by the obser-
vation that it is commonplace that a privately informed expert is uncer-
tain how the information he transmits will be used. I analyze how the
expert’s uncertainty about the preferences of the decision-maker affects
strategic communication in a repeated cheap-talk game.
Consider, for instance, that a sender has conﬁdential information that
he can share with a receiver periodically. Relevant situations arise be-
tween friends sharing secrets, between a supervisor and a subordinate
sharing ﬁrm-sensitive information, or between a lobbyist and a govern-
ment ofﬁcial sharing conﬁdential information that goes beyond mere pol-
icy consultancy. All of these relationships rely on mutual trust; the re-
ceiver must trust the sender in his report, but more importantly, the
sender must trust that the receiver does not use the information against
him. If the sender is uncertain about the trustworthiness or intrinsic mo-
tivations of the receiver, he must be careful in what information to share.
On the other hand, by sharing information, whether truthful or not, the
sender is able to test the receiver to see if she can be trusted with addi-
tional information later on. Secrets themselves come in many forms, some
are highly conﬁdential while some others cause less trouble if leaked or
misused. How much the sender and the receiver value each secret need
not be correlated. This paves the way for reputation building in the sense
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that an intrinsically ill-motivated receiver may act like a trustworthy per-
son in the current period to maintain the communication relationship, but
betray the sender’s trust as soon as he shares a scoop.
The described setup has been largely overlooked in the in the cheap-
talk literature. In this paper, I consider a model which has two-sided
asymmetric information in the sense that the sender is privately informed
of a state of the world, and the receiver is privately informed of her payoff-
type. The receiver uses the information transmitted by the sender to take
a decision that affects the welfare of both players. Borrowing for now the
notation from Sobel (1985), the receiver may be one of two types, a Friend
or an Enemy, and the sender needs to learn the type in order to tailor his
future reports accordingly.
The only way for the sender to learn about the receiver’s type is by send-
ing informative reports to her and by observing the action that she takes
in reaction to these reports. A Friend always chooses the action that max-
imizes her own payoff and the sender’s payoff. Therefore, communication
with a Friend would always be honest. An Enemy, on the other hand, has
preferences in pure conﬂict with those of the sender − she has a myopic
incentive to always choose the action that minimizes the sender’s payoff.
Therefore, the sender would never report his information perfectly to an
Enemy. With only two possible reports, the best the sender can do is to
randomize between them independently of his private information. How-
ever, the Enemy has sometimes an inter-temporal incentive to use the
sender’s report in the way the sender wants it to be used. Namely, if the
ﬁrst stage game is not valuable to the Enemy, she would use it to build a
reputation for being a Friend by mimicking the equilibrium action of the
Friend, only to exploit this reputation in the second stage where the un-
suspecting sender reports his private information honestly. This means
that sometimes, upon observing that the receiver takes the correct action
from the sender’s point of view, the sender only receives an imperfect sig-
nal about the receiver’s payoff-type.
How informative the receiver’s actions are about her payoff-type de-
pends on how much the sender knows about the equilibrium action of the
Enemy. If the sender knows that the ﬁrst-stage game is not valuable to
the Enemy and that both types behave well in the ﬁrst period, he does not
learn anything from the receiver’s ﬁrst-stage action. On the other hand,
if the sender knows that the ﬁrst-stage game is valuable to the Enemy
and that the ﬁrst-stage equilibrium is separating, he learns the receiver’s
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type perfectly at the end of the ﬁrst period. If the sender does not know
how much the receiver values the ﬁrst-stage game, he does not know what
drives the ﬁrst-stage action of the Enemy − reputation or myopic incen-
tives. As long as the Friend behaves well with a higher probability than
the Enemy, the sender always learns from the receiver’s action, but only
less than perfectly.
This paper studies strategic communication when the sender tries to
screen the receiver in the ﬁrst period while at the same time trying to
beneﬁt from the Enemy’s reputation concerns. The communication rela-
tionship is, however, delicate in the sense that trust must be mutual. That
is, just as the sender can punish the receiver for not honoring trust, the
receiver can punish the sender for not showing trust in the ﬁrst place,
that is, for sending false information. To sustain mutual trust, the sender
has the incentive to screen the receiver by sending honest reports more
frequently than he would do without the threat of punishment.
I study the structure of equilibrium communication with a particular
focus on the receiver’s behavior. I build a two-stage communication game
and analyze separately two versions of it. The versions differ in their in-
formational assumptions concerning the players’ stakes which measure
the importance of play. In the ﬁrst version, information about the stakes
is public, and both players know how his or her opponent values the ﬁrst
stage game. In the other version, the information about the stakes is pri-
vate, and none of the players knows how much his or her opponent values
the ﬁrst stage. By doing this, the paper contributes to the literature in
two ways. Firstly, it characterizes under the two model variants the most
informative equilibria of a repeated cheap talk game in which the receiver
has reputational concerns. Secondly, it analyzes the welfare effects from
additional public information concerning the stakes, or more generally,
the conditions under which the receiver chooses her action.
My main result is that for a wide range of parameter values, all players’
ex-ante expected payoffs are higher if the stakes are private information.
This seems counter-intuitive at ﬁrst since one would expect that informa-
tion is valuable in this type of a setting. However, from all players’ point
of view, the reputation concerns of the biased type can be better utilized
if her stakes are not known to the sender. The ex-ante expected bene-
ﬁts that this yields especially to the sender compensate in many cases for
the ex-ante expected losses that the sender incurs in case the receiver is
biased and betrays his trust immediately.
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A well-suited application of the analysis of this paper would be the com-
municating of new ideas in an organization. Suppose you have a new and
exciting project idea but since it is partly outside your area of expertise
you need help from a colleague at another department. Since you and
your colleague do not meet on a daily basis, you are uncertain about her
trustworthiness. There is a risk that after explaining your idea in detail
to her, she will steal the idea and represent it as substantially her own.
To succeed, the idea also needs expertise that you have, so if the colleague
is to proﬁt from stealing your idea, she must obtain accurate information
from you. The optimal scenario from your point of view would be that
you reveal the project idea together with your private information to your
colleague who offers to you her expertise without owning the project. If
the colleague is a team-player, this is how it would proceed. If, however,
the colleague is selﬁsh, she would bluff you with ﬂawed information and
before long would proceed with the project as if it was her own. Clearly,
you would never trust your ideas to her again. If you suspect that your
colleague is selﬁsh, you can test her by giving her inaccurate information
about the project or about the issue under your expertise. That way, if
she steals your project, the project will not succeed and she will be tagged
with a failed project. Beware, however, that if you do this to a colleague
who is in fact a team-player, you will be revealed, even if falsely, to be
selﬁsh and your colleague would never help you in the future.
Another application concerns the reporting of sales forecasts within a
ﬁrm. Consider a market analyst who reports sales forecasts periodically
to the ﬁrm’s CEO to back up investment decisions. The market analyst
prefers the ﬁrm to invest in new production plants counter-cyclically: in-
vestments should be made when the demand is lagging. The CEO may be
of the same opinion but may also be of the opposite opinion, that invest-
ments should be made when times are good and demand is high. Based
on the sales forecast, the market analyst chooses whether to recommend
a new production plant to be built or not. Should he be caught lying, the
CEO would replace him for good.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses
related literature. The model in which there is uncertainty only about the
receiver’s payoff-type is described in section 3.3. Section 3.4 characterizes
the most informative equilibrium of the game. Section 3.5 covers a variant
of the model in which there is uncertainty about the receiver’s payoff-type
as well as both players’ stakes. Section 3.6 compares the two models in
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terms ex ante welfare. Discussion and conclusions are covered in sections
3.7 and 3.8, respectively.
3.2 Related literature
The seminal paper on cheap talk by Crawford and Sobel (1982) has been
followed by numerous applications and variations. Most relevant to the
present framework are sender-receiver games that deal with reputation,
two-sided incomplete information, and dynamic information transmission.
The insights from the literature on reputation in principal-agent frame-
works (see e.g. Kreps & Wilson, 1982; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982; Ely &
Välimäki, 2003) have been applied to communication games in various
ways. In most of this literature1, interest is on the consequences for in-
formation transmission of the sender’s reputational concerns. Out of the
existing literature, Sobel (1985) shares some key elements with my model.
He assumes that the sender can be of two types, good and bad, where a
good sender is nonstrategic and always tells the truth while a bad sender
chooses between truth-telling (investing in reputation) or lying (exploiting
reputation). Moreover, the bad sender’s preferences directly conﬂict with
those of the receiver. In this paper, I analyze the complete opposite of this
setting, by turning the informational setup upside down. To the best of
my knowledge, the present paper is the ﬁrst to study the effect of the re-
ceiver’s reputational concerns on information transmission. In line with
existing work on reputation building in communication games, reputa-
tional concerns as such are found to have a positive effect on information
transmission.
Both Sobel (1985) and Morris (2001) incorporate stakes into their mod-
els essentially to give rise to reputational incentives. A similar approach
has been employed more recently by Li & Mylovanov (2008). The usual
assumption has been that the stakes are common knowledge among play-
ers. However, reputational concerns are present also when information
about the stakes is held privately by each player. Regardless of the infor-
mational assumptions concerning the stakes, if desirable behavior is ob-
served, the player who is trying to learn about his or her opponent cannot
1Reputational concerns of the sender have been studied for instance by Morris
(2001), Sobel (1985), Bénabou & Laroque (1992), Wrasai & Swank (2007), Guem-
bel & Rossetto (2009), Durbin & Iyer (2009), Frisell & Lagerlöf (2007), Ottaviani
& Sørensen (2006).
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be certain which type took the particular action. This paper constructs
an equilibrium under both scenarios and compares them in terms of ex
ante welfare. This should bring new insights to the effects of reputational
concerns in communication games.
Whereas dynamic communication in the previous papers focuses on study-
ing the role of reputation, the models of Renault et al. (2013) and Golosov
et al. (2014) focus on the dynamics of communication between two long-
run players. As in the present paper, this allows both the sender and the
receiver to discipline the behavior of his or her opponent by threatening
to resort to playing a less informative equilibrium if the opponent fails to
cooperate. Apart from this similarity, their papers are substantially dif-
ferent from mine. The model of Renault et al. (2013) differs most notably
in the assumption that the state of the world follows a Markov chain, and
the preferences of the receiver are commonly known. Golosov et al. (2014)
ﬁnd that gradual, and eventually full, revelation of information is pos-
sible in a dynamic cheap-talk game in which, in contrast to the present
set-up, information is fully persistent in the sense that the state of the
world remains the same across time.
Two-sided asymmetric information in cheap talk games has been stud-
ied by Chen (2009, 2012), Watson (1999), Lai (2013), Moreno de Barreda
(2010), and Ishida & Shimizu (2012). In all of these, the receiver is as-
sumed to be partially informed about the state of the world, but her pref-
erences remain common knowledge. Watson (1996) deals with a model in
which the sender is confused about his information; he does not fully un-
derstand it because he lacks a decoding device which the receiver, in turn,
possesses. Sender’s confusion in Watson’s model has the same implica-
tions as in my model: the sender is uncertain about the reaction of the
receiver to his information. However, in Watson’s analysis, the sender’s
uncertainty is fundamentally about the state of the world while in my
model, it is about the receiver’s preferred way to use the information.
Many of the aforementioned papers ﬁnd that incomplete information is
beneﬁcial for communication. Against this background, the result of this
paper, that additional public information may not be socially optimal, is
not unique, but what distinguishes it from previous work is the source of
informational asymmetry.
Related to the public disclosure of information, Li & Madarász (2008)
analyze the welfare consequences of mandatory versus voluntary disclo-
sure, via cheap talk, of the sender’s bias. They conclude that it never ben-
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eﬁts the receiver nor the sender to impose mandatory disclosure of the
sender’s bias. In this paper, the bias of the receiver is ﬁxed and neither
the bias nor the stakes are subject to voluntary disclosure.
In the model to be analyzed, players’ stakes are assumed to be drawn
independently across players. This differs from the assumption used in
Watson (1999, 2002) that players value each project identically and jointly
decide on the optimal sequencing of projects in terms of their importance.
Watson shows that the equilibrium implements a “starting small” feature
such that the players gradually increase the stakes as the relationship
evolves and the opponent behaves in a trustworthy manner. This model-
ing structure, however, excludes the randomness in the stakes which is
central to the results in this paper.
Blonski and Probst (2004) analyze a game closely related to that of
Watson (1999, 2002). They look at a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game
with two-sided incomplete information in that each player is privately
informed of his or her discount factor which is either high or low. In addi-
tion, they introduce stakes in the form of a parameter λ that determines
the division of a cake between the two players. Hence, the stakes are
jointly determined and public knowledge. They demonstrate that in some
equilibria of their game with two-sided incomplete information all players
do strictly better than in a corresponding game with complete informa-
tion. The authors are mainly concerned of the formation of relationships,
and do not account for two-dimensional types as in the present analysis.
Nevertheless, their paper builds on similar type of argumentation as in
the current paper regarding the welfare effects of additional public infor-
mation.
Finally, analysis of the social value of additional information relates
to the studies of transparency in organizations. Prat (2005), Matozzi &
Merlo (2007), Levy (2007), and Bar-Isaac (2012) are but a few examples
that focus on issues of transparency in principal-agent relationships, al-
though none of them considers cheap talk. In their papers, transparency
is coined as the ability of the principal to either observe how the agent
behaves and/or what the consequences of such behavior are. For example,
the principal may or may not observe the agent’s choice of effort. Trans-
parency in the present model should be interpreted as the expert’s ability
to observe the conditions under which the decision-maker takes her deci-
sions. In line with previous ﬁndings, increased transparency is not always
socially optimal.
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3.3 The Model
This section formalizes a model in which both players’ stakes are common
knowledge. The equilibrium of the game is analyzed in section 3.4. Sec-
tion 3.5 covers an alternative model in which the stakes are each player’s
private information. Apart from the change in the informational struc-
ture and its implications for strategies, histories and equilibrium beliefs,
the basic structure remains unchanged.
There are two players, a sender (S, or he) and a receiver (R, or she) who
interact twice, in time periods t = 1, 2. In each period, R has to make a
decision that is payoff relevant to both players. S has private information
concerning a state of the world that affects R’s decision, and he can re-
port his information to R by sending a costless and unveriﬁable message.
There is potentially a conﬂict of interests between the players. As a re-
sult, communication is modeled as cheap talk. Before players choose their
actions, Nature moves and draws R’s payoff type and players’ stakes once
and for all.
The payoff-type τ is privately observed by R and it determines R’s pref-
erences vis-à-vis S. It is drawn from the commonly known distribution
τ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
U wp. π1
B wp. 1− π1
,
where U stands for “unbiased” and B for “biased”. The unbiased type has
preferences aligned with those of S, whereas the biased type has prefer-
ences in pure conﬂict with S. Henceforth, I apply the short-hand notation
RU and RB for unbiased and biased type, respectively.
Furthermore, all players publicly observe y and x, which are the realiza-
tions of random variables Y and X, governed by distributions H and G,
respectively, with supports on [0, y¯] and [0, x¯], y¯, x¯ ∈ R+. These parameters
measure players’ stakes in the ﬁrst period, that is, the relative importance
of the ﬁrst period as compared to the second period. It is assumed that
the stakes are independent of the state of the world, and x is independent
of R’s payoff-type, τ. As a result, R’s type is a two-dimensional vector,
(τ, x) ∈ {U,B}× [0, x¯], and there is asymmetric information about the ﬁrst
dimension. In the repeated game, S hopes to learn τ in order to be able
to use his ﬁrst-best communication strategy throughout the rest of the
game. With RU , this would be perfect communication, and with RB, this
would be babbling.
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After the types have been drawn, the play proceeds through two stages.
At the beginning of each stage, a state of the world, θt, is drawn in an
i.i.d. manner from the set Θt = {0, 1}, with Pr(θt = k) = 12 for k = 0, 1.
The state of the world is privately observed by S, and after observing it, S
reports it to R by sending a message mt ∈ Mt = {0, 1}. After observing mt,
R chooses an action, at, from At = {0, 1} so as to maximize her expected
payoff. After R’s action, payoffs are realized and privately observed, but
all players observe the realized state of the world as well as actions taken.
This is a crucial assumption for the analysis and the results of the game.
3.3.1 Payoffs
The stage game payoffs for S are given by a function uS : Θ × A → R,
and for the receiver by uR : Θ×A×{U,B} → R. In addition, both players
weight the ﬁrst period with y and x, respectively. The stage-game payoffs
of S and RU are maximized when at = θt, and the payoff of RB is maxi-
mized when at = 1−θt. The stage-game payoff vector (uS , uB) as a function
of the state and the action taken is characterized in the following matrix.
a = 0 a = 1
θ = 0 1,−1 −1, 1
θ = 1 −1, 1 1,−1
Table 3.1. Stage-game payoffs
Since the players’ payoffs are symmetric in θ, the explicit values of θt,
mt or at are not of importance per se which simpliﬁes the analysis of the
game. Instead, what players care about is whether or not S’s report was
truthful, and whether or not R followed the report. Finally, both players
maximize the sum of expected stage-game payoffs which are given as
US(θ1, θ2, a1, a2; y) = yuS (θ1, a1) + uS (θ2, a2)
URτ (θ1, θ2, a1, a2;x) = xuτ (θ1, a1) + uτ (θ2, a2) , τ ∈ {U,B} .
3.3.2 Histories and strategies
At the moment when the players choose their actions in the ﬁrst pe-
riod, they know the public history h1 ∈ H1 = [0, y¯] × [0, x¯]. The set of
period 2 public histories is given by H2 = (Θ × M × A × [0, y¯] × [0, x¯]),
with a typical element h2. From S’s point of view, histories can be di-
vided into two categories, good or bad, with good histories given by the set
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H2S+ =
{
h2 | a1 = m1
}
, and bad histories by the set H2S− =
{
h2 | a1 = m1
}
.
On the other hand, from R’s point of view, good histories are only those
where S has reported the state correctly. Therefore, denote the set of good
histories from R’s point of view by H2R+ =
{
h2 | m1 = θ1
}
, and the set of
bad histories by H2R− =
{
h2 | m1 = θ1
}
. What matters for the analysis of
the game are the commonly perceived good or bad histories. Therefore, de-
note the commonly perceived set of good histories by H2+ ≡ H2S+
⋃H2R+ =
{(0, 0, 0, y, x) , (1, 1, 1, y, x)} . All the remaining histories of play are catego-
rized as bad, since along such a history, either S or R has misbehaved.
A behavior strategy for S in period t = 1, 2 is a function μt : Θ ×
Ht → [0, 1], where μt(θ, h) gives the probability that he reports the state θt
truthfully given the history of play up to period t. The probability that
S misreports the state, or lies, is given by the complementary proba-
bility 1 − μt(θ, h). A behavior strategy for R of type (τ, x) is a function
αt : M ×Ht × {U,B} → [0, 1], where αt(m,h, τ) gives the probability that
R follows S’s message mt by taking action at = mt given her type and the
history of play. The probability that R deviates from S’s message, by not
following it, is given by 1− αt(m,h, τ).
3.3.3 Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept applied is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)2.
This requires sequential rationality, that is, for any date t and any his-
tory ht the strategies being played from ht onwards constitute a Bayesian
equilibrium of the continuation game. Formally, given the history of play
ht, let
V S((μ, α) | ht, θ)
be the expected continuation payoff of the sender of type θ under strategy
proﬁle (μ, α) conditional on reaching history ht. Similarly, let
V τ ((μ, α) | ht,m)
be the expected continuation payoff of the receiver of type (τ, x) under
strategy proﬁle (μ, α) conditional on reaching history ht.
With the continuation payoffs deﬁned, a PBE of the two-period game
consists of a strategy proﬁle (μ, αU , αB) and posterior beliefs πt(h), f
(
θt | mt, ht
)
2Since both states of nature, 0 and 1, occur with positive probability, there are
no off-path messages so that a PBE of the game coincides with a sequential equi-
librium.
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such that
i) for the sender, for each state of the world θ, alternative strat-
egy μ′ , and for any history ht,
V S
(
(μ, αU , αB) | ht, θ
) ≥ V S ((μ′ , αU , αB) | ht, θ) .
ii) for a receiver of type τ , for each message m, alternative strat-
egy α′ , and for any history ht,
V τ
(
(ατ , μ) | ht,m
) ≥ V τ ((α′τμ) | ht,m) .
iii) beliefs about the state of the world held by R, and beliefs
about R’s type held by S are updated according to Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. That is,
π2(h) = Pr {τ = U | a1(m) = m} =
π1α1(m, y, x, U)
π1α1(m, y, x, U) + (1− π1)α1(m, y, x,B)
Pr(θt = k | mt = k, ht) =
Pr (θt = k)μ(h
t, k)
Pr (θt = k)μ(ht, k) + Pr (θt = 1− k) (1− μ(ht, k))
As in all cheap talk games, there always exists an uninformative babbling
equilibrium in which the sender’s report does not depend on θt, and there-
fore R will ignore mt and choose at based on her prior belief about θt.
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium is said to be informative if, after receiv-
ing a message m, the receiver’s belief Pr(θ = k | m = k) = 12 , for k ∈ {0, 1}.
As a result, in any informative equilibrium, the receiver’s expected payoff,
Eθu(a(m), θ), is higher than in the non-informative, babbling, equilibrium.
Among the many informative PBE of the game, I focus on the one which is
obtained when all players follow grim-trigger strategies that tell to resort
to the babbling equilibrium forever after whenever anyone has deviated
from the equilibrium path of play. That is, if S ever lies to R, or if R ever
misuses S’s trust, the friendship will end immediately and will never be
restored.3 Since babbling constitutes a stage-game Nash equilibrium and
3I acknowledge, however, that RU ’s punishment is not renegotiation-proof; once
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gives all players their min-max payoffs, it is the most severe punishment
available to any player. The use of grim-trigger strategies gives therefore
the highest incentives for mutual cooperation. In fact, the equilibrium be-
ing characterized is the most informative equilibrium of the game, giving
rise to as much communication overall as possible given the asymmetries
in information.
3.3.4 A game without reputation
To illustrate how the sender’s incentives to screen the receiver in the ﬁrst
period of the game affect the informativeness of communication, consider
the following example in which it is commonly known that x, y = 1. That
is, both players put equal weight on the decisions in periods 1 and 2, and
hence the stakes are redundant. This immediately implies that RB has
no incentives to invest in reputation because the immediate cost for her
from mimicking RU , −1, is just covered by the reward of 1 from being
able to exploit the reputation at t = 2. Instead, RB gains strictly more by
diverting from the S’s message immediately. This gives her a total payoff
of 1.
Strategies in period 2 Working backwards, the second and last period of
the game is played like a static game. Suppose that the history of play is
good and S enters the second period with posterior beliefs π2(h+). Since
RB does not have reputational concerns, it must be that π2(h+) = 1 and S
knows that R is unbiased. An unbiased R will naturally follow m2, which
yields her and S a payoff of 1. If R has deceived trust in the ﬁrst period,
π2(h−) = 0 and S babbles in the second period. The best response of RB
is to ignore m2 and randomize her action based on her prior. Both players
obtain an expected payoff of 0.
Strategies in period 1 Given that RU follows all honest reports and RB
diverts from them, the incentive compatibility condition faced by S, for
any realization of θ1, is
π1 − (1− π1) + π1V S(h+) ≥ −π1 + (1− π1), (3.1)
where he compares his expected payoff from honest reporting to the ex-
pected payoff from lying about the ﬁrst state. Only if these two actions
S has learned R’s type via a dishonest report, both players would be strictly
better off by returning to cooperation. However, especially in friendships, it is
not unheard of that the sender’s dishonesty hits the pride of the receiver to such
an extent that the two never speak to each other again.
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yield the same payoff would S consider babbling or randomizing his ﬁrst
message.
From (3.1) it is evident that if π1 > 12 , honesty strictly dominates ly-
ing in the current period. In addition, if faced by RU , S obtains a strictly
positive continuation payoff. If π1 = 12 , S obtains 0 in the current period
regardless of his report. However, honesty brings with it the strictly pos-
itive continuation payoff making it the optimal strategy for S. If π1 < 12 ,
honest reporting yields immediate expected losses as compared to lying.
However, for sufﬁciently high π1, the continuation payoff, V S(h+) = 1, is
enough to compensate for these losses. Proposition 3.1 states the result
formally.
Proposition 3.1. If y, x = 1, and π1 ≥ 25 ,
μ1(θ) = 1, μ2(θ, h2) =
⎧⎨
⎩1 if h
2 ∈ H2+
1
2 otherwise
α1U (m) = 1, α
2
U (m,h
2) =
⎧⎨
⎩1 if h
2 ∈ H2+
1
2 otherwise
α1B(m) = 0, α
2
B(m,h
2) =
⎧⎨
⎩0 if h
2 ∈ H2+
1
2 otherwise .
Moreover,
π2(h) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if a1 = m1
0 otherwise
, f(θ1 | m1) = 1, f(θ2 | m2, h2) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if h2 ∈ H2+
1
2 otherwise.
If π1 < 25 ,
μt(θ) = αtτ (m) =
1
2
, ∀t, τ.
π2(h) = π1, f (θt | mt) = 1
2
.
In order to preserve communication with a potential RU , S is willing to
screen R also when it implies expected costs in the short term. With-
out the threat of punishment S would not send informative messages, for
any stakes, if π1 < 12 . The use of grim-trigger strategies thus produces
an ex-ante Pareto improvement; for priors π1 ∈ [25 , 12), all players are ex
ante strictly better off when S communicates truthfully as compared to
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a babbling equilibrium. In fact, honest reporting is strictly better than
babbling for all π1 > 13 . However, the possibility of lying undermines com-
munication for priors π1 ∈ [13 , 25).
Next, I proceed to analyze the game when the stakes are not degenerate
at 1. In the following section, the stakes are still degenerate but not nec-
essarily equal to 1. Section 3.5 analyzes a model in which the stakes are
random and players’ private information. I will henceforth refer to the
former scenario as ’Public regime’, and to the latter as ’Private regime’.
3.4 Public regime equilibrium
This section characterizes the most informative communication equilib-
rium when both players’ stakes are public information. S knows not only
the equilibrium strategy of R but also her equilibrium action. As a result,
he knows if the ﬁrst-stage equilibrium is pooling or separating. In the
former case, he does not learn anything, and in the latter case he learns
R’s type with certainty.
The second and last period of the game is played like a static game.
Suppose that no one has misbehaved in the ﬁrst period, and S holds a
belief π2(h+) that R is unbiased. Since RB has no reputation to keep
up, she diverts from any truthful message while RU follows it. Given the
payoffs as speciﬁed in section 3, honest reporting is strictly optimal for S if
and only if π2(h+) > 12 . For any lower beliefs, given R’s proposed strategy,
S would rather lie about θ2 than report it honestly. However, since R is
aware of this, she will adjust her strategy accordingly. In equilibrium,
S will not be able to fool R by lying, and the unique equilibrium must
consist of babbling. If π2(h) = 12 , S is indifferent between being honest or
dishonest.
In the ﬁrst period, the best response of RU is always to follow S’s reports
if they are truthful on expectation, regardless of the continuation payoffs
which are at least zero in any case. I will therefore concentrate on charac-
terizing the ﬁrst-period equilibrium strategies of S and RB. The structure
of equilibrium depends on S’s prior belief about R’s type.
Proposition 4.1. If π1 ≥ 12 , the sender reports θ1 honestly for all y ≥ 0.
58
Can You Keep a Secret? - Building Reciprocal Trust in Communication
RB plays according to the following cutoff strategy.
α1B(m,h) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if x ≤ 12
0 otherwise.
Moreover,
π2(h) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
π1 if x ≤ 12
1 if x > 12 and a1 = m1
0 otherwise.
Proof: In the appendix. 
If S is conﬁdent that R is unbiased (i.e. π1 ≥ 12), S’s equilibrium strategy
is driven by his concern to maximize payoffs against RU . This involves re-
porting the state truthfully regardless of any player’s stakes. Irrespective
of RB ’s action, S’s payoff is higher in both periods if he reports the ﬁrst
state honestly instead of lying. Given the strategy of S, if R’s stakes are
lower than 12 , or put differently, if the second period is at least twice as im-
portant as the ﬁrst period, the optimal strategy is to invest in reputation
by mimicking RU because it guarantees the maximal payoff at the second
stage. If R’s stakes are higher than 12 , the myopic incentives dominate
and RB deceives S’s trust immediately.
Proposition 4.2. If π1 ∈ [14 , 12), and if
x ≤ 12 , μ1(θ, h) = 1 for all y ≥ 0, RB follows the ﬁrst report with prob-
ability α1B(m,h) =
π1
1−π1 . If h
2 ∈ H2+, μ2(θ, h) = 12 + x;
x > 12 , S plays according to the following cutoff strategy,
μ1(θ, h) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if y ≤ yˆPub
1
2 otherwise,
where yˆPub = min
{
π1
2(1−2π1) , y¯
}
. RB ’s strategy is given by
α1B(m,h) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if y ≤ yˆPub
1
2 otherwise.
Proof: In the appendix. 
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If S’s prior is less than 12 he cares about RB ’s action, and all the more
so the lower the prior is. Consider the case in which RB has reputational
concerns. To ensure that the investment in reputation pays off in the fu-
ture, RB must mimic RU with a probability less than one so as to induce
a high enough posterior π2(h). In equilibrium, all types x ≤ 12 randomize
their ﬁrst-stage action by mimicking RU with a probability that just in-
duces a posterior belief of 12 . To ensure that all types x ≤ 12 are indifferent
between investing in reputation and deceiving S immediately, S must de-
crease the beneﬁts from reputation by promising an honest report at t = 2
with a probability less than one. One way to achieve this is to randomize
between honest and false reporting.4 Since π2(h+) = 12 , consistency of S’s
mixed-strategy is ensured.
When S knows that RB has only myopic concerns
(
x > 12
)
and the ﬁrst-
stage equilibrium is separating, his prior is too low to screen R for all
stakes y. For priors less than 12 , honest reporting yields expected losses
in period 1. Therefore, S is willing to report the ﬁrst state truthfully and
thereby screen R if and only if the ﬁrst period is not very important, that
is, if and only if y ≤ yˆPub. For all stakes higher than yˆPub, since S cannot
gain from lying in the Public regime, communication can only consist of
babbling.
Proposition 4.3. If π1 < 14 , there exists an informative equilibrium such
that for all y ≤ yˆPub S reports θ1 honestly, RU follows m1 and RB diverts
from it. Otherwise the unique equilibrium consists of babbling.
If S’s prior is lower than 14 the mixed-strategy equilibrium cannot be sup-
ported any longer because S prefers to lie about θ1. This is because to
induce a high enough posterior belief, RB must mimic RU with such a
low probability that S does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to seek beneﬁts from
RB ’s reputational concerns. Because RB has no further ways to proﬁtably
invest in reputation, the equilibrium for low priors is separating. As dis-
cussed under Proposition 4.2, S is willing to screen R if and only if his
stakes are low enough.
The equilibrium of the game is visualized in Figure 3.1 (Figure 1). For
mere expositional purposes, y¯ is set equal to 4. The lower graph displays
RB ’s strategy in the ﬁrst period in the nontrivial case when x ≤ 12 . For in-
4Another way would be to randomize between honest reporting and babbling.
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termediate priors π1 ∈ [14 , 12), RB randomizes her action in the ﬁrst period
by following with probability α1B(m) ∈ [13 , 1). In this interval, the realiza-
tion of x also affects the equilibrium second-stage action of S.
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Figure 1. Public regime equilibrium
μ1(θ, y, x) =
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if x >
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if x ≤
1
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μ1(θ, y, x) = 1
Figure 3.1. Public regime strategies
3.5 Private regime equilibrium
The assumption that players always know each other’s stakes seems some-
what optimistic. Interactions in which none of the players actually knows
how valuable the stage game is to their opponent are so common that it
is important to study how this affects strategic communication. In this
section, I characterize the most informative communication equilibrium
of a game in which both players observe their stakes privately at the be-
ginning of the game. That is, asymmetric information relates not only to
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the state of the world and R’s payoff-type but also to the stakes of one’s
opponent. The distributions H and G from which the stakes are drawn
from are common knowledge. In other respects the model is as formalized
in section 3.3.
The change in the informational assumptions affects histories, strate-
gies and beliefs. The public history at t = 1 is now h1 = {∅}, and therefore
omitted in notation for the rest of the section. The public history of play
at the beginning of the second period is H2 = (Θ×M ×A). Players’ strate-
gies now only depend on one’s own stakes, and equilibrium beliefs are
characterized by the following Bayes’ rules.
π2(h+) = Pr {τ = U | a1(m) = m}
=
π1
´
[0,x¯] α
1
U (m,x)dG(x)
π1
´
[0,x¯] α
1
U (m,x)dG(x) + (1− π1)
´
[0,x¯] α
1
B(m,x)dG(x)
Pr(θt = k | mt = k, ht) =
Pr(θt = k)
´
[0,y¯] μ
1(k, y, ht)dH(y)
Pr(θt = k)
´
[0,y¯] μ
1(k, y, ht)dH(y) + Pr(θt = 1− k)
´
[0,y¯] 1− μ1(k, y, ht)dH(y)
As in the previous section, the equilibrium will be characterized by cutoff
strategies for both S and RB, with equilibrium cutoffs denoted by yˆPr and
xˆPr, respectively. Now that y is not observed by R, the equilibrium cutoff
strategy of S will be of different nature than under the Public regime.
Because R is not able to tell whether y is below or above yˆPr, S is able to
lie about the state in equilibrium. Therefore, the structure of equilibrium
strategies that I look at is the following. For S,
μ1(θ, y) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if y ≤ yˆPr
0 otherwise,
and for RB,
α1B(m,x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if x ≤ xˆPr
0 otherwise.
In the second and last period of the game, RB has no reputation to keep
up and will divert from any message which is truthful on expectation. RU
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will continue to follow if the history of play is good. The equilibrium will
thus be identical to the Public regime as characterized in section 3.4.
In the ﬁrst period, since RU has only two available actions, she fol-
lows S’s report as long as it is truthful on expectation, that is, as long
as H(yˆPr) > 12 . For the rest of the section, I concentrate on characteriz-
ing the equilibrium strategies of S and RB. Proposition 5.1 is the Private
regime analog of Proposition 4.1 with the difference that the lower bound
for priors supporting the equilibrium is given by π˜ ≤ 12 .
Proposition 5.1. If π1 ≥ π˜ ≡ max {π˜SR, π˜IC} , S reports θ1 honestly for
all y ≥ 0, and μ2(θ, h) = 1 iff h2 ∈ H2+. RB follows a cutoff strategy with
xˆPr =
1
2 .
Proof: In the appendix. 
The condition π1 ≥ π˜IC , where ′IC ′ is short-hand for incentive compatibil-
ity, ensures that honest reporting is optimal at t = 1 without accounting
for continuation payoffs. It follows from the inequality
[
π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr)− (1− π1) (1−G(xˆPr))
]
y ≥ 0
that is,
π1 ≥ 1− 2G(xˆPr)
2 (1−G(xˆPr)) ≡ π˜IC . (3.2)
The condition π1 ≥ π˜SR, where ′SR′ is short-hand for sequential rational-
ity, ensures that honest reporting is optimal at t = 2 after a good history
of play, and it is derived from the condition
π2(h+) :=
π1
π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr) ≥
1
2
, (3.3)
that is,
π1 ≥ G(xˆPr)
1 +G(xˆPr)
≡ π˜SR.
Since S has a myopic incentive to report honestly in both periods, RB is
free to invest in reputation whenever x ≤ 12 . If S’s prior is lower than π˜,
either he or RB must adjust the equilibrium strategy to guarantee infor-
mative communication.
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Proposition 5.2. If π1 ∈ [14 , π˜SR), S reports θ1 honestly for all y ≥ 0.
RB invests in reputation if and only if x ≤ xˆPr = G−1
(
π1
1−π1
)
. Moreover, in
equilibrium, μ2(θ, h+) = 12 + xˆPr.
Proof: In the appendix. 
If S’s prior is lower than π˜SR but higher than π˜IC , which occurs whenever
G(12) ≥ 13 , S ﬁnds it optimal to report θ1 honestly, but if RB follows the
ﬁrst report with probability 1, S would babble in period 2, a contradiction.
An equilibrium with reputation building thus requires that xˆPr adjust to
ensure a high enough posterior π2(h+). In equilibrium, the highest type
who still invests in reputation is the type xˆPr for whom the sequential
rationality condition (3.3) holds as equality. If there was slack, implying
that S would report the second state truthfully after a good history of
play, there would always exist some type xˆ +  who would strictly prefer
to invest in reputation than not. To make the cutoff type xˆPr indifferent,
and in particular, to make sure that all types higher than the cutoff prefer
to forgo the investment in reputation, S must make the investment less
appealing by randomizing his second-stage action after a good history of
play. Unlike in the Public regime where each type x ≤ 12 must be made in-
different, in the Private regime S only needs to make sure that the cutoff
type is indifferent. Finally, the equilibrium requires that S want to re-
port θ1 honestly for all stakes y. Since S’s expected payoff from period 2 is
zero, the lower bound for priors that support the equilibrium is obtained
by substituting for G (xˆPr) = π
1
1−π1 in (3.2).
Proposition 5.3. If π1 ∈ [πˆ, π˜IC), where πˆ = max {πˆx, πˆy} , and πˆx is
the lowest prior such that G(xˆPr) ≤ 1−2π12(1−π1) , and πˆy is the lowest prior such
that H(yˆPr) > 12 , the equilibrium ﬁrst-period strategies of S and RB are
characterized as
μ1(θ, y) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if y ≤ yˆPr
0 otherwise
, α1B(m,x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if x ≤ xˆPr
0 otherwise
,
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where yˆPr and xˆPr are determined simultaneously by
yˆPr(π
1, xˆPr) =
1
2
[
π1 − (1− π1)G(xˆPr)
]
[(1− π1) (1− 2G(xˆPr))− π1]
xˆPr(yˆPr) =
H(yˆPr)
2 (2H(yˆPr)− 1) .
Moreover, in equilibrium,
π2(h+) =
π1
π1 + (1− π1)G (xˆPr) .
Proof: In the appendix. 
If S’s prior is less than π˜IC but higher than π˜SR, which occurs whenever
G(12) <
1
3 , honest reporting yields S an immediate expected loss and there-
fore, taking into account the positive continuation payoff if S is truthful,
honest reporting of the ﬁrst state occurs only for y ≤ yˆPr. The equilibrium
cutoff yˆPr is higher than under the Public regime because S uses truthful
reporting not only to screen R but also to beneﬁt from the reputational
concerns of RB that exist with probability G (xˆPr).
As a reaction to the fact that S lies about the ﬁrst state with probability
1−H(yˆPr), RB ’s cutoff xˆPr adjusts upwards. Namely, RB has now a higher
incentive to follow the ﬁrst report, not to invest in reputation but to reap
as much as she can from the ﬁrst period in case S lies and communication
turns into babbling in period 2 irrespective of RB ’s action. The higher
the probability that S lies, the higher the R’s cutoff. Therefore, in the
equilibrium xˆPr is a decreasing function of yˆPr.
Finally, notice that the lower bound supporting the equilibrium is de-
termined by the interplay of xˆPr and π˜IC in the following sense. Since
xˆPr is decreasing in π1, the probability G(xˆPr) is also decreasing in π1.
This means that S’s incentive to report θ1 truthfully is also decreasing in
π1. The equilibrium, however, requires that the ﬁrst-period yields S an
expected loss, that is, that π1 < π˜IC . This again requires that G(xˆPr) ≤
1−2π1
2(1−π1) . Denote by πˆx the prior at which the curves G
−1
(
1−2π1
2(1−π1)
)
and xˆPr
as deﬁned in the proposition intersect. At the same time, the equilibrium
requires that H(yˆPr) > 12 . Denote by πˆy the lowest π
1 for which this holds.
The lower bound is then given by max {πˆx, πˆy} .
Proposition 5.4. If π1 is lower than 14 or πˆ, depending on the value of
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G(12), there exists a cutoff
yˆPr =
π1
2 (1− 2π1)
such that for each π1, if H(yˆPr) > 12 , S reports θ1 truthfully for all y ≤ yˆPr
and RB diverts from all m1. Therefore, μ2(θ, h+) = 1. For each π1, if
H(yˆPr) ≤ 12 , the unique equilibrium consists of babbling.
Proof: In the appendix. 
Similarly to the Public regime, RB does not invest in reputation for low
priors. Since π1 is low, S engages in screening R by reporting θ1 truthfully
if and only if his stakes are low. While under the Public regime, a low
cutoff yˆ poses no problem for the existence of the informative equilibrium,
the existence is restricted by the condition H(yˆPr) > 12 under the Private
regime.
Before turning to the welfare analysis, a short look at the difference in
S’s cutoffs between the regimes is in order as it will in part determine the
relative ranking of the regimes in terms of ex ante welfare. Notice, ﬁrstly,
that yˆPub is independent of distributions G and H. Secondly, yˆPub < yˆPr
for all π1 ≥ πˆ. The reason is that under the Public regime, the cutoff
only ensures that honest reporting is optimal when RB is known to devi-
ate immediately, which imposes a more demanding constraint for truthful
communication. At the limit, when G(12) = 0, the cutoffs are identical for
all π1.
Figure 3.2 (ﬁgure 2) plots the sender’s cutoff yˆPr for two alternative dis-
tributional assumptions. The dashed line assumes that both players’
stakes are distributed according to a uniform ratio distribution5. The
support of the distribution is R+ but the vertical axis is limited to 4
for expositional purposes. The dotted line assumes that both players’
stakes are distributed uniformly on [0, 2]. Both of the considered distribu-
tions are analytically convenient and impose the assumption that E(X) =
E(Y ) = 1. Moreover, both distributions imply that the equilibrium con-
dition H(yˆPr) > 12 holds if yˆPr > 1. Therefore, if π
1 < 14 , an informative
equilibrium fails to exist under the Private regime because the equilib-
5This assumption seems reasonable if the stakes are derived as the ratio of the
stakes of periods 1 and 2. Suppose that both are draws from U [0, 1]. The ratio
Z = X1X2 follows a uniform ratio distribution with a pdf p(z) =
{
1
2 if z ≤ 1
1
2z2 if z > 1.
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rium cutoff, equal to yˆPub as plotted in the ﬁgure, is too low. This explains
why the Public regime yields all players strictly higher ex ante welfare for
low priors; there is a positive probability that information is transmitted
which gives all players strictly higher expected payoffs than babbling. We
turn to the welfare comparison next.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium cutoﬀs yˆ
Figure 3.2. Equilibrium cutoff of the sender
3.6 Welfare
This section examines the social value of public information concerning
the stakes. This is done by comparing the ex ante expected payoffs from
the two models analyzed in section 3.4 and 3.5. The results show that, for
a range of parameter values, public information about the stakes hurts at
least some and often all players. The result derives mainly from the dif-
ferences in the informational assumptions about R’s stakes. Whether S’s
stakes are known or not affects welfare to a lesser extent. In fact, the re-
sult would remain qualitatively unchanged if we set y = 1 and ignore the
sender’s stakes altogether. The result that additional information about
R is detrimental for ex-ante welfare seems surprising because in a single-
player game information is always valuable in the sense of Blackwell.
To see this, consider a single-player game which replicates the commu-
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nication model but replaces R with a machine. A player does not know the
type of the machine and can play it at most twice. A good machine always
yields a prize whereas a bad machine follows a cutoff rule in the ﬁrst pe-
riod by returning a prize if the realization of a random variable X is below
an exogenously given threshold xˆ, and otherwise returns nothing. There
is a prior probability of π that the machine is good. In this setting, a player
is always at least as well off by knowing x than not knowing it because
he always has the option to ignore this additional information and play as
if he did not know x if that results in higher expected payoffs. When the
machine is replaced by a strategic R who, if biased, behaves well only if it
ensures a high enough continuation payoff, more information may make
not only R but also S strictly worse off. The fact that private information
smooths the posterior turns out to be a blessing for all players.
The analysis is done in two parts, separately for S and R. I limit atten-
tion to priors in the range [14 ,
1
2). The welfare analysis for all lower and all
higher priors is straightforward. More speciﬁcally, as long as H(yˆPr) < 12 ,
the Public regime strictly dominates the Private for all π1 < 14 because the
Private regime has a unique equilibrium in babbling. If H(yˆPr) > 12 , the
Private regime has an informative equilibrium in which S lies if y > yˆPr.
The only player who beneﬁts from this is S because both types of R prefer
babbling to being deceived. A numerical example of such a case is in-
cluded in the appendix and it shows that lying hurts R signiﬁcantly more
than S ever beneﬁts from it.
On the other hand, for all π1 ≥ 12 , the regimes are identical in equilib-
rium strategies and therefore also in expected payoffs. Since S is conﬁdent
enough in facing RU , he ignores any information about the stakes, his own
or R’s, and therefore the regime does not play any role in determining the
welfare.
For the remainder of the section, to obtain a better view of what is driv-
ing the results, I focus on the ex-ante welfare at the point in time where
the realization of Y is known (to the researcher) but the realization of
X remains unknown. This should ease the exposition of the results and
makes the composition of each player’s welfare more transparent than if
we only look at the expectation of Y. There exist parameter environments
in which all players strictly prefer the Private regime over the Public,
but also those in which the reverse holds. The actual ex-ante welfare is
obtained by integrating over Y. A few numerical examples are provided
in the appendix when relevant. The next subsection concentrates on the
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sender’s welfare, and the receiver’s welfare is covered separately in sub-
section 3.6.2.
3.6.1 Sender’s welfare
The sender’s welfare is a result of two counteracting effects. On the one
hand, he beneﬁts in the short run from RB ’s reputational concerns by ob-
taining his maximum payoff whenever RB mimics RU . On the downside,
this involves the risk of incurring losses at the second period where a po-
tential RB exploits her reputation at the expense of S. However, the more
important the ﬁrst period is to S the less the expected losses in the second
period matter. Therefore, the higher S’s stakes are the more he stands
to gain from RB ’s reputational incentives. When RB ’s motive in the ﬁrst
period is to establish a reputation, S maximizes his gains from this by
allowing RB to maximize the probability with which she mimics RU . For
this reason S strictly prefers the Private regime where RB has more room
to invest in reputation than under the Public regime where S cannot up-
date his beliefs when RB is known to pool with RU . Furthermore, the
optimality of the Private regime increases monotonically in y.
On the other hand, S incurs expected losses from trusting R if RB does
not have reputational concerns and deceives S’s trust immediately. Sup-
pose that x > 12 . If y ≤ yˆPub, both regimes have an equilibrium in which
S trusts R at t = 1, and hence they yield identical expected payoffs. If
y > yˆPub, the unique Public regime equilibrium consists of babbling. The
informative equilibrium in the Private regime dominates babbling as long
as S’s stakes are not too high (yˆPub ≤ y ≤ 2yˆPub) because the positive
continuation payoff if R turns out to be unbiased outweigh the short-term
expected cost from being deceived by RB. For all stakes higher than 2yˆPub,
however, the equilibrium of the the Private regime, involving high trust,
is inferior in expected payoffs to the babbling equilibrium of the Public
regime. Moreover, the difference to the beneﬁt of the Public regime in-
creases in y as S has more to lose if exploited by RB. Hence, for all high
stakes, S would like to know if RB is going to divert from m1 so as to tailor
the reporting strategy accordingly. In fact, the optimal strategy for those
high stakes is to babble immediately and forgo the possibility to learn R’s
type altogether.
For the analysis of the sender’s welfare, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween two effects which I call the reputation effect and the screening
effect. The reputation effect favors the Private regime and occurs with
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probability G(xˆ), and the screening effect favors the Public regime and
occurs with probability 1−G(xˆ).
Deﬁnition 2. Reputation effect (RE) and screening effect (SE) are deﬁned
as follows.
RE := EτEX
[
V Pr (μ, α)− V Pub (μ, α) | X ≤ xˆ
]
SE := EτEX
[
V Pub (μ, α)− V Pr (μ, α) | X > xˆ
]
,
where V Pr is S’s total expected payoff under the Private regime, and V Pub
is S’s total expected payoff under the Public regime.
With the notation introduced, the condition for the Private regime to dom-
inate ex-ante can be expressed as
G(xˆ)RE − (1−G(xˆ))SE ≥ 0.
That is, the reputation effect outweighs the screening effect. In fact, all
players’ ex-ante expected payoffs can be expressed in terms of these two
effects. However, it is not as illustrative for the receiver who beneﬁts from
more communication regardless of the value of x. As to the ex-ante wel-
fare of the sender, Proposition 6.1 gives the cleanest result which holds if
the reputation concerns arise with a substantial probability.
Proposition 6.1. (Sender) If G(12) ≥ 13 and π1 ∈ [14 , 12), the Private regime
yields a strictly higher ex-ante expected payoff for all y > min
{
yˆPub,
1
2
}
.
Proof: In the appendix. 
For all stakes higher than min
{
yˆPub,
1
2
}
, the reputation effect is large
enough to outweigh the screening effect. For stakes lower than this, the
beneﬁts from RB ’s reputational concerns are low; the ﬁrst period has lit-
tle value to S and he has little to gain even if both types follow his report,
but has a lot to lose in the second period if R deceives his trust. If the
ﬁrst period is not valuable, S would optimally use it for screening R, and
the Public regime offers him a better environment to do this. To see this,
recall that under the Public regime, RB must randomize her ﬁrst-stage
action. Hence there is a strictly positive probability that S learns R’s type
immediately which allows S to design his reporting strategy optimally in
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the second period.
The scale of the payoff difference between the reputation and the screen-
ing effects is represented in ﬁgure 3.3. It visualizes S’s expected payoff at
an arbitrarily chosen point π1 = 25 as a function of the stakes x and y. It
is assumed that 25 > π˜SR so that the Private regime consists of an equi-
librium in pure strategies (characterized in Proposition 5.1). This in turn
requires that G is any distribution such that G(12) ≥ 23 .
As is apparent from the ﬁgure, the superiority of the Private regime in
case RB has reputational concerns (x ≤ 12) greatly exceeds its inferiority
in case RB has myopic concerns. Moreover, since G(12) >
1
2 , the ex-ante
value of RE is always higher than the ex-ante value of SE. The wedge
(yˆPub, 2yˆPub] where the Private regime is strictly optimal both when x ≤
1
2 and when x >
1
2 (as SE is negative) arises because under the Public
regime, when x > 12 , the sender would like to lie about θ1. Since lying
cannot be part of an equilibrium in which y is publicly known, the only
equilibrium must consist of babbling which, however, yields S strictly less
than if he was able to commit to truthful reporting at t = 1.
When π1 ∈ [14 , π˜SR), the intuition behind the result remains unchanged
even though the Private regime consists of an equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies (see Proposition 5.2). In the case where x ≤ 12 the Private regime is
still superior because it allows RB to invest in reputation with a higher
probability than in the Public regime. Regarding the ex-ante welfare be-
fore the realization of y, a few numerical examples where both y and x
follow a Beta(α, β) distribution with some, not necessarily the same, pa-
rameters α and β, are provided in the appendix (ﬁgures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8).
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Things are slightly different if RB has reputational concerns with a less
substantial probability, that is, if the ﬁrst period is likely to be important
to RB. Proposition 6.2 formalizes the welfare result in such a case.
Proposition 6.2. (Sender) If G(12) <
1
3 , and π
1 ∈ [πˆ, 12),
(i) if y ≤ min{yˆPub, 12} : the Public regime yields a strictly higher
expected payoff, with indifference at y = min
{
yˆPub,
1
2
}
;
(ii) if y ∈ (min{yˆPub, 12} ,min {y, yˆPr}], where
y =
π1 − (1− π1)G(xˆPr)
(1− 2π1) (1− 3G(12))− 2(1− π1) (G(xˆPr)−G(12)) ,
the Private regime yields a strictly higher expected payoff;
(iii) if y > min {y, yˆPr} , and if
G(xˆPr) > Z(π
1) : the Public regime yields a strictly higher
expected payoff,
G(xˆPr) ≤ Z(π1) : the Private regime yields a strictly higher
expected payoff for all y > yˆPr, where
Z(π1) :=
1− 2π1 − (4π1 − 1)G(12)
2(1− π1) .
Proof: In the appendix. 
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The fact that RB is not likely to have reputational concerns affects the
Private regime equilibrium and hence welfare in two notable ways. First,
the reputation effect only outweighs the screening effect if S’s stakes are
lower than y < yˆPr. The reason is that the ex ante probability with which
the reputation effect takes place is so low that the ex ante dominance of
the Private regime is not enough to compensate for its ex-ante inferiority
in case RB is myopic.
The value of y is, however, very different if S’s prior is above π˜IC than
what it is for priors lower than this. Recall from proposition 5.1 that for
π1 ≥ π˜IC , yˆPr = y¯ which implies that H(yˆPr) = 1 and therefore xˆPr = 12 .
Substituting this into the expression of y in the proposition results in a
threshold which is increasing in π1. Without changes in G(12), an increase
in π1 implies above all that the dominance of the Public regime in case RB
is myopic decreases since the risk of obtaining a negative expected payoff
is lower under both regimes. The Private regime beneﬁts from this more
through the continuation payoff of π1 which S obtains if R turns out to be
unbiased and the communication is preserved.
If π1 < π˜IC , the cutoffs xˆPr and yˆPr are determined simultaneously, and
xˆPr is decreasing in π1. While a decrease in π1 induces a decrease in the
numerator of y the effect of a decrease in π1 to the denominator is am-
biguous. It increases both of its terms but the total effect remains unclear
without a closed-form solution for xˆPr. In fact, the effect of a decrease in
π1 to y depends on how it affects the reputation effect and the screening
effect driving the welfare result. The condition for the Private regime to
dominate when π1 ∈ [πˆ, π˜IC) can be expressed as
G(
1
2
)
[(
1− 2π1) (2y − 1)]+ (G(xˆPr)−G(1
2
)
)[
y − (1− 2π1)]
≥ (1−G(xˆPr))
[(
1− 2π1) y − π1] ,
where the LHS measures the ex-ante reputation effect, that is, the supe-
riority of the Private regime in case RB has reputational concerns, and
the RHS measures the ex-ante screening effect, that is, how much the
Private regime costs to S relative to the Public regime in case RB has
only myopic incentives. Now, the effect of a change in π1 is a balancing
act between three effects. First, a decrease in π1 increases the superior-
ity of the Private regime in case x ≤ 12 ; both regimes’ expected payoffs
decrease but they decrease less in the Private regime because S beneﬁts
more from RB ’s reputational concerns. Second, it increases xˆPr thereby
increasing the probability
(
G(xˆPr)−G(12)
)
, although at the same time,
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the superiority of the Private regime, as measured by the bracketed term
after it, decreases. This is because the expected payoffs of the Public
regime consist of babbling payoffs which are not affected by changes in π1
whereas the Private regime payoffs decrease if π1 decreases. The third ef-
fect comes through the RHS where the probability (1−G(xˆPr)) decreases
at the same time as the inferiority of the Private regime increases be-
cause S is at a greater risk of incurring costs which he avoids in the Public
regime due to babbling. The relative strengths of these effects determine
how y reacts to changes in the prior.
One numerical result is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.4 which visualizes propo-
sition 6.2 for the scenario in which both players’ stakes are drawn from a
uniform ratio distribution. This implies that G(12) = 0.25, which produces
π˜IC =
1
3 , πˆ = 0.25, and the yˆPr as plotted in the ﬁgure.
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Figure 3.4. Sender’s ranking of the regimes
At least in this speciﬁcation, the threshold y is decreasing in S’s prior
which means that as xˆPr increases, it beneﬁts the Private regime rela-
tively more by increasing the frequency of the reputation effect. More-
over, since for this speciﬁcation G(xˆPr) > Z(π1), the Public regime strictly
dominates for all y > min {y, yˆPr} .
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The low probability of reputational concerns has another implication for
the welfare result through the introduction of yˆPr. In the Private regime,
S lies about θ1 for all stakes higher than yˆPr. What the proposition es-
tablishes is that S’s ability to lie actually harms him ex ante unless the
probability of reputation concerns is very low. Because the Private regime
cutoffs for S and R are determined simultaneously, and xˆPr is decreasing
in yˆPr, S only gets to lie for very high stakes. Therefore, if S lies about θ1
but RB actually invests in reputation by following the dishonest message,
it is very costly to S. As a result, ex ante, S only gains from lying if RB
misbehaves frequently enough (if the probability G(xˆPr) is small enough).
Figure 3.5 in the appendix reproduces the breakdown of S’s welfare in
the same manner as in ﬁgure 3.4, but in the case where G(12) =
1
4 and
π1 = 0.3. The losses that S incurs from lying in case RB actually invests
in reputation are so high, and G(xˆPr) is not low enough to mitigate these
ex ante, that the babbling equilibrium under the Public regime is superior
in terms of welfare.
3.6.2 Receiver’s welfare
The general principle guiding the welfare analysis of the receiver is that
both receiver types strictly prefer the regime which minimizes the proba-
bility of a babbling equilibrium since it always yields them strictly lower
payoffs than any informative equilibrium. Proposition 6.3 establishes a
result for the higher end of intermediate priors where the welfare com-
parison is straightforward and unambiguous. This Proposition is enough
to make the claim that, for any distribution G, there always exists prior
beliefs of the sender under which both receiver types strictly prefer the
Private regime.
Proposition 6.3. (Receiver) If π1 ∈ [π˜, 12), where π˜ is equal to π˜SR if
G(12) ≥ 13 , and equal to π˜IC if G(12) < 13 , the Private regime yields strictly
higher ex-ante expected payoffs to both types of R.
Proof: In the appendix. 
What makes the Public regime inferior in terms of welfare is that RB
can only invest in reputation partially, by randomizing her ﬁrst-stage ac-
tion if x ≤ 12 . This hurts RB but not yet RU . Both types are, however, hurt
by the fact that in the Public regime S rewards good behavior with less
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than certainty. Notice also that both types of R prefer the Private regime
regardless of the value of x. Therefore, the distinction between the repu-
tation and the screening effect is not as valuable for intuition as it is for
the sender.
Graphical analysis reveals that the result of Proposition 6.3 holds also
for many priors smaller than π˜. However, showing this analytically is left
for future work.6 Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 in the appendix provide a few
examples, though.
3.7 Discussion
The main result of the paper is that under the presence of incomplete in-
formation about the payoff-type of the receiver, public information about
the stakes is often not welfare improving. The analysis builds on a sim-
ple two-period model with binary state, message and action spaces. While
this seems a rather stylized setting, the main results of the paper would
go through at least in a model where θ remains binary but R’s action y
is continuous and all players have a strictly concave utility over y. To
translate the assumption of pure conﬂict in interests into such a model,
let there be a constant bias b that measures the divergence in the prefer-
ences of S and RB. As long as b is so large that S would choose to babble
with RB, the results would go through without signiﬁcant changes. If θ is
continuous as well, the presence of stakes y complicates the construction
of partition equilibria which require there to exist ﬁxed cutoff types who
are indifferent between any two consecutive messages.
Regarding the time horizon, if it was longer than two periods, as in So-
bel (1985), the equilibrium cutoffs would be characterized by functions
that decrease in time. When the remaining horizon is very long, the con-
tinuation value for S from learning that R is unbiased is so high that it
incentivizes him to screen R at high stakes even for low priors. However,
since the equilibrium cutoffs would be recursive functions of the continu-
ation payoffs, welfare analysis would be a lot more complicated.
Regarding the motivating assumption that R’s payoff-type is ﬁxed over
time, this assumption is reasonable only if the two decisions taken up
in periods 1 and 2 are similar in nature. It could of course be that S
is advising R in two very different issues where R is biased in one but
6Results depend mainly on the relationship between μ2Pr(θ) and μ2Pub(θ), that is,
between xˆPr and E [X | X ≤ xˆ] . Without further knowledge about G, it is hard to
determine whether or not xˆPr > E [X | X ≤ xˆ] .
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unbiased in the other. However, assuming R’s bias-type to be i.i.d across
time would reduce the model to a sequence of one-shot games thereby
removing the reputation and learning aspects of the current game. An
intermediate approach could be to assume that there is, in every period, a
constant probability p ∈ [0, 1] that R is unbiased. If S is faced by RU , p = 1,
and if he is faced by RB, p ∈ (0, 1). That is, rather than learning about
τ ∈ {U,B}, S is learning about p. This variation would not change the
qualitative results of the model. The current model represents a special
case with p = 0 for RB.
While private information about R’s stakes makes players better off,
private information about S’s stakes is harmful if S’s initial prior is low.
In other respects, whether S’s stakes are public or private information
has little effect on the social welfare. In general, not much is lost of the
analysis if S’s stakes are public information in both regimes, and the only
dimension in which the regimes differ is in information about R’s stakes.
Throughout the analysis, I abstract away from the mechanism of mak-
ing the stakes public knowledge. The paper merely analyzes the differ-
ence in ex ante welfare under two different regimes, where the regime
is exogenously imposed and pre-existing. A question of its own would
be to consider the transition from the Private regime to the Public when
beneﬁcial. How much information about the stakes could be transmitted
via cheap-talk, by adding a prior stage of communication to the existing
model or by allowing S to use multidimensional messages, seems a promi-
nent way forward. In some settings, on the other hand, the disclosure
could be obtained via legislation. A case in point is the disclosure of cam-
paign ﬁnances by elected politicians which in many countries has been
made compulsory by law. Information about the sources and amounts of
campaign contributions may serve as a proxy for politicians’ stakes in var-
ious policy issues. In light of the results from this paper, the reporting of
campaign ﬁnances may reduce welfare through distortions in the ﬂow of
information from lobbyists to politicians.
Finally, an interesting question arising out of the present analysis con-
cerns the optimal sequencing of decisions. Under the Public regime, once
the stakes have been realized, and given the equilibrium strategy of R, if
S is given the option to choose in which order the two decisions are taken
up, how would the optimal solution be characterized? Watson (1999, 2002)
has addressed the issue of “starting small” in a framework in which two
players with equal stakes play prisoner’s dilemma against each other in
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continuous time. Starting small is not necessarily optimal when the play-
ers’ stakes are not perfectly correlated and the sender must balance be-
tween riding on the biased receiver’s reputation concerns and the beneﬁt
from a quick revelation of the receiver’s type.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed strategic information transmission in a repeated
model of communication in which the sender is uncertain about the pref-
erences of the receiver. There are two effects taking place simultaneously.
On the one hand, S tries to learn about R’s type by sending her informa-
tive messages and observing her actions. Due to the grim-trigger strategy
followed by all players, S is more inclined to learn about R via truthful
messages than via lying. This alone beneﬁts informative communication
and produces ex ante gains to all players. On the other hand, S is wary of
the incentives of the biased type of R to invest in reputation by mimicking
the action of the unbiased type when her stakes are low. Whether S knows
if these reputation concerns exist or not matters for the ex ante welfare of
all players. In particular, the higher S’s stakes are, the more he gains if
RB invests in reputation in the current period, by following his message.
The ex ante value of these gains is often enough to outweigh the ex ante
costs that this trusting strategy incurs to S in case the biased type betrays
his trust immediately. The higher frequency of communication that this
results to beneﬁts also both types of R. The result suggests that preserv-
ing informational asymmetries in organizations is sometimes justiﬁable
on the grounds of higher ex ante welfare which is manifested through an
increase in the frequency of transmission of valuable information.
3.9 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Consider ﬁrst RB . Given S’s strategy, investing in
reputation is optimal if and only if −x+ V B(h2+) ≥ x, that is,
x ≤ 1
2
V B(h2+), (3.4)
where V B(h2+) = 1. Consider then S.GivenR’s strategy, if x ≤ 12 , honest reporting
is optimal if and only if y+V S(h2+) ≥ −y. Since V S(h2+) = π1−(1−π1) ≥ 0, honest
reporting is optimal for all y ≥ 0. If x > 12 , honest reporting is optimal if and only
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if
[
π1 − (1− π1)] y + π1V S(h2+) ≥ − [π1 − (1− π1)] y. (3.5)
When π1 ≥ 12 , honest reporting is not only optimal at t = 1 but yields also positive
continuation payoffs, and therefore S is honest for all y ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Consider ﬁrst the case x ≤ 12 . In the equilibrium,
α1B(m,h) must satisfy
π2(h2+) ≡
π1
π1 + (1− π1)α1B(m,h)
=
1
2
. (3.6)
To see this, consider that the last equality is replaced by a strict inequality, such
that π2(h2+) > 12 . In that case, S would reward for good behavior with certainty.
Since following m1 would be strictly optimal for all RB of type x ≤ 12 , they could
increase α1B(m,h) slightly without violating the condition π2(h+) >
1
2 . From con-
dition (3.6) it follows that α1B(m,h) =
π1
1−π1 .
In equilibrium, μ2Pub(θ, h+) must satisfy the incentive compatibility condition
of RB to randomize between her pure actions at t = 1. By replacing V B(h2+) with
μ2Pub(θ, h+)−
(
1− μ2Pub(θ, h+)
)
in (3.4), RB ’s incentive condition holds as equality for each type x ≤ 12 if and only
if
μ2Pub(θ, h+) =
1
2
+ x.
Finally, given R’s strategy, S’s expected payoff from honesty at t = 1,
[
π1 + (1− π1)α1B(m,h)− (1− π1)
(
1− α1B(m,h)
)]
y +
[
π1 + (1− π1)α1B(m,h)
]
V S(h2+),
must exceed his expected payoff from dishonesty,
− [π1 + (1− π1)α1B(m,h)− (1− π1) (1− α1B(m,h))] y.
Since π2 = 12 , V
S(h2+) = 0, and honesty is optimal for all y ≥ 0 iff
π1 + (1− π1)α1B(m,h)− (1− π1)
(
1− α1B(m,h)
) ≥ 0,
which, after substituting for α1B(m,h) =
π1
1−π1 , holds iff π
1 ≥ 14 .
Consider then the case x > 12 . Since π
1 < 12 , honest reporting yields S an
expected loss in period 1 but a continuation payoff of 1 if R is unbiased. S’s
incentive compatibility condition for reporting θ1 honestly is
[
π1 − (1− π1)] y + π1 ≥ − [π1 − (1− π1)] y.
79
Can You Keep a Secret? - Building Reciprocal Trust in Communication
The condition holds as equality if
y =
π1
2 (1− 2π1) ≡ yˆPub,
and holds as a strict inequality for all y < yˆPub. Finally, in case x > 12 and
y > yˆPub, the unique equilibrium must consist of babbling where both types of R
randomize their actions independently of S’s reports in both periods. Given R’s
strategy, S cannot do better than to randomize his reports independently of the
state of the world. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Given S’s strategy, RB invests in reputation iff
−x+ 1 ≥ −x ⇔ x ≤ 1
2
.
Given the strategy of R, for any θ1 and y, S reports the ﬁrst state honestly iff
[
π1 + (1− π1)G( 12 )− (1− π1)
(
1−G( 12 )
)]
y +
[
π1 + (1− π1)G( 12 )
]
V S(h2+) ≥
− [π1 + (1− π1)G( 12 )− (1− π1) (1−G( 12 ))] y, (3.7)
where the terms including y are identical but of opposite sign. If
π1 + (1− π1)G(1
2
)− (1− π1)
(
1−G(1
2
)
)
≥ 0,
that is, if π1 ≥ 1−2G( 12 )
2(1−G( 12 ))
= π˜IC , the incentive compatibility conditions holds for
all y ≥ 0 given that V S(h2+) ≥ 0. Finally, to ensure that S reports θ2 honestly
after a good history of play, we need
π2(h+) :=
π1
π1 + (1− π1)G( 12 )
≥ 1
2
,
that is,
π1 ≥ G(
1
2 )
1 +G( 12 )
= π˜SR. (3.8)
Both π1 ≥ π˜IC and π1 ≥ π˜SR hold whenever π1 ≥ π˜ ≡ max {π˜IC , π˜SR} . 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. S is indifferent between honest and false report-
ing at t = 2 iff π2 = 12 . From the Bayes’ rule, we obtain that this requires that
G(xˆPr) =
π1
1−π1 , that is, xˆPr = G
−1
(
π1
1−π1
)
. RB of type xˆPr is indifferent between
following m1 and diverting from it if and only if
−xˆPr + μ2Pr(θ, h+)− (1− μ2Pr(θ, h+)) = xˆPr,
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that is, iff μ2Pr(θ, h+) =
1
2 + xˆPr. Finally, S reports θ1 honestly iff
[
π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr)− (1− π1) (1−G(xˆPr))
]
y
+
[
π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr)
]
V S(h2+) ≥
− [π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr)− (1− π1) (1−G(xˆPr))] y, (3.9)
where G(xˆPr) = π
1
1−π1 , and V
S(h2+) = 0 since π2(h+) = 12 . The condition reduces
to (
4π1 − 1) y ≥ − (4π1 − 1) y,
which holds for all y ≥ 0 iff π1 ≥ 14 . 
Proof of Proposition 5.3. To see that S’s and RB ’s cutoffs are consistent with
each other, ﬁx ﬁrst xˆPr and consider S. He reports θ1 honestly if and only if con-
dition (3.9) holds, where
V S(h2+) = π
2(h+)− (1− π2(h+)) = π
1 − (1− π1)G(xˆPr)
π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr) ,
where the last equality follows from Bayes’ rule. As long as G(xˆPr) ≤ 1−2π12(1−π1) ≤
π1
1−π1 , where the last inequality holds for all π
1 ≥ 14 , and which ensures that
S’s expected ﬁrst-stage payoff is negative after honest reporting but expected
continuation payoff is positive so that S reports θ2 honestly after a good history
of play, the equilibrium cutoff type yˆPr is solved from (3.9) to equal
yˆPr(π
1, xˆPr) =
1
2
[
π1 − (1− π1)G(xˆPr)
]
[(1− π1) (1− 2G(xˆPr))− π1] . (3.10)
Given S’s cutoff strategy, RB invests in reputation if and only if
H(yˆPr) (−x+ 1) + (1−H(yˆPr))x ≥ H(yˆPr)x− (1−H(yˆPr))x,
that is, iff
x ≤ H(yˆPr)
2 (2H(yˆPr)− 1) ≡ xˆPr(yˆPr). (3.11)
The closed-form solutions for the cutoffs are obtained by solving the system of
equations consisting of (3.10) and (3.11). Since xˆPr(yˆPr) is decreasing in yˆPr
and yˆPr(π1, xˆPr) is increasing in xˆPr, a solution to the system always exists. Fi-
nally, the equilibrium requires that H(yˆPr) > 12 and G(xˆPr) <
π1
1−π1 . Denote by
πˆy the lowest prior for which H(yˆPr) > 12 , and by πˆx the lowest priors for which
G(xˆPr) <
π1
1−π1 . The equilibrium is supported by all π
1 ≥ πˆ ≡ max {πˆx, πˆy} . 
Proof of Proposition 5.4. Given that the ﬁrst-stage equilibrium is separating,
S screens R via an honest report if and only if
[
π1 − (1− π1)] y + π1 ≥ − [π1 − (1− π1)] y,
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that is, if and only if
y ≤ π
1
2 (1− 2π1) ≡ yˆPr.
Given yˆPr, RB diverts from all m1 iff
H(yˆPr)x− (1−H(yˆPr))x ≥ −H(yˆPr)x+ (1−H(yˆPr))x,
that is, iff H(yˆPr) > 12 . An analogous condition applies for RU to follow all m1.
If H(yˆPr) ≤ 12 , all players would deviate from their proposed strategies, and the
only equilibrium must consist of babbling. 
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Analyze ﬁrst the interval π1 ∈ [π˜SR, 12 ). Consider
separately cases (i) y ≤ yˆPub, and (ii), y > yˆPub.
Case (i). Private regime maximizes the sender’s ex-ante expected payoff if and
only if
π1(y + 1) + (1− π1) [G( 12 )(y − 1)− (1−G( 12 )) y] ≥
G( 12 )(4π
1 − 1)y + (1−G( 12 )) [(2π1 − 1)y + π1]
which, after rearranging, can be shown to hold for all y ≥ 12 .
Case (ii). Private regime is optimal iff
π1(y + 1) + (1− π1) [G( 12 (y − 1)− (1−G( 12 )) y]≥ G( 12 )(4π1 − 1)y
⇔ [2 (1− 3G( 12 ))π1 + (3G( 12 )− 1)] y≥ − [π1 − (1− π1)G( 12 )] ,
which holds for all y ≥ 0 when π1 ∈ [π˜SR, 12 ) since the bracketed terms on the
LHS and the RHS are both positive.
Consider then the interval π1 ∈ [ 14 , π˜SR). Consider separately cases (i) y ≤ yˆPub,
and (ii), y > yˆPub.
In case (i), Private regime yields a higher expected payoff iff
(4π1 − 1)y ≥ G( 12 )(4π1 − 1)y +
(
1−G( 12 )
) [
(2π1 − 1)y + π1] ,
where the LHS can be written as a convex combination
G( 12 )
[
(4π1 − 1)y]+ (1−G( 12 )) [(4π1 − 1)y] ,
such that the inequality reduces to
(4π1 − 1)y ≥ (2π1 − 1)y + π1,
which holds if y ≥ 12 .
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In case (ii), Private regime yields S a higher ex ante expected payoff iff
(4π1 − 1)y ≥ G( 12 )(4π1 − 1)y,
which holds for all y ≥ 0. The proposition follows from observing that the Private
regime is optimal for all y > yˆPub, and yˆPub < 12 when π
1 < 13 . 
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Consider ﬁrst π1 ∈ [π˜IC , 12 ). Consider separately
cases (i) y ≤ yˆPub, and (ii), y > yˆPub.
Case (i). Private regime maximizes the ex-ante expected payoff iff
π1(y + 1) + (1− π1) [G( 12 ) (y − 1)− (1−G( 12 )) y] ≥
G( 12 )(4π
1 − 1)y + (1−G( 12 )) [(π1 − (1− π1)) y + π1]
which, after rearranging, can be shown to hold for all y ≥ 12 .
Case (ii). Private regime is optimal iff
π1(y + 1) + (1− π1) [G( 12 ) (y − 1)− (1−G( 12 )) y]≥ G( 12 )(4π1 − 1)y
⇔ [(2π1 − 1) (1− 3G( 12 ))] y≥ − [π1 − (1− π1)G( 12 )] ,
where the LHS is negative since G( 12 ) <
1
3 . The inequality holds for all y ≤ y
where
y =
[
π1 − (1− π1)G( 12 )
][
(1− 2π1) (1− 3G( 12 ))] .
Consider then π1 ∈ [πˆ, π˜IC). Consider separately cases (i) y ≤ yˆPub, (ii) y ∈
(yˆPub, yˆPr], (iii) y > yˆPr
Case (i). Under the Private regime, where RB follows m1 if x ≤ xˆPr, the
sender’s expected payoff can be written as
π1(y + 1) + (1− π1) [G( 12 )(y − 1) + (G(xˆPr)−G( 12 )) (y − 1)−(
1−G( 12 )
)
y +
(
G(xˆPr)−G( 12 )
)
y
]
.
His expected payoff under the Public regime is given by
G( 12 )
(
4π1 − 1) y + (1−G( 12 )) [π1(y + 1)− (1− π1)y] .
After rearranging, the Private regime is shown to dominate iff
2
[
(1− π1)G(xˆPr)− π1G( 12 )
]
y ≥ (1− π1)G(xˆPr)− π1G( 12 ),
from where we obtain that the Private regime yields higher payoffs iff y ≥ 12 .
Case (ii). The sender’s ex-ante expected payoff under the Private regime is
π1(y + 1) + (1− π1) [G(xˆPr)(y − 1)− (1−G(xˆPr)) y] ,
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and under the Public regime, G( 12 )
(
4π1 − 1) y. Rewriting the Private regime
payoffs as in case (i) and rearranging terms yields that the payoff under the
Private regime is higher if and only if
− [(1− 3G( 12 )) (1− 2π1)− 2 (1− π1) (G(xˆPr)−G( 12 ))] y ≥
− [π1 − (1− π1)G(xˆPr)] ,
where the term in the brackets on the RHS is positive since in the equilibrium
G(xˆPr) <
π1
1−π1 , and the term in the brackets on the LHS is positive if
G(xˆPr) ≤
(
1− 3G( 12 )
) (
1− 2π1)+ 2(1− π1)G( 12 )
2(1− π1)
which holds by the equilibrium requirementG(xˆPr) ≤ 1−2π12(1−π1) .Hence, the Private
regime yields a higher ex-ante expected payoff iff y ≤ y, where y is given in the
Proposition. Notice that for priors, π1 ≥ π˜IC , xˆPr = 12 , and y = y.
Case (iii). The sender’s expected payoff under the Private regime is
− [π1 + (1− π1)G(xˆPr)− (1− π1) (1−G(xˆPr))] y,
and under the Public regime,
G( 12 )(4π
1 − 1)y.
Payoff under the Private regime is higher if and only if
G(xˆPr) ≤
1− 2π1 − (4π1 − 1)G( 12 )
2(1− π1) := Z(π
1).
The proposition follows from combining the results of cases (i) through (iii). 
Proof of Proposition 6.3. Proceed by looking at two cases separately: case (i):
y ≤ yˆPub, and case (ii): y > yˆPub.
Case (i). y ≤ yˆPub. Consider RU : Private regime is optimal if
E(X) + 1 ≥ E(X) + 1−G( 12 ) (1− rPub) ,
which holds for all y ≥ 0, and for all rPub < 1. Consider then RB : Private regime
is optimal if
G( 12 )(−E
(
X | X ≤ 12
)
+ 1) +
(
1−G( 12 )
)
E
(
X | X > 12
) ≥
G( 12 )
[
μ
(−E (X | X ≤ 12)+ rPub)+ (1− μ)E (X | X ≤ 12)]+ (1−G( 12 ))E (X | X > 12) ,
which can be reduced to
1− E (X | X ≤ 12) ≥ μ (−E (X | X ≤ 12)+ rPub)+ (1− μ)E (X | X ≤ 12) ,
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where rPub = 12 + E
(
X | X ≤ 12
)
so that we are left with
1− E (X | X ≤ 12) ≥ 12μ+ (1− μ)E (X | X ≤ 12) .
The LHS ≥ 12 and the RHS ≤ 12 so the condition holds.
Case (ii). y > yˆPub. Consider ﬁrst RU : Private regime is optimal if
E(X) + 1 ≥ G( 12 )
(
E
(
X | X ≤ 12
)
+ rPub
)
,
which holds for all distributions G since the Public regime yields 0 with proba-
bility
(
1−G( 12 )
)
.
Consider then RB . Private regime is optimal if
G( 12 )
[−E (X | X ≤ 12)+ 1]+ (1−G( 12 ))E (X | X > 12) ≥
G( 12 )
[
μ
(−E (X | X ≤ 12)+ rPub)+ (1− μ)E (X | X ≤ 12)].
It was shown under case 1 that RB obtains higher expected payoffs under the
Private regime in case x ≤ 12 . Since the Public regime yields 0 in case x > 12 ,
the Private regime is clearly strictly preferred. The Proposition follows from
combining results from cases (i) and (ii). 
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Figure 3.5. Reputation and screening effects as a function of y when G( 1
2
) = 1
4
and π1 =
0.3. Dashed line: x ∈ ( 1
2
, xˆPr], dotted line: x ≤ 12 .
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Figure 3.6. Ex-ante expected welfare, X ∼ Beta(2, 6), Y ∼ Beta(1, 1)
Figure 3.6 plots the ex-ante expected payoffs of all players separately and the
sum of payoffs weighted by π1. It provides an example in which G( 12 ) ≥ 13 . If the
distribution of y is heavily skewed to the right, such that H(yˆPr) > 12 , where
yˆPr =
π1
2(1−2π1) , then informative communication can still be sustained under the
Private regime for priors less than 14 . In that case, S is able to fool RB by lying
if y > yˆPr which beneﬁts S at the expense of both types of R. This beneﬁt is not
very sizable, though, given the fairly low probability that RB actually deviates
from S’s dishonest message. All players still get higher expected payoffs than
under babbling due to the high probability that S is actually truthful.
Figure 3.7 represents one possible situation. Since the probability mass in H is
so concentrated on low values of y, the Public regime ex ante dominates for the
sender for all intermediate priors (Proposition 6.1). To the other direction, if S’s
stakes are very high on expectation it beneﬁts the Private regime because the
probability of babbling increases in the Public regime due to Pr [Y ≤ yˆPub] being
low.
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Figure 3.7. Ex-ante expected welfare, X ∼ Beta(2, 8), Y ∼ Beta(1, 6)
Ex ante welfare in case G( 12 ) <
1
3
Figure 3.8 plots the ex ante welfare for each player when each player’s stakes are
drawn from a uniform ratio distribution. The support of the distribution is R+
which this allows also for very high realizations of Y . This largely explains why
S obtains higher welfare under the Public regime for all π1 ∈ [ 14 , 12 ). Restricting
the support on a ﬁnite interval, for example to [0, 10] alleviates the difference,
and at least if y ∈ [0, 2], the Private regime is strictly optimal also for the sender.
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Figure 3.8. Ex-ante expected welfare, X,Y ∼ Uniform ratio distribution [0, 1000]
88
Can You Keep a Secret? - Building Reciprocal Trust in Communication
References
Bar-Isaac, H. (2012) “Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for
Acquiring Expertise”. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12
(1), 1-13.
Bénabou, R., and G. Laroque (1992) “Using Privileged Information to Ma-
nipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility”. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 107, 921-58.
Blonski, M. and D. Probst (2004) “The Emergence of Trust”. unpublished
manuscript, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main.
Chen, Y. (2012) “Value of public information in sender-receiver games”.
Economics Letters, 114, 343-345.
Chen, Y. (2009) “Communication with Two-sided Asymmetric Informa-
tion”. mimeo, Arizona State University.
Crawford, V., and J. Sobel (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission”.
Econometrica, 50 (6), 1431-1451.
Durbin, E., and G. Iyer (2009) “Corruptible Advice”. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 1 (2), 220-242.
Ely, J., and J. Välimäki (2003) “Bad Reputation”. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 118 (3), 785-814.
Frisell, L., and J. Lagerlöf (2007) “A model of Reputation in Cheap Talk”.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109 (1), 49-70.
Golosov, M., V. Skreta, A. Tsyvinski, and A. Wilson (2014) “Dynamic Strate-
gic Information Transmission”. Journal of Economic Theory, 151,
304-341.
Guembel, A., and S. Rossetto (2009) “Reputational Cheap Talk with Mis-
understanding”. Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (2), 736-744.
Ishida, J., and T. Shimizu (2012) “Can more information facilitate com-
munication?”. ISER Discussion Paper No. 839.
Kreps, D., and R. Wilson (1982) “Reputation and Imperfect Information”.
Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), 253-279.
Lai, E. (2013) “Expert Advice for Amateurs”. mimeo, Lehigh University,
January, 2013.
89
Can You Keep a Secret? - Building Reciprocal Trust in Communication
Levy, G. (2007) “Decision-Making Procedures for Committees of Careerist
Experts”. American Economic Review, 97 (2) 306-310.
Li, M., and K. Madarász (2008) “When Mandatory Disclosure Hurts: Ex-
pert Advice and Conﬂicting Interests”. Journal of Economic Theory,
139, 47-74.
Li, M., and T. Mylovanov (2008) “Credibility for Sale - the Effect of Dis-
closure on Information Acquisition and Transmission”. Concordia
University Working Paper no. 09-008.
Matozzi, A., and A. Merlo (2007) “The Transparency of Politics and the
Quality of Politicians”. American Economic Review, 97 (2), 311-315.
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts (1982) “Predation, Reputation, and Entry De-
terrence”. Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), 280-312.
Moreno de Barreda, I. (2010) “Cheap Talk with Two-Sided Private Infor-
mation”. mimeo, London School of Economics and STICERD.
Morgan, J., and P. Stocken (2003) “An Analysis of Stock Recommendations”.
RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (1), 183-203.
Morris, S. (2001) “Political Correctness”. Journal of Political Economy,
109, 231-265.
Ottaviani, M., and P. Sørensen (2006) “Reputational Cheap Talk”. RAND
Journal of Economics, 37 (1), 155-175.
Prat, A. (2005) “The Wrong Kind of Transparency”. American Economic
Review, 95 (3), 862-877.
Renault, J., E. Solan, and N. Vieille (2013) “Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games”.
Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2), 502-534.
Sobel, J. (1985) “A Theory of Credibility”. Review of Economic Studies, 52
(4), 557-573.
Watson, J. (1996) “Information Transmission When the Informed Party is
Confused”. Games and Economic Behavior, 12, 143-161.
Watson, J. (1999) “Starting Small and Renegotiation”. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 85 (1), 52-90.
Watson, J. (2002) “Starting Small and Commitment”. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 38, 176-199.
90
Can You Keep a Secret? - Building Reciprocal Trust in Communication
Wolinsky, A. (2003) “Information transmission when the sender’s prefer-
ences are uncertain”. Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 319–326.
Wrasai, P., and O. Swank (2007) “Policy makers, advisers, and reputa-
tion”. Journal of Econ. Behavior and Organization, 62, 579-90.
91
Can You Keep a Secret? - Building Reciprocal Trust in Communication
92
4. Reputation and the Value of
Information in a Trust Game
4.1 Introduction
Many transactions between economic actors, whether between a ﬁrm and
its employees, between a ﬁrm and its suppliers, or between a buyer and a
seller, require some trust to realize. A ﬁrm would not commit to pay wages
to employees who are anticipated to exert no effort; similarly, no employee
would choose to work for a ﬁrm that has a reputation of reneging on its
wage payments; furthermore, no buyer would trade with an online seller
who is believed to offer low quality for a high price. In general, where
a mutually beneﬁcial cooperative outcome requires one party to take an
action that the opponent may exploit, a minimal level of trust must exist
for cooperation to arise.
As in the examples mentioned, the principal must often take a poten-
tially costly action without being certain if it will pay off. Because the
agent who moves second and is assumed to be strategic will betray trust
if given the opportunity, cooperation unravels in a ﬁnite game unless the
agent’s behavior is disciplined via some form of external control.1 In many
relationships, such as the one between an Investor and an Entrepreneur
analyzed in this paper, it is not possible to write formal contracts. In-
stead, the agent is motivated by reputational concerns. If a fraction of
agents are honest, in a sense of always rewarding trust, then a strategic
agent may want to be perceived as trustworthy. This way, the strategic
type is able to ensure a positive payoff by building up a reputation for
being the non-strategic type and thereby reassuring the principal to keep
investing.
1In an inﬁnite game this problem would be resolved, though, provided that the
agent is patient enough.
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Reputation building by the strategic type is welfare enhancing since it
encourages more trade. In a ﬁnitely repeated game, this requires that
the agent who invests in reputation ﬁnd it worthwhile to forgo high short-
term proﬁts in return for a continued interaction. Thus, the agent’s choice
between an immediate exploitation of the principal and a postponed ex-
ploitation depends on his current and future payoffs. Suppose that this
payoff information may or may not be known to the principal. It is then
natural to ask how the probability of trade depends on the information
available to the principal. Is welfare increasing in the information that
the principal holds about the agent? If the principal could control the
agent and monitor his payoffs, or downright spy him, would she be better
off?
To address these questions, this paper studies two versions of a twice-
repeated, binary trust game. The versions differ in their informational
assumptions concerning the type of the agent. In the stage-game, an In-
vestor ﬁrst decides whether to invest or not an amount x to a project led
by an Entrepreneur. In the hands of the Entrepreneur, an investment
worth of x translates into an output worth of Mx, with M ≥ 0. After the
production, the Entrepreneur decides whether to honor trust by return-
ing x with a ﬁxed interest rate r, or to abuse trust by keeping all of the
proceeds to himself.
The Entrepreneur is privately informed about his payoff-type. A reli-
able Entrepreneur is nonstrategic and always returns the investment re-
gardless of the realized output. Assume for example that his payoffs are
driven by reciprocity or fairness which imply high psychological costs from
deceiving someone. Alternatively, this may be a reﬂection of the probabil-
ity of another trading opportunity with another principal, say in the case
where past repayments are a matter of public record. The reliable agent
is one that has always a sufﬁciently large continuation surplus to make
exploitation excessively costly. An unreliable Entrepreneur is strategic
and only returns an investment if it is optimal for his total payoff. There-
fore, in a one-shot game, the unreliable Entrepreneur would always abuse
trust, and, anticipating this, the Investor would invest only if she has a
high enough belief that the Entrepreneur is reliable. In a repeated game,
however, the unreliable type sometimes repays the Investor in the early
periods so as to mimic the reliable type’s behavior and be perceived as
one. This reputation building is optimal only if the discounted future cost
for the Entrepreneur from the punishment that ensues if trust is not re-
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turned is larger than the immediate gain from abusing trust.
The value of the future from the perspective of the Entrepreneur is de-
termined by δM where δ is a common discount factor. For high enough
M, the unreliable type ﬁnds it worthwhile to mimic the reliable type and
return the investment in the ﬁrst period. The value of his project is, how-
ever, assumed to be stochastic, drawn by Nature at the beginning of the
game. Two alternative assumptions can be imposed on the observability
of M. First, M may be publicly observed. This is the assumption applied
generally in experimental studies of the trust game (where usually M is
deterministic and equal to 3).
On the other hand, it is rather easy to assume that the Entrepreneur is
better informed about the proﬁtability of his project, or that the proﬁtabil-
ity is determined only after the investment has been made2. Therefore,
the Investor has to make her investment decisions based on imperfect in-
formation about M. This would not pose a problem if the Entrepreneur
was known to be reliable. The unreliable type, however, repays an in-
vestment if his business is proﬁtable enough. Therefore, not observing M
exposes the Investor to an additional uncertainty concerning the equilib-
rium action of the unreliable type of Entrepreneur.
While trust games with incomplete information about the type of the En-
trepreneur have been subject to numerous studies in the literature, they
all deal with situations in which M is common knowledge, that is, the En-
trepreneur’s type is one-dimensional. The main contribution of this paper
is to formalize a variant of the game in which the agent’s payoffs are his
private information and to compare the ex-ante expected equilibrium pay-
offs across the the two models. The main result from this analysis is that,
for any distributional assumptions aboutM, and for any parametrizations
of r and δ, there always exists a non-empty set of prior beliefs of the In-
vestor about the reliability of the Entrepreneur for which all players are
ex-ante strictly better off if and only if M is private information of the
Entrepreneur.
The result means that less information about the Entrepreneur gives
rise to more trust ex-ante. More trust, in turn, beneﬁts all players, even
the Investor. In fact, under incomplete information, more trust hurts the
Investor if the bad Entrepreneur is only concerned of immediate gains.
Naturally, the lower the prior belief of the Investor, the more risky it is
2though still remaining private information about the Entrepreneur. Note also
that x and M are assumed to be independent.
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to trust the Entrepreneur. However, this ex-ante exposure to risk is com-
pensated by the ex-ante possibility that the bad type has reputational
concerns. If this is the case, then more trust is beneﬁcial to the extent
that these ex-ante expected beneﬁts outweigh the ex-ante expected costs
from being exploited immediately.
The result would suggest that the cost of control in organizations (for
instance, the monitoring of employees’ workload which determines the
performance of the unreliable worker types) may not only be borne by a
decreased intrinsic motivation of the agent who feels being under surveil-
lance, but may also be borne by the reduction of trust, such as delega-
tion, between the principal and the agent. To increase trusting behavior,
it helps if the principal remains ignorant about an aspect related to the
agent which determines whether the strategic type is more concerned of
the future of cooperation or of the immediate gains. To return to the model
studied in this paper, from an ex-ante welfare point of view, the owner of
a start-up may do a favor not only to himself but also to the Investor if his
business plan and revenue forecast is not very detailed.
The trust game is stylized enough to be readily applied to varying set-
tings. An example of the importance of trust is the case of Lincoln Electric
(see e.g. Miller, 2001: 316). The ﬁrm has publicly committed to no wage
cuts, which has increased the workers’ trust in their employment and in-
creased their motivation to put voluntary effort in their work. In light of
the results of this paper, if there is less than full trust among the employ-
ees about the ability or willingness of the ﬁrm to not cut their wages or lay
off workers, it may be advisable that Lincoln Electric keep its employees
on their toes by not releasing them information about the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
condition. Through the increased trust that this induces, the employees
give the ﬁrm a chance to prove its loyalty to them, and thus the unreliable
ﬁrm has more room to mimic the reliable type which in the end beneﬁts
everyone.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 takes a look at the
relevant literature. Section 4.3 formalizes the model with common knowl-
edge about M and solves for its equilibrium. Section 4.4 solves for the
equilibrium of the model with private information about M. Section 4.5
formalizes the main results of the paper which are obtained by comparing
the ex-ante welfare of players across the two models. Section 4.6 dis-
cusses extensions and outlines ideas for further research, and section 4.7
concludes.
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4.2 Literature
This paper is directly related to the existing literature on trust games,
studied both in the theoretical and experimental literature about trust
and reciprocity. In addition, the stylized model of the paper is indirectly
related to a variety of more applied frameworks where trust plays a role,
such as relational contracting and delegation in agency settings. In addi-
tion, the key feature in this paper, the comparison of different information
structures regarding the value of the Entrepreneur’s project, can be linked
to the literature on transparency in principal-agent models.
A vast literature in behavioral economics has studied variants of the
trust game between a Trustor and a Trustee in the lab3. Camerer (2003)
offers a comprehensive coverage of these studies which have consistently
found that, against theoretical predictions, people tend to reciprocate trust
even in one-shot interactions. More importantly, numerous studies4 have
investigated the behavior of subjects in trust games with incomplete in-
formation about the Trustee, both under static and under repeated inter-
actions. In the latter case, the focus is on reputation building in ﬁnite
games that build on the seminal work by Kreps and Wilson (1982). Gen-
erally, trust is maintained for some periods in the beginning of the game
but it declines as the game approaches its end.
A somewhat different theoretical contribution to the literature is that of
Colombo & Merzoni (2006) who consider a two-period game with incom-
plete information, but their focus is on the length of contracts: they show
that sometimes trust requires that the principal commits to a two-period
game.
The game analyzed in this paper is a version of the loan model of Sobel
(1985). However, he assumes that the Investor chooses the level of invest-
ment which directly determines players’ stage-game payoffs. The payoff
uncertainty which is key to the current paper is thus not present. Sobel
shows that the amount invested in equilibrium increases with each suc-
cessful loan, which is consistent with ﬁndings from other papers studying
the phenomenon of “starting small” (see. e.g. Watson, 1999, 2002).
All of the aforementioned papers deal with a setting where the only
uncertainty concerns whether the Trustee is strategic or not. The novelty
of the current paper is to analyze a trust game where the Trustee’s type
3see e.g. Cochard et al. (2004) for a repeated trust game with perfect information
4see e.g. Anderhub et al. (2002), Neral & Ochs (1992), Camerer & Weigelt (1988),
Brandts & Figueras (2001)
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is two-dimensional, and study how this scenario compares in terms of
expected welfare to the more standard version of one-dimensional types.
Trust-games are readily transformed to analyze various worker-ﬁrm
settings in which a worker must trust the ﬁrm in paying the bonuses
it has promised in exchange for high effort, or the ﬁrm must trust the
worker to exert the effort required after a hiring decision. This takes the
model closer to the burgeoning literature on relational contracts, studied
recently among others by Levin (2003) and Halac (2014). The results of
my paper would suggest a new angle to explore in the theory of relational
contracts. Relational contracting between a principal and an agent with a
ﬁxed, unknown type have been studied for instance by Halac (2014), Wat-
son (1999, 2002), Yang (2013), and Lukas & Schöndube (2012). In all of
them, uncertainty concerns the ﬁxed strategy type of the agent. In Lukas
and Schöndube (2012), for instance, the agent has some initial trust in
the ﬁrm, denoted by γ, which gives the probability that the ﬁrm is a non-
strategic type who always pays a bonus. With complementary probability
the ﬁrm is strategic and only pays a bonus when it is optimal. Whether
the welfare results of the current paper continue to hold in such settings
may be worthwhile to explore formally.
As to models of relational contracting with uncertainty about the pay-
offs, a recent paper by Li and Matouschek (2013)5 considers a ﬁrm and
an employee who interact inﬁnitely, and the ﬁrm has private information
about its opportunity costs to pay a bonus to the worker. More speciﬁcally,
the ﬁrm sometimes prefers an alternative use for the funds intended for
bonus payments, such as an exceptional investment opportunity. The ﬁrm
is known to be strategic, and what causes conﬂict is that since the worker
does not observe whether the ﬁrm is hit by a shock or not, he does not
know if the nonpayment of a bonus was warranted or not. This imperfect
monitoring, and the fact that paying the bonus is efﬁcient in some peri-
ods, also makes possible the gradual decline in trust instead of a sudden
termination of the relationship. In contrast to the setting in my model,
the setting of Li and Matouschek is not concerned with learning about
the ﬁrm. In addition, they assume that the ﬁrm’s opportunity costs, and
hence payoffs, vary over time.
The question of whether the value of the project should be publicly ob-
served or not relates to theoretical research conducted on transparency in
5see also a related paper by Englmaier & Segal (2013) in which the worker’s
choice is binary, and the ﬁrm’s opportunity cost of paying the worker in a bad
state of the world is inﬁnite.
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principal-agent settings. In previous literature (e.g. Prat, 2005; Matozzi
& Merlo, 2007, Levy, 2007a,b), transparency has been coined as the abil-
ity of the principal to either observe how the agent behaves and/or what
the consequences of such behavior are. I consider a somewhat different
version of transparency, namely the ability of the principal to observe one
dimension of the agent’s type.
Literature on delegation and authority6 in organizations is relevant in
terms of applications in that the decision of a principal to delegate a task
to an agent of unknown type is essentially analogous to the principal de-
ciding to trust the agent in completing a task on her behalf. Literature on
for instance delegated portfolio management7, and delegation models in
political science8 provide interesting applied settings in which the results
of this paper could be applied. As an example, it may be socially optimal
to have the compensation structure of a portfolio manager concealed from
investors.
4.3 Public information aboutM
This section introduces the model in which the Entrepreneur is privately
informed of his reliability, but the value of his project is common knowl-
edge. In addition, both players discount the future at the rate of δ. In the
short game that we consider, though, discounting does not really play a
role, and one could as well set δ = 1. A δ less than 1 can be interpreted
as there being a risk that the interaction stops after the ﬁrst period due
to sudden changes in either the Investor’s or the Entrepreneur’s environ-
ment. For instance, Entrepreneur may not need ﬁnancing anymore after
one round, perhaps due to a bequest from a suddenly deceased relative,
or due to health problems leading to an early retirement. In what follows,
the model of this section is sometimes referred to as ’Public regime’, and
the terms investment and loan are used interchangeably despite subtle
differences in their etymologies.
6see e.g. Baker et al (1999), Marino et al. (2010), Bester & Krähmer (2008),
Armstrong & Vickers (2010)
7see e.g. Huberman & Kandel (1993), Huddart (1999), Chevalier & Ellison
(1999), Stracca (2006)
8see e.g. survey by Bendor et al. (2000)
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4.3.1 The Model
There are two players, an Investor and an Entrepreneur who interact in
periods t = 1, 2, to play a stage-game which is identical over time9. At the
beginning of the game, Nature moves and draws once and for all the En-
trepreneur’s type (τ,M).10 The type vector consists of his strategy-type,
τ ∈ {g, b} , and the value of his project, M . The strategy type τ is pri-
vately observed by the Entrepreneur. With a common prior probability
p ∈ (0, 1) the Entrepreneur is reliable, or “good”, g, and with the comple-
mentary probability he is unreliable, or “bad, b”. A good Entrepreneur
is non-strategic and always repays investments. Therefore, with a good
type, the Investor would always choose to invest. A bad Entrepreneur
is strategic: he maximizes his total payoff which is given by the sum of
stage-game payoffs. The value of the project, M, is publicly observed.
For the purposes of ex-ante welfare, discussed in section 4.5, let M be
drawn from a commonly known continuous11 distribution F with a sup-
port M ⊂ R+. After Nature’s move, the following stage-game is repeated
twice.
1. Investor ﬁrst chooses whether to “Invest, I” or “Not invest, NI” a ﬁxed
amount x ≥ 0 to the Entrepreneur’s project. For simplicity, normalize x
to 1. If her action is “Not invest”, the stage game ends.
2. If an investment is made, the Entrepreneur can either “Repay, R” it or
“Default, D” on it.
3. Payoffs are realized and privately observed12.
The payoffs are displayed in Figure 4.1 which sketches the stage-game
between the Investor and the bad Entrepreneur. If the Investor chooses
9the stage game is an adaptation of the trust game introduced by Berg et al.
(1995)
10Since the Entrepreneur does not have the choice to turn down investments,
it may be more reasonable to have M drawn only after an investment is made.
This would not change the dynamics of the game as long as E(M) > 1 + r.
11This is required for the construction of the Private regime equilibrium for pri-
ors in the range [pˆ, p˜SR). Were F discrete, the determination of Mˆadj would not be
possible. In such a case, the equilibrium would consist of the bad type betraying
trust for all values of M . This would result in changes in the lower bound pˆ.
12This is crucial only in the Private regime where the Investor would be able to
learn that the Entrepreneur is good if he repays a loan when M < Mˆ.
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not to invest, all players get a payoff of 0, that is, no one’s initial wealth
is affected. If the Investor chooses to invest and the Entrepreneur repays
it the Investor gets a net payoff of r > 0 which is the interest accrued to
the investment. The Entrepreneur gets the output less the repayment of
the investment, M − (1 + r). If the Entrepreneur defaults the Investor
simply loses her investment and gets a payoff of −1. The bad type of En-
trepreneur obtains a payoff of M whereas the good type incurs an in-
ﬁnitely large cost from betraying the Investor. All players maximize the
sum of stage-game payoffs, discounted by the commonly known discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1].
Denote the behavior strategy of the Investor in period t by σIt : Ht →
[0, 1] such that σI(ht) gives the probability that she invests in period t
given the realized history of play. Similarly, denote the behavior strategy
of the Entrepreneur of type τ ∈ {g, b} by στt : Ht → [0, 1] such that στ (ht)
gives the probability that he repays an investment made in period t.
Notice that if the realization M is less than 1 + r, the good type already
knows upon entering the game that his payoff will be negative. While it
is reasonable to assume that in such environments he may choose to not
seek ﬁnancing, the possibility of declining loans is not considered here. In
fact, it is not uncommon that long-term projects yield deﬁcits in their early
stages. In a longer game, this issue may need to be addressed for example
by assuming that δ < 1 and F is supported on M ≥ 1+r, or by introducing
some dynamics to M. In the current setup where the Entrepreneur cannot
decline investments, if it occurs that M < 1 + r, the good Entrepreneur
would prefer the Investor to not invest. That is, for some combinations
of r, δ and F the good type prefers an equilibrium which minimizes the
frequency of investments. This will be reﬂected in the welfare results
discussed in section 4.5.
One-shot game
Suppose a game of perfect information between an Investor and the bad
Entrepreneur. Being the second mover, a bad Entrepreneur has a dom-
inant strategy in a one-shot game to default. Anticipating this, the In-
vestor will not invest, and the only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
of the game with perfect information is {NI,D}. Notice, however, that
both players would prefer the cooperative outcome {I, R} to the no-trust
outcome.
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·
Not Invest Invest
Investor
(0, 0) ·
Default Repay
Entrepreneur
(−1,M) (r,M − (1 + r))
Figure 4.1. One-shot game
In a game with imperfect information about the reliability of the En-
trepreneur, the one-shot game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which
the Investor invests if she is conﬁdent enough that the Entrepreneur is
good.
Proposition 1. In a one-shot game, the Investor invests if and only if
her belief about the Entrepreneur being good satisﬁes
p ≥ 1
1 + r
.
4.3.2 Equilibrium
Assume that the Investor plays according to the following trigger strategy:
In the ﬁrst period, play “invest”. Thereafter, if all moves in all previous periods
have been “invest” and “repay”, play “invest”; otherwise, play “not invest”.
Given the assumption on the strategy of the Investor, this section analyzes
when it is supported as part of an equilibrium of the game. In a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game, no player wants to deviate from
his or her equilibrium strategy after any possible history of the game,
given the equilibrium strategies of other players. In addition, beliefs held
by the Investor about the payoff type of the Entrepreneur are updated
according to Bayes rule whenever possible.
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Second period: Solving backwards, in the second and last period the In-
vestor invests if and only if p2(h2) ≥ 11+r ,where h2 ∈ H2 ≡ {NI, (I,D) , (I, R)}.
More speciﬁcally, given that the good Entrepreneur always repays the In-
vestor, after a history including a default, p2(I,D) = 0 leading to σI2(I,D) =
0. If the Investor has chosen to not invest in the ﬁrst project, p2(NI) = p,
and σI2(NI) = 1 if p ≥ 11+r . In case the Entrepreneur has repaid the In-
vestor, the revised beliefs about the Entrepreneur’s type depend on the
equilibrium ﬁrst-period strategy of the bad Entrepreneur, to which we
turn next.
First period: When choosing their actions in the ﬁrst period, both the In-
vestor and the Entrepreneur take into account the value ofM which deter-
mines the equilibrium ﬁrst-period action of the bad Entrepreneur. If the
business is proﬁtable enough, the bad type has a reputational incentive
to repay the ﬁrst-period loan so as to convince the Investor of his trust-
worthiness. Suppose that the Investor continues investing as long as the
Entrepreneur has repaid earlier loans. For any δ, the bad Entrepreneur
chooses to repay the ﬁrst-period loan if and only if M − (1 + r) + δM > M,
that is, if
M >
1 + r
δ
≡ Mˆ.
Let M > Mˆ. If σb1(M) = 1, the Investor’s posterior p2(I, R) = p and repay-
ment leads to a new investment only if p ≥ 11+r . Any lower belief than this
contradicts σb1(M) = 1 and hence it must be that σb1(M) < 1.
Assume that 0 < σb1(M) < 1. If this leads to σI2(I, R) = 1, then σb1(M) =
1would be optimal, a contradiction. Thus, the requirement for 0 < σb1(M) <
1 is that 0 < σI2(I, R) < 1. This means that the Investor must be indiffer-
ent between investing or not in period 2, that is, p2(I, R) = 11+r . Hence, for
all priors p < 11+r , σb1(M) must satisfy
p
p+ (1− p)σb1(M) =
1
1 + r
,
where the LHS gives the updated belief of the Investor that the Entrepreneur
is good after a repayment of the ﬁrst loan. Moreover, the proposed mixed
strategy for the Entrepreneur requires him to be indifferent between re-
paying or not, given the proposed strategy of the Investor. That is,
M − (1 + r) + δσI2(I, R)M = M,
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from where we can solve for σI2(I, R). The following proposition summa-
rizes the equilibrium strategies of the Investor and the bad Entrepreneur.
Proposition 2. Let M > Mˆ .
• If p ≥ 11+r , the Investor invests in the ﬁrst period and continues investing
as long as investments are repaid. The equilibrium of the ﬁrst stage game
is pooling: the bad type of Entrepreneur repays the ﬁrst investment with
probability 1.
• If p ∈ [ 1
r2+2r+1
, 11+r ), the Investor invests in the ﬁrst period and, if the
investment is repaid, invests in period 2 with probability σI2(h2) = 1+rδM .
The equilibrium of the ﬁrst stage game is semi-separating: the bad type of
Entrepreneur repays the ﬁrst investment with probability σb1(M) = rp1−p .
• If p < 1
r2+2r+1
, the unique equilibrium of the game consists of no in-
vestments being made. If an investment is made, the bad type of En-
trepreneur defaults with probability 1.
In proposition 2, the lowest prior for which investment is supported in pe-
riod 1 is solved from the incentive compatibility condition of the Investor
given the proposed equilibrium strategy of the Entrepreneur. That is, in-
vestment in the ﬁrst period is optimal if and only if
p(1 + δσI2)r + (1− p) [σb1 (r − δσI2)− (1− σb1)] ≥ 0.
Assume now that M ≤ Mˆ. The bad Entrepreneur is only concerned about
maximizing his payoff in the ﬁrst period, and the ﬁrst-period equilibrium
is separating, leading to p2(I, R) = 1 or p2(I,D) = 0.
Proposition 3. Let M ≤ Mˆ. The equilibrium of the ﬁrst stage game is
separating; the bad type of Entrepreneur defaults with certainty if an in-
vestment is made. The Investor invests in the ﬁrst period if and only if
p ≥ 1
1 + (1 + δ) r
.
The proof is straightforward. Given that the bad Entrepreneur does not
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compensate the Investor, the threshold outlined in proposition 3 is solved
from the Investor’s incentive compatibility constraint to invest in the ﬁrst
period. This is given by
p(1 + δ)r − (1− p) ≥ 0.
Notice that if p ≥ 11+r , the Investor would invest in period 2 even after
no investment in period 1. This, however is suboptimal and hence not
an equilibrium. The Investor gets a higher expected payoff by investing
already in period 1 and reinvesting in period 2 if the outcome of the ﬁrst
period is (I, R). We now turn to analyze the game in which M is the En-
trepreneur’s private information.
4.4 Uncertainty aboutM
This section solves for the PBE of a trust game which is otherwise the
same as the one in the previous section, but M is now private information
to the Entrepreneur. As a result, private information of the Entrepreneur
concerns the whole type vector (τ,M) . The Investor’s belief about M is
given by the commonly known prior distribution F . In what follows, this
model is sometimes referred to as the ’Private regime’.
Since M does not affect the strategy of the bad type in the last period,
the second period is played as in the Public regime. That is, the Investor
invests if and only if p2(h2) ≥ 1/ (1 + r) . Suppose that this holds and
σI2(I, R) = 1. As under the Public regime, there exists a cutoff Mˆ such
that all bad types M ≤ Mˆ = (1 + r) /δ do not repay and all higher types
invest in reputation in the ﬁrst period by repaying the ﬁrst loan.
Let us ﬁrst look for an equilibrium in which the Investor invests in pe-
riod 1, and σb1(M) = 1 if M > Mˆ. The strategy of the bad type is optimal
only if σI2(I, R) = 1. Given the proposed strategy of the bad type, the
Investor continues investing in period 2 if and only if her belief at the
beginning of period 2 is high enough. That is, if
p
p+ (1− p)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) ≥ 1
1 + r
. (4.1)
Denote by p˜SR the lowest prior p for which the condition above still holds
(as an equality). The subscript ′SR′ stands for sequential rationality. No-
tice that p˜SR is increasing in the probability
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
: the more likely
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it is that the bad type is concerned for reputation and repays the ﬁrst in-
vestment, the less the Investor’s posterior beliefs react if an investment
is repaid and hence the more limited the bad Entrepreneur’s scope for
mimicking the good type.
Suppose that p ≥ p˜SR. To check that the Investor wants to invest in
period 1, the following incentive constraint must hold. The LHS gives
her expected payoff if she invests, given the proposed strategy of the En-
trepreneur, and the RHS is her payoff if she does not invest.13
p(1 + δ)r + (1− p)
[(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(r − δ)− F (Mˆ)
]
≥ 0. (4.2)
The set of priors which satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint is
larger the more likely it is that the bad type is concerned for reputation
and repays the ﬁrst investment. In this case, if r > δ it is always opti-
mal to invest in the ﬁrst period, and if δ > r investing remains optimal
for quite long. If the bad type is only concerned for short-term gain, in-
vesting is optimal only for priors higher than 1/ (1 + (1 + δ)r) . Since the
value of M is unknown to the Investor, investing remains optimal also for
priors less than this, provided that it is sufﬁciently likely that M > Mˆ.
Call the lowest prior that satisﬁes the incentive-compatibility constraint
by p˜IC . By the previous discussion, p˜IC is decreasing in the probability(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
.
Since p˜IC is decreasing and p˜SR increasing in
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
, there exists
a unique value Z(r) ≡ 12+r such that p˜SR = p˜IC if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
= Z(r). If(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r), the reputation concern is so likely that p˜IC ≤ p˜SR.
If the reverse holds, the bad Entrepreneur is likely to have a concern for
short-term proﬁts, and p˜SR < p˜IC .
Proposition 4. For all p ≥ p˜ ≡ max {p˜SR, p˜IC} , where
p˜SR =
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
+ r
,
13In fact, if p > 11+r , and the Investor does not invest, she would have the option
to still invest in period 2. This would place a more demanding constraint for
the equilibrium that we are looking at. However, it is easy to check that the
Investor gets always a higher expected payoff by investing immediately and not
postponing investments. This way, she may have two proﬁtable trades instead of
one.
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and
p˜IC =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
F (Mˆ)−(1−F (Mˆ))(r−δ)
(1+δ)r+F (Mˆ)−(1−F (Mˆ))(r−δ) if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≤ 11+r−δ
0 otherwise.
the unique PBE of the game consists of the Investor investing as long as
earlier investments have been repaid. The bad Entrepreneur’s strategy in
period 1 is characterized by
σb1(M) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if M > Mˆ
0 otherwise
,
where Mˆ = 1+rδ .
Proof: In the appendix. 
For the equilibrium for priors lower than p˜, it matters what p˜ is. Sup-
pose that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r), and consider priors p < p˜SR. If the bad
Entrepreneur is concerned for his reputation, it must be that σb1(M) < 1.
On the other hand, for there to exist an equilibrium in which the bad type
randomizes in period 1, it must be that σI2(I, R) < 1, which again requires
that p2(I, R) = 1/(1+r). Thus, σb1(M) must satisfy
p
p+ (1− p)(1− F (Mˆ))σb1(M)
=
1
1 + r
. (4.3)
But recall from the analysis of the Public regime that any equilibrium
which consists of mixing by the bad type requires that the Investor’s
mixed strategy in period 2 is a function of M. When M is not observed
by the Investor, the mixed strategy of the bad type is equivalent to there
being a cutoff type Mˆadj such that all types higher than this invest in
reputation with probability 1. The adjusted cutoff is implicitly deﬁned by
(
1− F
(
Mˆadj
))
=(1− F (Mˆ))σb1(M)
=
rp
1− p,
where the last equality follows from eq. (4.3). The above equality is valid
as long as r < 1−pp .
14 To ensure that the bad Entrepreneur of type Mˆadj
14Since the term 1−pp is decreasing in p, and the condition holds for all r ≥ 0
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is indifferent between repaying or not in period 1, the Investor needs to
lower the beneﬁt from an established reputation. Let σPrI2 ∈ (0, 1) give the
probability that she invests in period 2 if the earlier investment has been
repaid. In the equilibrium, this probability has to decrease in Mˆadj so as to
discourage all types lower than the cutoff to forgo investing in reputation.
Finally, the equilibrium requires that the Investor ﬁnd it optimal to in-
vest in period 1 given the strategy of the Entrepreneur. Denote the lowest
prior belief for which the equilibrium is supported by pˆ. For priors below
it, the expected gains to the Investor from the reputation building of the
bad type are so low that they are outweighed by the expected costs that
occur in case the bad type is concerned for short-term gains only. Thus,
the only equilibrium of the game is a no-trade equilibrium.
Proposition 5. If
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r), and if
• p ∈ [pˆ, p˜SR) , where pˆ = 1r2+2r+1 , the unique PBE consists of the Investor
investing in period 1 and the bad Entrepreneur repaying it with certainty
if M > Mˆadj . In period 2, if the ﬁrst investment was repaid, the Investor
randomizes her action by investing with probability
σPrI2 (p) =
1 + r
δMˆadj
.
• p < pˆ, the unique PBE of the game consists of no investments, and
σb1(M) = σb2(M,h2) = 0.
Proof: In the appendix. 
Suppose now that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), and consider priors lower than
p˜IC . The mixed-strategy equilibrium of Proposition 5 cannot be sustained
if p ∈ [p˜SR, p˜IC) because the posterior of the Investor is high enough to
have σI2(I, R) = 1, and therefore σb1(M) = 1. However, since p < p˜IC , the
Investor does not have the incentive to make the ﬁrst investment. On the
other hand, if p < p˜SR, the mixed-strategy equilibrium in Proposition 5
cannot be sustained since it can be checked that p˜SR < pˆ. Finally, since
p˜IC <
1
1+(1+δ)r for all r ≥ 0 and for all δ ∈ [0, 1], a separating ﬁrst-period
equilibrium cannot be sustained either.
when p = p˜SR, Mˆadj is always deﬁned.
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Proposition 6. If
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), and if p < p˜IC , the unique PBE
consists of no investments being made and σb1(M) = σb2(M,h2) = 0.
Proposition 6 states that in case the project does not seem to be very valu-
able and the Investor’s prior belief is rather pessimistic, the only equilib-
rium of the game is a no-trade equilibrium in which the Investor does not
invest and therefore the bad Entrepreneur does not repay for any M . We
now turn to comparing the equilibria under the Public and the Private
regime in terms of their welfare.
4.5 Welfare
This section presents the main results of the paper which concern the ex-
ante welfare of the players. Ex-ante welfare of any player i and for any
prior p is given as the expected payoff conditional on any realized value
of M. In what follows, the focus is on priors in the intermediate range of
[pˆ, 11+r ). For all other prior beliefs, the equilibria as well as expected pay-
offs of the two regimes are identical. Recall that for priors below pˆ, both
regimes feature no investments. On the other hand, for priors higher than
1
1+r , the Investor is sufﬁciently conﬁdent in facing a good Entrepreneur to
not pay attention to the actions of the bad type. Information about M is
therefore redundant. Ex-ante expected payoffs of each player in both of
the models are reported in the appendix.
In general, whether any given player prefers the Private or the Public
regime depends on the form of F. It is a somewhat complicated exercise
to state general conditions that hold for all possible distributions F , and
for all r and δ. Therefore, the results of this section are not exhaustive;
they do not cover all possible scenarios for all players15. Rather, the pur-
pose of this section is to point out that there exist, under fairly general
conditions, parameter speciﬁcations of the model under which all players
obtain a strictly higher ex-ante expected payoff if information about M is
privately held by the Entrepreneur. In fact, the result holds also to the
other direction. In particular, this section shows that for any r, δ ∈ (0, 1]
and for any distribution F , there always exists at least some priors such
that the Private regime is optimal for all players. The results are ex-
pressed in terms of the probability
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
instead of F (Mˆ) because
the former gives directly the probability of reputational concerns which is
a central measure for the analysis.
15In particular, the welfare analysis of the Entrepreneur is not comprehensive
for all possible priors.
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4.5.1 General results
The main result concerning the ex-ante welfare of the Investor across
regimes is summarized in Theorem 1. The welfare of the Entrepreneur
is covered shortly at the end of this subsection. Theorem 1 holds for any
r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and covers all possible distributions F. It establishes that the
range of priors for which the Private regime dominates is increasing in
the ex-ante probability that the bad Entrepreneur has reputational con-
cerns. Moreover, as long as there is a strictly positive probability that the
bad type has reputational concerns, there is shown to exist a set of priors
for which the Private regime dominates. This result is restated in Corol-
lary 1.
Theorem 1. (Investor) For any r, δ ∈ (0, 1], the Private regime yields the
Investor strictly higher ex-ante expected payoff if and only if
• Z(r) ≤
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< 1 and p ∈
(
pˆ, 11+r
)
, or
• X(p, r, δ) ≤
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r) and p ∈
(
p˜IC ,
1
1+r
)
, or
• 0 <
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< X(p, r, δ) and p ∈
(
1
1+(1+δ)r ,
1
1+r
)
, where
Z(r) ≡ 12+r , and X(r, δ, p) ≡ Δ1Δ1+Δ2 , with Δ1 = (1 − p) − r(1 + δ)p, and
Δ2 = 1 + r − δ −
(
r2 + (2− δ)r + (1− δ)) p.
Proof: In the appendix. 
The more probable it is that the bad Entrepreneur has reputational con-
cerns the larger is the set of priors for which the Private regime dominates
in terms of ex-ante expected payoffs. Notice that all of the intervals for
the prior beliefs are nonempty as long as r, δ > 0. Therefore, given that
Theorem 1 spans all values of F ∈ (0, 1), it directly implies Corollary 1
below.
Corollary 1. For any non-degenerate distribution F and for any r, δ ∈
(0, 1], there exists a non-empty set of priors p such that the Investor is
strictly better off under the Private regime.
It is rather intuitive that the Entrepreneur of any type always prefers
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the regime which maximizes the probability of investments, both in the
ﬁrst and in the second period.16 Why the the Investor holds a fairly gen-
eral preference for the Private regime is less clear. The remainder of this
subsection tries to shed light on what drives the welfare result of the In-
vestor.
The general principle is that whenever M ≤ Mˆ, the Investor would pre-
fer the Public regime so as to avoid expected losses due to the bad type
defaulting on all loans. Under the Private regime, investments are made
in equilibrium as long as the Investor believes that there is a high enough
probability that the bad type repays the ﬁrst loan. For some priors17, were
she able to tell that this probability is zero, she would be better off by not
investing.
On the other hand, whenever M > Mˆ, the Investor is better off un-
der the Private regime where, given that the bad type of Entrepreneur
is concerned for his reputation and repays the ﬁrst loan, the Investor ob-
tains her maximum payoff in the ﬁrst period as long as both types of the
Entrepreneur repay the investment with certainty. Because the Investor
always learns from the equilibrium action of the Entrepreneur, the bad
type has to rely less on mixed strategies under the Private regime. Thus,
the Private regime beneﬁts from having more room for reputation build-
ing, and this beneﬁt is increasing in the difference (r − δ). With this in
mind, let us introduce the following notation.
Deﬁnition 1. Reputation effect, R, and the screening effect, S are deﬁned
as
R ≡ EτEM
[
V Pr(σI , στ )− V Pub(σI , στ ) | M > Mˆ
]
S ≡ EτEM
[
V Pub(σI , στ )− V Pr(σI , στ ) | M ≤ Mˆ
]
,
where V κ(σ) is the Investor’s total payoff under the regime κ ∈ {Pub, Pr} .
Using the reputation and the screening effect, the Private regime ex-ante
dominates the Public regime if and only if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
R− F (Mˆ)S ≥ 0. (4.4)
16as long as E
[
M | M ≤ Mˆ
]
> 1 + r. Ref. section 4.5.2. for more on this.
17p < 11+(1+δ)r
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Both the reputation and the screening effect are positive. The reputation
effect occurs when M > Mˆ and, as discussed, it works for the beneﬁt of
the Private regime. The screening effect occurs if M ≤ Mˆ and it works for
the beneﬁt of the Public regime. Notice that the inequality in (4.4) merely
reformulates the condition that the ex-ante expected payoff is higher un-
der the Private regime than under the Public regime. Theorem 2 below is
therefore essentially another way to express Theorem 1 using the reputa-
tion and the screening effects.
Theorem 2. (Investor) Take any r, δ ∈ (0, 1], and any non-degenerate dis-
tribution F such that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r). The ex-ante reputation effect
strictly dominates the ex-ante screening effect for all priors p ∈ (pˆ, 11+r ).
Proof: In the appendix. 
What Theorem 2 shows, which is not evident from the discussion under
Theorem 1, is that the reason for the ex-ante dominance of the Private
regime is the fact that the ex-ante value of the reputation effect outweighs
the ex-ante value of the screening effect. A similar result can be con-
structed for other distributions as well. The less likely it is that the bad
Entrepreneur has reputational concerns, however, the more the screening
effect weighs for ex-ante welfare and therefore the higher the Investor’s
prior belief has to be for the Private regime to dominate. In particular,
if X(p, r, δ) ≤
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), the ex-ante reputation effect strictly
dominates the ex-ante screening effect for all priors p ∈ (p˜IC , 11+r ). If
0 <
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< X(p, r, δ), the strict dominance of the Private regime
can only be ensured for p ∈ ( 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the reputation and the screening effects in one
numerical example where r = δ = 1, and M is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [1, 4]. These imply that Mˆ = 2 and
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
= 23 >
Z(r) = 13 . Thus, reputation concerns are very likely. By Theorems 1 and
2, the Private regime is strictly optimal for all intermediate priors (now
all priors between 14 and
1
2 ). To ease the interpretation of the ﬁgure, note
in addition that p˜SR = 25 , and
1
1+(1+δ)r =
1
3 . The values behind the ﬁgure
are reported in the appendix. Notice that the ﬁgure compares the ex-ante
effects, that is, R and S weighted by their respective probabilities.
The ﬁgure shows that the reputation effect remains relatively stable for
priors below p˜SR, and decrease linearly as p increases towards 12 . Consider
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Figure 4.2. Reputation and screening effects, r = δ = 1,M ∼ U [1, 4]
ﬁrst the interval [25 ,
1
2 ]. The Private regime equilibrium consists of the
bad Entrepreneur repaying the ﬁrst loan with probability 1, whereas the
Public regime equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the bad type repays
the ﬁrst loan with a probability which is increasing in the prior. This is
why the reputation effect dies out gradually as p approaches 12 .
For priors lower than 25 , the Private regime features mixed strategies as
well. This is why the reputation effect is more modest though still posi-
tive. This is because the bad type is still able to repay the ﬁrst investment
with a higher probability if M is private knowledge. The source of this dif-
ference in the repayment rates is explained in more detail under the proof
of Theorem 2. Basically, when conditioning on the event that M > Mˆ, the
probability Pr
[
M > Mˆadj | M > Mˆ
]
is given by
(
1− F (Mˆadj)
)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) = rp1−p(
1− F (Mˆ)
) = σPubb1 (M)(
1− F (Mˆ)
) > σPubb1 (M),
where σPubb1 (M) is the probability that the bad type repays the investment
in period 1 under the Public regime.
Turning to the screening effect, it is zero for p ∈ [25 , 12) because both
regimes involve investments as long as they are repaid. Since the ﬁrst
investment is not repaid if the Entrepreneur is bad, the Investor learns
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this under both regimes and is hence in the same position at the beginning
of period 2 regardless of the regime. For p ∈ [13 , 25 ], the screening effect is
strictly positive and decreasing in the prior because the Public regime
allows the Investor to learn if the Entrepreneur is good in which case she
invests in period 2 with certainty. The Private regime, on the other hand,
consists of mixed strategies by which the Investor invests in period 2 with
a probability strictly less than 1 even though, would she know M, she
would know that the Entrepreneur is good for sure if he has repaid.
For p ∈ [14 , 13 ], there is no trust under the Public regime. This means,
on one hand, that the good Entrepreneur gets no chance to reveal his
type, but more importantly, that the bad type has no chance to deceive
the Investor which for low priors weighs more than the forgone opportu-
nity to invest to the good type’s project. Under the Private regime, the
equilibrium features mixed strategies which means that the good type
gets ﬁnancing with certainty in period 1 but with less than certainty in
period 2. More importantly, though, the lower the prior is the higher is
the Investor’s expected loss from investing in period 1.
Let us concentrate brieﬂy on the welfare of the Entrepreneur. It is sen-
sitive to the shape of F, as the mixed strategy equilibria of both the Pri-
vate and the Public regime involve randomization which depends either
on Mˆadj = F−1
(
1−p−rp
1−p
)
or on E
(
M | M > Mˆ
)
. However, the following
Lemmas 4 and 5 can be readily established. They are enough to provide
the result of Theorem 3 that follows.
Lemma 4. (Entrepreneur)
Take any r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and any F such that E
(
M | M ≤ Mˆ
)
> 1 + r. Then
an Entrepreneur of any type is strictly better off under the Private regime
for all p ∈ (p˜, 11+r ), where p˜ is either p˜SR or p˜IC , depending on the value of
F (Mˆ).
Proof: In the appendix. 
Lemma 5. (Entrepreneur)
Take any r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and any F such that E
(
M | M ≤ Mˆ
)
< 1 + r. Then
an Entrepreneur of any type is strictly better off under the Private regime
for all p ∈ (max
{
p˜SR,
1
1+(1+δ)r
}
, 11+r ).
Proof: In the appendix. 
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Lemmas 4 and 5 only provide a partial truth in the sense that the re-
sults may hold for a larger set of priors. This remains future work for
now. However, since the lemmas span all F ∈ (0, 1) Theorem 3 can be
established.
Theorem 3. (Entrepreneur) For any non-degenerate distribution F and
for any r, δ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a non-empty set of priors p such that the
Entrepreneur of any type is strictly better off under the Private regime.
The following subsection covers two simple numerical examples that il-
lustrate the more general results in this subsection. The ﬁrst example is
to illustrate Lemma 5. Namely, it matters for the welfare of the good En-
trepreneur whether the Entrepreneur’s project may be unproﬁtable, that
is, whether M may take on values less than 1 + r. The second example
assumes a discrete uniform distribution to show that the results of this
section continue to hold. This, however, requires small changes in the
equilibrium of the Private regime.
4.5.2 Two examples
Example 1. Let r = δ = 1, and let F be uniform on [1, 4]. For p ∈ (13 , 12), all
players are strictly better off under the Private regime. For p ∈ (14 , 13), the
Investor and the bad Entrepreneur are strictly better off under the Private
regime, but the good Entrepreneur is strictly better off under the Public
regime. For all other priors, all players are indifferent between the regimes.
In this example18, because an Entrepreneur who always repays invest-
ments incurs ex-ante expected losses in case E
[
M | M ≤ Mˆ
]
< 1 + r, he
would prefer no investments to be made if M < Mˆ . This is the case under
the Public regime where, for p < 11+(1+δ)r , the Investor refuses to invest
knowing that the bad type of the Entrepreneur would default with cer-
tainty. This non-investment equilibrium is a blessing for the good type
who avoids the negative payoff associated with a low realization of M.
The bad type obviously prefers that an investment be made because he
would not repay it in any case. Also, given that M does not directly af-
fect the Investor’s payoff, as long as she expects investments to be repaid,
she prefers the regime under which the investments are more likely to be
18The ex-ante expected payoffs are reported in the appendix.
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made. The welfare in Example 1 is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. Ex-ante expected payoffs, r = δ = 1,M ∼ U [1, 4]
Discrete uniform distribution Let r = δ = 1 such that Mˆ = 2, and let
M ∈ {2, 4} with F (2) = F (4) = 12 . A discrete distribution implies small
changes in the equilibrium under the Private regime for priors p < p˜SR.
Namely, since we are unable to deﬁne Mˆadj , which would require M to
be continuous, the only Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of the bad
type betraying trust with certainty in both periods. The equilibrium is
supported for all priors p1 ≥ 11+(1+δ)r , as solved in section 4.3.2 for the
Public regime.
Example 2.19 Let r = δ = 1, andM ∈ {2, 4}with equal probability. For all
priors in the range (13 ,
1
2), all players obtain strictly higher ex-ante payoffs
under the Private regime. For all other priors, all players are indifferent
between the regimes.
19The ex-ante expected payoffs are reported in the appendix.
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4.6 Discussion and ideas for further research
The current model is binary by construction. It does not allow the In-
vestor to adjust the level of her investment as the game proceeds. Since
the Investor’s stage-game payoff is increasing in x, focusing on an all or
nothing set-up is without loss of generality in a one-shot game. In a re-
peated game, though, allowing x to adjust between periods would seem a
more realistic assumption. However, if the Investor can choose the future
value of the relationship by committing to an increasing sequence of in-
vestments as trust evolves, she could incentivize a bad Entrepreneur to
repay investments. By handing this power to the Investor we however lose
the distinction between the Private and the Public regime, as the Investor
would always be informed about the bad Entrepreneur’s equilibrium ac-
tion in the ﬁrst period. The logic of “starting small” has been studied by
many authors (see e.g. Watson, 1999 and 2002; Watson and Rauch, 2003;
and Halac, 2014), and it has been shown to resolve challenges in coopera-
tion games in which players can choose to change partners at any period
(Datta, 1996; Ghosh & Ray, 1996; Kranton, 1996). When relationships
start small, the temptation to switch partners at every period and betray
consecutively is removed because a change of partner will lead to a period
of low payoffs during new phase of trust building.
Suppose that the Investor is able to design a contract which speciﬁes
the interest rate that the Entrepreneur must use for repayments and an
investment x as a function of the interest rate r. The Investor must de-
sign the contract in such a way that the Entrepreneur accepts it. Certain
incentive compatibility conditions must hence be satisﬁed. The good type
of Entrepreneur would never breach the contract but the bad type has an
incentive to set r = 0 to maximize his immediate gain although at the cost
of not obtaining ﬁnancing in period 2. By designing the contract optimally,
the Investor is able to dictate the type of equilibrium to be implemented.
However, since the optimal level of r likely depends on M, if the Investor
is uncertain about M, she may end up implementing a suboptimal equi-
librium. This model, which is reminiscent of the relational contracting
models discussed in section 2, may serve as an example where at least
the Investor is hurt by private information about M.
The current set-up features one-sided imperfect information in that the
Entrepreneur has all the available information in both regimes. Two-
sided imperfect information could be introduced for instance by assum-
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ing that the Investor is privately informed of her investment horizon.
She may know with certainty that she is only going to invest once in
the project, and look for other investment opportunities in the second pe-
riod. Alternatively, since the availability of substitutes may not be clear
at the beginning of the game, or ﬁnding them may turn out to be too
costly, she may only know the probability δ that the game continues af-
ter the ﬁrst period. The Entrepreneur only knows the distribution from
which δ is drawn. Tentative analysis suggests that introducing this type
of additional information asymmetry would still allow for the existence of
parameter environments under which all players strictly prefer the Pri-
vate regime. However, the existence of those environments seems to be
more limited than in the present model. Moreover, interim welfare would
suggest that after learning that her investment horizon is short, the In-
vestor prefers to not reveal it. Conversely, after learning that the invest-
ment horizon is long (two periods), the Investor prefers to have it publicly
known. Since the short-horizon type would always mimic the reports of
the long-horizon type, cheap talk regarding the investment horizon does
not seem credible.
Just as the Investor may be privately informed about her investment
horizon, the Entrepreneur may be privately informed about his future
plans. The analysis in this paper would go through without signiﬁcant
changes20 if, instead of M, the Entrepreneur may be privately informed
about the discount factor δ which could be interpreted as the probability
that he continues to do business in the second period. It could happen,
for example, that due to sudden changes in his health, he will retire after
the ﬁrst period. Since he is better informed of his health, he knows the
probability that a sudden retirement occurs, but the Investor holds only a
belief about the true value of δ.
Currently, there is only one Investor offering ﬁnancing for the Entrepreneur.
In the presence of a pool of Investors, each uninformed about the history of
play in other games but the ones they are involved in, the Entrepreneur’s
incentives to repay loans would be weakened. If the cost of ﬁnding a new
investor is low, the bad Entrepreneur would never repay his loans. The
harder it is to replace the Investor, for instance in economic downturns,
20The only change in the analysis would arise from the fact that δ, being the
common discount factor, enters the incentive compatibility constraint of the In-
vestor. Hence, under the Private regime, the equilibrium of the game depends on
how the Investor’s prior falls between thresholds which are functions of the con-
ditional belief about δ. Uncertainty about δ will shift the lower bound pˆ up such
that there will be priors for which all players strictly prefer the Public regime
because the Private regime no longer supports trust.
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the more likely it is that the bad Entrepreneur has concerns for reputa-
tion. Instead, publicly observed history of play between any Investor and
Entrepreneur would bring us back to the model of this paper.
Another simplifying assumption relates to the interest rate which is
ﬁxed. It therefore excludes the possibility for the good Entrepreneur to
attract the Investor by optimizing the interest rate it offers to pay in re-
turn for ﬁnancing. As long as the cooperative outcome Pareto dominates
the no-trust outcome, the good Entrepreneur could, by adjusting r, try to
induce an equilibrium in which the bad type would default on the loan
immediately if it was preferred to an equilibrium in which the bad type’s
action remains uncertain. By merely setting the interest rate high, the
good type is not able to separate from the bad type because the latter
could promise also a high rate. However, the Investor would know after
seeing a high r that it is at least very unlikely that the bad type would
actually repay in the ﬁrst period.
Finally, the results of the theoretical model could be tested empirically
in the lab by comparing the frequency of trust across two versions of
the standard trust game used in experiments: one in which all payoffs
are common knowledge and another in which the Trustee is privately in-
formed of his payoffs.
The model features both adverse selection (hidden information) (which
the Principal tries to mitigate by learning from the agent’s observed ac-
tions), and moral hazard (hidden action) in the sense that once an invest-
ment is made, the agent’s action is still unknown.
4.7 Conclusion
The paper analyzes a twice-repeated trust game with incomplete informa-
tion about the reliability of an Entrepreneur under two model variants
and compares them in terms of ex-ante expected payoffs. Based on the
results, the paper proposes a rationale for concealing information about
payoffs or about the length of the horizon in principal agent interactions.
Namely, there is shown to always exist parameter speciﬁcations under
which all players are strictly better off if and only if the Investor remains
ignorant about the payoffs of the Entrepreneur. The intuition for the re-
sult is that private information about the Entrepreneur’s payoffs allows
for more room for reputation building by the bad type which again results
in more trust on average. From the Investor’s point of view, the beneﬁts
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from increased trust due to reputation building by the bad type exceed the
expected losses that the Investor incurs in case the bad type is only con-
cerned about immediate gains. The model analyzed in the paper, although
highly stylized, is reminiscent of models analyzed in the literature on del-
egation and on relational contracts, and the analysis of more nuanced
settings could bring new results on transparency in organizations.
4.8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4. First, p˜SR is solved from condition (4.1) in the
text. To solve for the p˜IC , notice that the incentive-compatibility condition
of the Investor in (4.2) can be rewritten as
p
[
(1 + δ) r −
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(r − δ)) + F (Mˆ)
]
≥ F (Mˆ)−
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(r − δ) . (4.5)
There are two cases to consider. First, if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≤ 11+r−δ ≡ Z(r, δ),
both sides of inequality (4.5) are positive, and the incentive condition
holds for all
p ≥
F (Mˆ)−
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(r − δ)
(1 + δ) r + F (Mˆ)−
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(r − δ)
. (4.6)
Second, if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
> Z(r, δ), then either the RHS of (4.6) is negative
and the LHS is positive, or both sides are negative. In either case, the
incentive condition would hold for all positive priors so that p˜IC = 0. Com-
bining condition (4.6) with the condition that p ≥ p˜SR implies that there
is a pooling ﬁrst-period equilibrium for all priors p ≥ max {p˜SR, p˜IC} .
To check for Z(r), notice that if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≤ Z(r, δ), then p˜SR ≥ p˜IC if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ 1
2 + r
≡ Z(r). (4.7)
Furthermore, Z(r) < Z(r, δ) for all r and δ. Thus, p˜SR ≥ p˜IC if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥
Z(r), and otherwise the reverse holds. Following the discussion in the
text, it is be clear that none of the players want to deviate from the pro-
posed equilibrium as long as others follow their equilibrium strategies. 
Proof of Proposition 5. To ensure that the bad Entrepreneur of type
Mˆadj is indifferent between repaying investments and not, the Investor
needs to lower the beneﬁt from an established reputation. Then σPrI2 is
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solved from
M − (1 + r) + MˆadjσPrI2 M = M.
The incentive-compatibility condition for the Investor to invest in period
1 given the strategy of the bad type is given by
F (Mˆadj)
[
p(1 + σPrI2 δ)r − (1− p)
]
+(
1− F (Mˆadj)
) [
p(1 + σPrI2 δ)r + (1− p)
(
r − σPrI2 δ
)] ≥ 0,
which holds whenever
p ≥ 1
r2 + 2r + 1
≡ pˆ.
Finally, it can be checked that if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r), p˜SR ≥ p˜IC ≥ pˆ.
When the conditions stated in the Proposition hold, there are no proﬁtable
unilateral deviations for any player. 
Ex-ante welfare
Public regime
If p ≥ 11+r ,
Investor:
F (Mˆ) [p (1 + δ) r − (1− p)]+
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
[p (1 + δ) r + (1− p) (r − δ)]
Eg: (E[M ]− (1 + r)) (1 + δ)
Eb: F (Mˆ)E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ]+
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [
(1 + δ)E[M | M > Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
If p ∈
[
1
1+(1+δ)r ,
1
1+r
)
,
Investor: F (Mˆ) [p (1 + δ) r − (1− p)] +
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1]
Eg:
F (Mˆ) (1 + δ)
[
E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
+(
1− F (Mˆ)
) (
1 + σPubI2 δ
) [
E[M | M > Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
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Eb:
F (Mˆ)E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ]+(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [
σ1b
(
E[M | M > Mˆ ] (1 + δσPubI2 )− (1 + r))+
(1− σ1b)E[M | M > Mˆ ]
]
=F (Mˆ)E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ] +
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
E[M | M > Mˆ ]
=E[M ]
If p
[
1
r2+2r+1
, 11+(1+δ)r
)
,
Investor:
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1]
Eg:
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) (
1 + σPubI2 δ
) [
E[M | M > Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
Eb:
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
E[M | M > Mˆ ]
If p < 1
r2+2r+1
: each player gets a payoff of 0.
Private regime
Case I: If
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r)
If p ≥ p˜SR =
(
1−F (Mˆ)
)
(
1−F (Mˆ)
)
+r
,
Payoffs for each player identical to those under the Public regime for
p ≥ 11+r .
If p ∈
[
1
r2+2r+1
, p˜SR
)
,
Investor:
F (Mˆadj)
[
p
(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
r − (1− p)]+(
1− F (Mˆadj)
) [
p
(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
r + (1− p) (r − σPrI2 δ)]
= p
(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
r − (1− p) + rp+ rp (r − σPrI2 δ)
=
(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1
Eg: [E[M ]− (1 + r)]
(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
Eb: F (Mˆadj)E
[
M | M ≤ Mˆadj
]
+
(
1− F (Mˆadj)
) [(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
E
[
M | M > Mˆadj
]
− (1 + r)
]
If p1 < 1r2+2r+1 : each player gets a payoff of 0.
Case II: If
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r)
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If p ≥ p˜IC ,
Payoffs as in Case I for p ≥ p˜SR.
If p < p˜IC ,
Investor, Eg, Eb : each player gets a payoff of 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us go though the proof in three parts, depend-
ing on the value of
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
. Lemmas 1-3 below and their proofs estab-
lish necessary conditions for the dominance of the Private regime. Since
the lemmas span all possible distributions F and hold for all r, δ ∈ (0, 1],
they also establish the sufﬁcient conditions for the dominance of the Pri-
vate regime.
Lemma 1. Take any r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and any F such that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r).
Then the Investor is strictly better off under the Private regime for all
p ∈ (pˆ, 11+r ).
Proof of Lemma 1.
Depending on the value of F (Mˆ), either p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r or the reverse
holds. We shall see that the result of the Lemma holds for both cases.
Suppose ﬁrst that p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r . We must check separately cases (i)
p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ), (ii) p ∈ [p˜SR, 11+(1+δ)r ), and (iii) p ∈ [pˆ, p˜SR). In case (i),
Private regime dominates iff
p(1 + δ)r + (1− p)(r − δ) ≥ (r2 + 2r + 1) p− 1,
which holds if and only if
p ≤ 1 + (r − δ)
r2 + (2− δ)r + (1− δ) . (4.8)
Since the expression in the RHS is always weakly higher than 11+r , the
condition (4.8) holds for all priors p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ). In case (ii), the Pri-
vate regime yields a negative expected payoff if M ≤ Mˆ since for priors
lower than 11+(1+δ)r , p(1 + δ)r − (1 − p) < 0. In the Public regime, this ex-
pected loss is avoided because the equilibrium consists of no investments
in case M ≤ Mˆ. Hence, the dominance of the Private regime requires that
the expected payoff in case M > Mˆ is sufﬁciently higher than under the
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Public regime. Thus, what is requires is that the ex-ante superiority of
the Private regime in case M > Mˆ is larger than the ex-ante inferiority of
the Private regime in case M ≤ Mˆ. In case M ≤ Mˆ, the expected payoff
under the Public regime is higher than under the Private regime by an
amount
(1− p)− r(1 + δ)p ≡ Δ1 > 0. (4.9)
In case M > Mˆ, the expected payoff under the Private regime is higher
than under the Public regime by an amount
1 + r − δ − (r2 + (2− δ)r + (1− δ)) p ≡ Δ2 > 0. (4.10)
Equation (4.10) is positive by case (i) earlier. The difference of eq. (4.10),
multiplied by the probability
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
, and eq. (4.9), multiplied by the
probability F (Mˆ), is positive, and the Private regime dominates if and
only if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Δ1
Δ1 +Δ2
≡ X(p, r, δ). (4.11)
It can further be shown, using some algebra, that X(p, r, δ) < Z(r) for all
p ≥ pˆ, which means that condition (4.11) is satisﬁed by the assumption
that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r). In case (iii), Private regime dominates iff
(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1 ≥
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1] ,
which clearly holds for all F, r, and δ.
Suppose then that p˜SR > 11+(1+δ)r . We must check separately cases (i)
p ∈ [p˜SR 11+r ), (ii) p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , p˜SR), and (iii) p ∈ [pˆ, 11+(1+δ)r ). Cases (i)
and (iii) are identical to cases (i) and (iii) earlier in the proof. In case (ii),
Private regime dominates iff
(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1 ≥ p(1 + δ)r − (1− p),
which can easily be shown to hold for all r, δ ∈ [0, 1]. The result of the
lemma follows directly after combining the results from all cases studied.

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Lemma 2. Take any r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and any F such that
X(r, δ, p) ≤
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r).
Then the Investor is strictly better off under the Private regime for all
p ∈ (p˜IC , 11+r ).
Proof of Lemma 2.
If
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), it can be shown that p˜IC < 11+(1+δ)r . Hence, to show
that the Private regime dominates for all p ≥ p˜IC , we must consider sepa-
rately two cases, (i) p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ), and (ii) p ∈ [p˜IC , 11+(1+δ)r ). Since for
all p ≥ p˜IC , the payoff of the Investor is identical to what she obtains for
p ≥ p˜SR which was covered in the proof of Lemma 1, the analysis in case
(i) is identical to that in case (i) in the proof of Lemma 1. The analysis in
case (ii) is also identical to that in case (ii) in the earlier proof, but now
that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), referring to the proof of Lemma 1, the Private
regime dominates only if X(p, r, δ) ≤
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r). 
Lemma 3. Take any r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and any F such that 0 <
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
<
X(r, δ, p). Then the Investor is strictly better off under the Private regime
for all p ∈ ( 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ).
Proof of Lemma 3.
The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 2, with the difference that, by
the assumption that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< X(r, δ, p), the Private regime does not
dominate the Public regime in case (ii) of the proof of Lemma 2. 
Proof of Theorem 2. This proof refers to some extent to the proof of The-
orem 1, and some of the overlapping notation is omitted here. Depending
on the exact value of F (Mˆ), either either p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r or the reverse
holds. Suppose ﬁrst that p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r . We must check separately cases
(i) p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ), and (ii) p ∈ [p˜SR, 11+(1+δ)r ), and (iii) p ∈ [pˆ, p˜SR). In
case (i), the reputation effect, given as the difference in the ex-ante ex-
pected payoffs under the Private and the Public regime in case M > Mˆ, is
given as
R1 ≡ p (1 + δ) r + (1− p) (r − δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Private reg.
− (r2 + 2r + 1) p− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸,
Public reg.
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Referring to the proof of Theorem 1, the reputation effect is positive in
the range of priors that we are interested in. The screening effect, given
as the difference in the ex-ante expected payoffs under the Public and
the Private regime in case M ≤ Mˆ, is equal to zero. Hence, the ex-ante
reputation effect strictly dominates the ex-ante screening effect for all
r, δ ∈ (0, 1] and for all relevant F.
In case (ii), the reputation effect is the same as in case (i). For later use,
rewrite it as
R2 ≡ 1 + r − δ −
(
r2 + (2− δ)r + (1− δ)) p ≡ Δ2
The screening effect is given by
S2 ≡ 0− [p (1 + δ)r)− (1− p)] ,
where 0 is the Investor’s payoff under the Public regime, and the latter
term her expected payoff under the Private regime which is negative for
priors less than 11+(1+δ)r .Hence, the screening effect is positive and rewrit-
ten as S2 = (1− p) − p (1 + δ)r) ≡ Δ1. Since the ex-ante dominance of the
Private regime is determined by whether, ex-ante, the value of the repu-
tation effect outweighs the value of the screening effect, the condition for
the Private regime to dominate is given by
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
R2 − F (Mˆ)S2 ≥ 0.
This condition was shown under the proof of Lemma 2 to hold whenever(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ X(p, r, δ). Since for the priors that we are considering,
Z(r) > X(p, r, δ), the result holds.
In case (iii), the expected payoff of the Investor conditional on M > Mˆ
can be expressed as a weighted average of the expected payoffs in cases
Mˆ < M ≤ Mˆadj and M > Mˆadj :
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
⎧⎨
⎩
F (Mˆadj)− F (Mˆ)(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
[
p
(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
r − (1− p)
]
+
(
1− F (Mˆadj)
)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
[
p
(
1 + σPrI2 δ
)
r + (1− p)
(
r − σPrI2 δ
)]
⎫⎬
⎭
where, notice that
F (Mˆadj)− F (Mˆ)(
1− F (Mˆ)
) = 1−
(
1− F (Mˆadj)
)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) .
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To save on notation, deﬁne
σPrb1 ≡
(
1− F (Mˆadj)
)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) = rp
(1− p)
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) .
The ex-ante expected payoff can be rewritten as
(
1− F (Mˆ)
){
p
(
1 + δσPrI2
)
r + (1− p) [σPrb1 (r − δσPrI2 )− (1− σPrb1 )]} ,
(4.12)
where σPrI2 =
1+r
δMˆadj
.
Before proceeding with reformulating expression (4.12), it is instructive
to point out the relation of it to the ex-ante expected payoff under the
Public regime, given as
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
{p(1 + δσI2)r + (1− p) [σb1 (r − δσI2)− (1− σb1)]} , (4.13)
where σb1 = rp1−p , and σI2 =
1+r
δE(M |M>Mˆ) . Since, by deﬁnition, σ
Pr
b1 > σb1, the
Private regime yields a higher expected payoff in case the Entrepreneur is
bad. If in addition Mˆadj < E
(
M | M > Mˆ
)
, σPrI2 > σI2, and the reputation
effect is certainly positive. If the last inequality does not hold, then the
Public regime yields a higher expected payoff in case the Entrepreneur
is good. For the Private regime to dominate, it must be that the payoff
against a bad type is sufﬁciently high to compensate for the lower payoff
against a good type.
By substituting in both (4.12) and (4.13) for σb1, σPrb1 , σI2, and σ
Pr
I2 , and
rearranging, one obtains that the ex-ante reputation effect is positive iff
pr(1 + r)F (Mˆ)
(
1− 1
Mˆadj
)
≥ 0, (4.14)
which holds for all r ≥ 0 since Mˆadj > Mˆ = 1+rδ > 1.
The ex-ante screening effect is given as
F (Mˆ)
{
0− [p(1 + δσPrI2 )r − (1− p)]} ,
where 0 is the payoff under the Public regime, and the second term the
expected payoff in the Private regime. Notice that it is negative. After
substituting for σPrI2 , one can check that the reputation effect outweighs
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the screening effect iff
F (Mˆ)
[(
r2 + 2r + 1
)
p− 1] ≥ 0,
which holds for all p ≥ pˆ, and is exactly the condition for the Private
regime to dominate ex-ante, as seen in the proof of Theorem 1.
Suppose then that p˜SR > 11+(1+δ)r . We need to check cases (i) p ∈
[p˜SR,
1
1+r ), (ii) p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , p˜SR), and (iii) p ∈ [pˆ, 11+(1+δ)r ). Cases (i) and
(iii) are identical in analysis to their counterparts earlier in the proof. In
case (ii), the reputation effect is identical to case (iii) earlier in the proof,
given in expression (4.14). The screening effect is given by
F (Mˆ)
{
p(1 + δ)r − (1− p)− [p (1 + δσPrI2 ) r − (1− p)]}
= prδF (Mˆ)
(
1− σPrI2
)
. ‖ σPrI2 =
1 + r
δMˆadj
The ex-ante reputation effect outweighs the ex-ante screening effect iff
prF (Mˆ) (1 + r − δ) ≥ 0,
which holds for all r, δ ∈ (0, 1]. The result of the theorem follows directly
after combining all the cases covered. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider ﬁrst the case that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r),
and p˜ = p˜IC . Then, one can compare the Entrepreneur’s expected payoffs
separately for cases (i) p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ), and (ii) p ∈ [p˜IC , 11+(1+δ)r ) to see
that the payoff under the Private regime is strictly higher in both cases
for all relevant values of r and δ. In particular, since the payoff under the
Private regime is the same in both cases, but that of the Public regime is
lower in case (ii)21 where the unique equilibrium in case M ≤ Mˆ consists
of no investments, it is enough to show that the payoff under the Private
regime is higher in case (i). For the good type, this requires that
(1 + δ) (E[M ]− (1 + r)) ≥
F (Mˆ) (1 + δ)
[
E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
+(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
(1 + σI2δ)
[
E[M | M > Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
which is easily checked to hold, since the Public regime equilibrium in-
volves mixing by the Investor in period 2, and σI2δ < δ. For the bad type,
21Note, this requires that E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ] ≥ (1 + r)
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Private regime is optimal if
F (Mˆ)E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ] +
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [
(1 + δ)E[M | M > Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
≥ E(M),
where the LHS can be rewritten as E(M)+
(
1− F (Mˆ)
) [
δE[M | M > Mˆ ]− (1 + r)
]
,
where the last term is positive since E[M | M > Mˆ ] ≥ Mˆ ≡ 1+rδ . Thus,
the condition holds for all F (Mˆ) ∈ (0, 1) and r, δ ∈ (0, 1].
Consider then the case that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r), and p˜ = p˜SR. Depend-
ing on the value of F (Mˆ), either p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r or the reverse holds.
Suppose ﬁrst that p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r . We must check separately cases (i)
p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ), and (ii) p ∈ [p˜SR, 11+(1+δ)r ). Since the Entrepreneur’s
expected payoff is identical for all p ≥ p˜, whether p˜ is p˜SR or p˜IC , the anal-
ysis of these two cases is identical to that in cases (i) and (ii) earlier in the
proof. Suppose then that p˜SR > 11+(1+δ)r . The only case to check is that of
p ∈ [p˜SR, 11+r ), which is identical in analysis to that in case (i) earlier in
the proof. The result of the theorem follows directly after combining all
the cases covered. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider ﬁrst the case that
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), and
p˜ = p˜IC . Then, the only case to consider is that of (i) p ∈ [ 11+(1+δ)r , 11+r ).
This is identical to the analysis under the proof of Lemma 4. The fact
that E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ] < 1 + r does not change the results there since the
expressions including the term E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ] cancel out from the pay-
off comparison of the good type, and the relationship of E[M | M ≤ Mˆ ]
and 1 + r does not concern the bad type who never repays the invest-
ment in case M ≤ Mˆ. Consider then that F (Mˆ) ≤ Z(r), and p˜ = p˜SR.
Depending on the value of F (Mˆ), either p˜SR < 11+(1+δ)r or the reverse
holds. In the former case, the analysis is identical to the discussion ear-
lier in the proof. In case p˜SR > 11+(1+δ)r , we need only to check the case
(i) p ∈ [p˜SR, 11+r ), which was shown to hold under the proof of Lemma 4.
Finally, to check that the function max
{
p˜SR,
1
1+(1+δ)r
}
selects the correct
input, notice that if
(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
< Z(r), p˜SR < p˜IC <
1
1+(1+δ)r , and in case(
1− F (Mˆ)
)
≥ Z(r), the maximum of the two thresholds is determined by
the exact value of F (Mˆ). 
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Reputation and screening effects for Figure 4.2.
Reputation effect: For p ∈ [25 , 12) : 1−2p. For p ∈ [14 , 25) : 2pF (Mˆ)
(
1− 1
Mˆadj
)
.
Screening effect: For p ∈ [25 , 12) : 0. For p ∈ [13 , 25) : pF (Mˆ)
(
1− 2
Mˆadj
)
. For
p ∈ [14 , 13) : F (Mˆ)
[
(1− p)− p(1 + σPrI2 (M)
]
.
Expected payoffs in Example 1.
By applying the numerical values to the ex-ante expected payoffs detailed
earlier in the appendix, one obtains the following payoffs. The proposition
is obtained by straightforward comparison of these.
Public p ≥ 12 p ∈ [13 , 12) p ∈ [14 , 13) p < 14
Investor 73p− 13 113 p− 1 83p− 23 0
Eg 1 79
10
9 0
Eb
19
6
5
2 2 0
Private p ≥ 25 p ∈ [14 , 25) p < 14
Investor 73p− 13 4p− 1 0
Eg 1 6−9p8−14p 0
Eb
19
6
5
2 +
3p2
(1−p)(4−7p) 0
Expected payoffs in Example 2.
Notice that the bad Entrepreneur repays the ﬁrst investment only if M >
Mˆ = 2. Thus, F (Mˆ) = 12 . By applying the numerical values to the ex-ante
expected payoffs detailed earlier in the appendix, one obtains the follow-
ing payoffs. The proposition is obtained by straightforward comparison of
these.
Public p ≥ 12 p ∈ [13 , 12) p ∈ [14 , 13) p < 14
Investor 2p− 12(1− p) 72p− 1 2p− 12 0
Eg 2
3
2
3
2 0
Eb 4 3 2 0
Private p ≥ 13 p < 13
Investor 2p− 12(1− p) 0
Eg 2 0
Eb 4 0
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